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The thesis analyses how NGOs define the meaning of civil society in Namibia 
through their everyday work. Based on 12 months fieldwork at the national umbrella 
for NGOs the thesis shows that this definition was mainly shaped by NGOs’ 
administration of the everyday rather than the outcome of ideological debates about 
how to “do good”. The thesis examines how dominant NGO practices reflect the basic 
tension between NGOs’ activists claims and the bureaucratic reality of their work and 
in doing so speaks to debates about NGO agency, accountability and their relevance 
for development.  
           
The thesis shows how organisations use formal criteria in reporting, 
networking, advocacy, fundraising and branding to continuously redefine what 
activism ought to be about and how “proper” civic organisations ought to behave. 
NGOs write reports to enhance their accountability and transparency, but the correct 
reporting form also delineates what counts as proper civic activism. They present 
networking as civil society’s main coordinating mechanism, but meetings always call 
for more coordination and hence additional meetings. Advocacy does not only 
concern the relations between civic organisations and the government, but NGOs also 
use these relations to justify surveillance and control within civil society. Competitive 
fundraising does not blindly follow donors’ demands, rather, through it NGOs create a 
canon of fundable and thus legitimate projects.  
 
           Finally, the branding of civic activism is not simply concerned with the 
promotion of civil society organisations, but is seen as an attempt to create a unified 
corporate image with a sharp distinction between proper and improper civic activism. 
Struggles over meaning are therefore shifted into contestations around technicalities. 
The administration of the everyday in civil society thus becomes the prime means to 
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Glossary of Organizations and Acronyms 
 
ACBF The African Capacity Building Foundation 
 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
 
BWS Breaking the Wall of Silence Committee 
 
CACOC Community-based AIDS Coordinating Council 
 
CATS Citizens for an Accountable and Transparent Society 
 
CBO Community-based organisation 
 
CSMQ Civil Society Management Qualification 
 
CSO Civil society organisation 
 
FBO Faith-based organisation 
 
GCAP Global Call to Action Against Poverty 
 
IDASA Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
 
LAC Legal Assistance Centre 
 
LaRRI Labour Research and Resource Institute 
 
MoHSS Ministry of Health and Social Services 
 
NACSO National Association of Community based natural resource 
management organisations 
 
NANASO Namibian Network of AIDS support organisations 
 
NANGOF Namibian NGO Forum 
 
NDT Namibia Development Trust 
 
NEPRU Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit 
 
NQA Namibia Qualifications Authority 
 
NSHR National Society for Human Rights 
 
NPC National Planning Commission 
 
OSISA Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa 
 




PE Programme Estimate 
 
PH Project Hope 
 
PLWHA People Living with HIV and AIDS 
 
RACOC Regional AIDS Coordinating Council 
 
SWAPO South West African People’s Organisation 
 
SWG Sector Working Group 
 
TRP The Rainbow Project 
 
VHB Village Health Bank 
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Chapter 1 Doing Civil Society 
This thesis is about how we understand civil society in Namibia. Based on 12 
months fieldwork at the national umbrella for NGOs the thesis analyses how non-
governmental organizations define the meaning of civil society through their everyday 
work. Namibia has a small but vibrant NGO sector which makes it possible to 
investigate networks between organizations in a state that has been comparatively 
tolerant towards non-governmental organisations. Namibian case study can therefore 
examine the significance of civil society for development if the sector is not curtailed 
by a restrictive state. Civil society has been central in discourses on development in 
Africa, but has been unduly overworked. It is expected to encourage people’s political 
engagement by teaching them the necessarily civic virtues in an arena for free 
association, to promote free market economies and to empower grassroots to hold the 
powerful to account.1 The literature on civil society in Africa has often portrayed it as 
a particular sphere and the dominant language in civil society debates has been 
revealingly spatial, talking about civil society organisations as being close to 
grassroots, sandwiched between the state and family (Mamdani 1996) or too close for 
comfort to donors (Hulme/Ewards 1997). Civil society organisations were said to 
function as mediators between grassroots communities and the political elite.  Ideas of 
hierarchy, scale and the communities’ proximity to nature were therefore all blurred 
into this vertical image of civil society’s position (Ferguson 1998). Chris Allen has 
pointed out that the multiplicity of its meaning has turned civil society into an 
analytically vacuous concept. Jonathan Spencer (1997) has made a related argument 
in political anthropology and pointed out that if everything is political we have no 
term left to describe the area in life that people themselves label “politics”. Why then 
should we keep the term civil society and is there any analytically meaningful way to 
define the concept? 
 
                                          
 
1 Rob Jenkins (2001) offers a careful dissection of the assumptions that civil society can promote three 
contradictory trends by supporting the transition to competitive politics, by consolidating democracy 
and by enhancing free market policies. As he rightly points out, if civil society was to contribute to one 
of these it is precluded to bring about the other two. The free market economies civil society is thought 
to promote would remove many decisions from the state and political community and thus undermine 
the consolidation of democracy. See also Ferguson 2006:96. 
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Civil Society in development – Why bother? 
As donors started to channel ever more aid to NGOs, the literature began to 
debate whether the concept “civil society” was relevant in understanding Africa at all. 
Donors “discovered” civil society in Africa at the beginning of the 1990s when civil 
society organisations were seen as driving force behind the global “third wave of 
democracy” (Huntington 1991).2 They were regarded as the local voices demanding 
competitive elections (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997) and “sound” liberal economic 
policies. Academics and development practitioners saw them as the most important 
vehicle for realising neo-liberal democracy and development on the continent (Hyden 
1997:4), as donors’ good governance agenda in international aid suggested that a 
reduced role of the state would mean that civil society groups could hold officials to 
account (Lewis 2002: 571). In this view civil society became indispensable for the 
successful transition to competitive elections in African states and donors very often 
believed that it could be created from scratch by funding the “right” organisations 
(Jenkins 2001; Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001). Based on the Gramscian view of civil 
society as sphere of hegemonic ideas, civil society was portrayed as a sphere of 
political solidarity at grassroots level (Bratton 1994; Ndegwa 1994; Monga 1996), 
voluntary and rich in the social capital that provided a platform for dissenting voices 
(Haynes 1997; Howell/Pearce 2001). It was the sphere of free associational life 
(Bratton 1994) opposed to the state (Bayart 1993; Chabal 1993; Harbeson et al 1994) 
that had been portrayed as overblown (Burnell 2001), weak (Migdal 1988), predatory 
(Fatton 1992; 1995) and incapable of “capturing” its rural population (Hyden 1980). 
Supporters of liberal policies have long entertained ideas about civil society as an 
independent sphere where individuals were taught the “right” values that would lead 
to better governance and liberal market economies (Williams/Young 1994; Williams 
1996).3 As James Ferguson (2006:91) pointed out, civil society, just like 
‘development’ or ‘education’, had become an all-encompassing concept that no 
reasonable person could oppose because it was too broad to have a contestable 
meaning. 
 
                                          
 
2 Jean and John Comarroff (1999) point out that this re-remembering of civil society meant that civil 
society could be stripped off its ideological baggage and be represented as new. 
3 See Sudipta Kaviraj (2001) for a critique of the idea that civil society could be promoted from the 
outside and an argument against imposing a thin layer of civil society on top of diverse social realities.  
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Critical accounts thus questioned whether civil society was relevant for 
development in Africa. They argued that civil society derived its meaning from 
historical processes that were highly particular to Western early capitalist societies. 
They argued that the “structural transformation of the public sphere” (Habermas 
1991) that created civil society as distinct discursive realm between the state, the 
family and the economy in Western societies did not take place in Africa because of 
the nature of the colonial state and its political economy. They pointed out that there 
is no empirical evidence to support the argument that NGOs indeed oppose 
authoritarian regimes and deepen democracy (Allen 1995). Although African societies 
have a rich associational life, these associations do not necessarily promote civic 
engagement and are not automatically voluntary. Their membership is often 
determined by kinship, religion or traditional leadership, modes of belonging not 
recognised by the traditional concept of civil society as free and voluntary (Karlström 
1999). In the critics’ view the concept of civil society hinders rather than helps 
understanding African development, because it denotes a particular form of 
association which is only rarely found African societies.  
 
Another trend in the literature has argued that any analysis of civil society in 
Africa should try to understand “real existing civil societies” (Mamdani 1996:19) 
instead of determine whether the traditional (Western) meaning of the concept is 
relevant in Africa or not. The colonial administrations had used civil society as 
boundary marker to distinguish between citizens and subjects, and civil society 
continues to inform popular discourse in and on Africa (Lewis 2002) in international 
development which still promotes it. They concluded that civil society is relevant in 
Africa because the idea has concrete consequences for African organisations. The real 
question is therefore which form real existing civil societies take and what 
consequences civil society support has for development in Africa. This literature thus 
makes a strong argument for more empirical work on civil society organisations 
instead of continuing the theoretical debate about the relevance of an abstract concept. 
This thesis is intended to be a contribution to the ethnographic exploration of civil 
society by looking at relations between NGOs and their umbrella organisation in 
Namibia.4 It demonstrates how a less certain interest in the dynamics of ‘doing civil 
                                          
 
4 See justification of focus on NGOs below. 
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society’ avoids common (tacit) assumptions about its inherent value and its exact 
relations to states, markets and donors. 
 
In this thesis I decided to follow my informants who referred to “civil society” 
as the joint initiatives and meetings between NGOs that were engaged in very 
different forms of social activism, ranging from traditional human rights campaigning 
to HIV counselling and to environmental research.5 Civil society happened at the 
intersection of organisations’ activities when directors discussed issues they regarded 
to be relevant for all of them like governmental policies or the funding decline. These 
meetings were not concerned with the “core” activism of single organisations or 
particular projects. Civil society assumed thus a very different meaning from labels 
referring to individual organisations like NGO or community-based organisation 
(CBO). Civil society was a set of practices6 and an empirical category, something that 
could be participated in and observed. Its meaning was acted out in meetings, minutes 
writing, and informal conversations over tea, in conferences and workshops. 
 
NGOs, more than any other organisations, have been idealised as the 
manifestation of civil society (Lewis 2003). The two concepts were seen as so closely 
connected that authors tended to use them interchangeably.7 These accounts often 
relied on a number of tacit assumptions about NGOs, most importantly that NGOs 
resemble private enterprises and that they were conducive to the operation of the free 
market. They also seemed to assume that by definition NGOs were closely connected 
to communities and therefore represented an authentic voice of grassroots.  
 
                                          
 
5 The thesis’ discussion of civil society focuses on NGOs and leaves out churches and Trade Unions. 
This is so because apart from specialised NGOs (like Labour Research Institute) NGOs hardly 
cooperated with trade unions in their everyday activism. Trade unions are comparatively weak and still 
closely associated with the government as they were set up by SWAPO in exile. Additionally I decided 
to include faith-based organisations as active members of NANGOF whose practices did not differ 
considerably from their secular peers, but to leave out the churches, because they hardly took part in 
any of the activities described here 
6 See Alisdair MacIntyre’s (1992) definition of ‘practice’ below. 
7 It is far from clear why and when authors talk about NGOs and when about civil society. The most 
articulated relation between the two that I found is that NGOs, together with social movements, church 
organisations and trade unions constitute civil society. The haziest boundary appears to be between 
NGOs and social movements because the literature hardly agrees on the degree of institutionalisation 
that distinguishes NGOs from social movements; in broad terms social movements are thought to be 
less institutionalised than NGOs and formed around particular issues (Mitlin 1998).  
 
 14
Do NGOs embody the principles of the free market? 
 
Sara Rich Dorman (2003) has stated most accounts on NGOs are written as 
consultancy style evaluation of entire NGO sectors and the organisations’ efficiency 
in fulfilling their funding targets. The study of NGOs suffers from an overemphasis 
on individual case studies at the expense of proper theorization (Lewis/Opokah-
Mensah 2006). The increase of evaluations was partly a reaction to long held 
assumptions that NGOs worked like idealised versions of private companies and had a 
natural affinity with free market principles. NGOs were thought to be diverse, small, 
flexible and efficient promoters of “development”. 8 
 
NGOs were thought to be particularly successful in the local context, because 
they were believed to attract diverse local experts. It was suggested that NGO staff 
knew the place of their organisation’s projects so well that NGOs could have a much 
better feel for communities’ needs than any state bureaucracy ever achieved 
(Edwards/Hulme 1992, 1996). NGOs were said to turn their local expertise into good 
projects by means of a lean administration and could thus focus their resources on 
goal achievement without getting entangled in a web of administration.9 This assumed 
lean administration was the main reason why NGOs could achieve “private sector 
levels of cost control and efficiency” (Hulme/Edwards 1997: 6). The absence of large 
bureaucracies was mainly responsible for NGOs’ capacity to adapt to changing 
circumstances. As Richard Sennett (1998:46) has argued this capacity to adapt to 
changing environments, a tolerance of fragmentation and the ability to pursue many 
possibilities simultaneously, all contribute to a particular kind of flexibility highly 
valued in capitalist economies and also praised in NGOs. Many different 
organisations were thought to contribute much more efficiently to the overall goal 
than one larger entity could do. Decentralised activism was said to be more efficient 
than centralised planning of large state bureaucracies. This assumption mirrors a 
common idea about the advantages of deregulated markets (Friedman 1962; Kay 
2003) which are said to satisfy needs as they arise exactly through their lack of central 
regulation and planning. NGOs were portrayed as becoming increasingly 
                                          
 
8 For a critique on these “NGO articles of faith” see Terje Tvedt (1998:128) and Sheelagh Stewart 
(1997). 
9 The literature assumes rather than proves NGOs’ goal orientation and sees donor pressures towards 
professionalisation as the most important threat to it, because it endangers NGOs’ capacity to identify 
their objectives independently by working directly with communities (Mitlin 1998).  
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institutionalised from ad hoc service provision to established structures and systems 
of capacity building in a teleological evolution of organisational learning and 
increasing efficiency (Ebrahim 2003; Fowler 1991). 
 
Whereas this literature has evaluated in how far NGOs fit this ideal type of 
efficient and flexible organisation, recent accounts paid more attention to how exactly 
NGOs create efficiency. These accounts conceded that NGOs constituted a distinct 
type of organisation and that rules of management applied differently to NGOs than to 
private sector companies or public institutions. This literature has stressed the 
important role normative power, symbolic rewards and consensus-building play in 
NGO management (Lewis 2003; Kocka 2005: 37). More radical critics pointed out 
that the managerial arguments about the supposed natural efficiency of NGOs do not 
capture organisations work at all. They argued that empirical data did not sustain the 
assumption that NGOs follow a linear learning curve towards greater efficiency and 
that any regressions are merely lapses in an otherwise straightforward progress 
towards a given goal. As Wiebe Nauta (2006) argues, in NGO work there is as much 
unlearned as there is learned and NGO development never evolves straight towards a 
given goal.10 NGO work thus includes at least as much repetition as innovation. 
 
 
Does civil society empower grassroots communities and advance the 
accountability of the powerful?  
Debates about civil society’s social empowerment role are often based on 
(tacit) assumptions about their close connections to recipient communities. (Clark 
1995; Fowler 1988). These accounts argue that the increase of international funding 
had led NGOs away from their original ties with grassroots communities. NGOs’ 
greatest challenge was to ensure that the organisation would not loose this connection 
by becoming too involved in donor-led contracting work, which narrowed their room 
for manoeuvre and let them shift resources away from trying to obtain long-term 
objectives (Lewis 2003).  Authors have cautioned that NGOs had become too close 
for comfort to donors and thus compromised on their own independence 
                                          
 
10 This observation has also been confirmed by data from Namibian NGOs. A comparison of meeting 
protocols over the years in Namibian NGOs also shows that NGOs frequently discussed the same 
topics over and over again and repeated particular initiatives over the course of several years. 
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(Edwards/Hulme 1997; Mitlin 1998). Jim Igoe (2003) provides a case study of this 
changing focus of NGO work. He shows how the rapid influx of donor money into 
pastoralist NGOs led to a widening gap between the organisations and the people they 
claimed to benefit, and thus illustrates how NGOs always reflect the context in which 
they work. The ever growing detachment of pastoralist NGOs from communities led 
to discontent with the increasingly distant organisations that did no longer understand 
the dominant concerns in communities and whose new focus on impact litigation held 
few benefits for their original constituencies.  
 
However, other case studies of African NGOs seem to suggest that NGOs 
never had any close connections to grassroots to begin with and had always defined 
accountability and responsiveness exclusively in regard to donors. Wiebe Nauta 
(2003: 262/3) has shown how an urban land rights NGO in South Africa represented 
rural communities as passive receivers of its projects which were often planned with 
only minimal involvement of recipients. The few times consultations with recipient 
communities took place the NGO had only met the rural elite who could speak 
English  and understood the process of land claims which meant that they could be 
easily integrated into the NGO’s centrally planned workshops. Erica Bornstein (2006) 
has shown how NGOs systematically misrepresent their projects to keep the correct 
reporting form, at the expense of honest feedback, to improve project implementation. 
These empirical accounts therefore demonstrate that organisations do not necessarily 
define their accountability as responsiveness towards recipients, but often regard it to 
be answerability to donors. 
Similarly, Namibian NGOs defined accountability as correct reporting to, and 
regular audits for, donors. In contrast they represented their relation to recipients 
above all as welfare intervention whereby the NGO gave out charity to undemanding 
beneficiaries. The literature on recipients in international development tried to move 
away from representing communities as passive “beneficiaries”. The dominant trend 
now represents recipients as “partners” (Maxwell/Ridell 1998) and advocates to place 
recipients’ human rights at the centre of development. This new “human rights based 
approach” in international development has claimed to embody the transition from the 
logic of philanthropy to a model that recognises the agency of recipients. Proponents 
argue that this new approach empowers recipients to claim development as part of 
their human rights instead of being dependent on the generosity of donors who might 
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grant or withhold charity at their own will (Filmer-Wilson 2005; Gready/Ensor 2005; 
Win 2007). Critics fear, however, that a human rights based approach is culturally 
imperialistic, lacks the potential for practical application and provides only a vague 
empowerment (Katsui 2008). Also, a human rights based approach still regards the 
overall goals of development as given, and concedes agency to recipients only as long 
as their demands are identical with these predefined goals (Höhn 2006). 
 
Debates around civil society’s multiple roles in development bring up 
questions which will constitute the analytical focus of the thesis. First, they point to 
debates about the definition of NGO agency and in how far their work is determined 
by external demands, i.e. by the government’s agenda, by donor requests or by 
recipients’ requirements. The second question concerns the relation between external 
expectations and internal dynamics in NGOs, and the impact normative assumptions 
about civil society‘s contribution to development had on the organisations’ internal 
practices. Lastly it can be asked what consequences these insights have for our 





A focus on a “real existing civil society” and closer attention to what NGOs 
actually do and how they do it suggests looking at NGOs’ dominant practices. A 
practice is here understood to mean much more than a particular action and includes 
the underlying rules and interactions that make it a human activity.11 Alasdair 
MacIntyre (1992: 187) has defined practice as 
 
Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through 
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human conceptions of 
the ends and good involved are systematically extended. 
 
Discrete acts are not a practice, but the entire dynamic system is. MacIntyre 
says that kicking a ball with skill is not a practice, the game of football is; planting 
                                          
 
11 See Hannah Arendt 1958 and chapter 7. 
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turnips is not a practice, farming is. In this sense writing a report is not practice, 
documenting is (see chapter 3); completing a funding application is not a practice, 
fundraising is (chapter 6). Practices are thus complex and interactional, rule-based, set 
to develop over time and provide actors with incentives to do well (MacIntyre 
1992:188). This view on practices therefore differs from the arguments that see NGO 
practices as means to achieve external goals, be it “development”, the extension of the 
state (Ferguson 1990: Jennings 2008) or the remodelling of societies (Jennings 2001). 
 
Practices are good to think with. David Mosse and David Lewis have argued 
that the “ethnographic complexity of practice” (2006:15) can help to understand how 
development workers draw diverse things and actors together in order to create 
coherence. In a similar way Namibian NGOs juggled their relations to donors, peers, 
government agencies and recipients in their daily work. This suggests investigating 
how NGO staff manage the sector’s embeddedness in multiple networks and how they 
reconcile tensions between normative ideas and their everyday work. It brings into 
focus NGO agency and the ways in which they actively construct their social, political 
and economic roles rather than simply implementing predefined models 
(Lewis/Mosse 2006:11).  
 
Practices develop their internal dynamics and lead to new outcomes because 
they result from people’s improvisation and their ability to play the game of social 
interaction (Calhoun et al 1993:4). Although practices are rules-based, people 
constantly redefine these rules in an infinite variety of social situations (Taylor 1993: 
58). In Namibian civil society, workshops, committee meetings and consultations 
often evolved in unforeseen ways, and led to surprising outcomes. NANGOF 
convened a series of meetings for civil society organisations, which were all planned 
in the same way. However, these meetings turned out to be very different in their 
content, structure and outcome as the interactions of the participants “eroded” 
NANGOF’s carefully planned blueprint. In the end, the purpose, outcome and follow-
ups of each session was different from the rest and they were hardly recognisable as a 
series of identically planned meetings.  At a national conference a very eloquent NGO 
director expanded his contribution to the general debate so that it turned out to be a 
twenty minute presentation about his strong views on the topic. This presentation 
consequently informed much of the remaining discussion for the day and shaped the 
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conference’s final resolution. Although it is impossible to know for sure how things 
would have gone if the director had not taken to the floor, it is very likely that people 
would have expressed more diverse opinions. The experience of the conference shows 
that interactive practices assume their own dynamics and often shape outcomes in 
ways that could not be anticipated beforehand. Very often, particular activities gave 
rise to the same sort of actions, committees led to more committees, conferences 
generated conferences and workshops required follow up workshops. During my time 
at NANGOF there was not one meeting without a follow up. Even meetings that were 
planned as singular events entailed at least a steering committee or working group 
session.12 
 
Practices are thus tools to trace how ‘doing civil society’ defines the sector, its 
boundaries and its unarticulated connotations. As Paul Lichterman (1998: 403) 
argued, participant observation is the best method to examine meanings that activists 
take for granted in their everyday work. I ‘did’ civil society from October 2007 until 
July 2008, working part-time for NANGOF, the Namibian NGO Forum. NANGOF is 
the organisation in Namibia that has most explicitly assumed a coordinating function 
for a wide variety of non-governmental organisations. David Mosse (2005:15) argued 
that organizations are best understood from within, and that it is impossible to sustain 
long term participant observation without any practical contribution. In this sense my 
involvement with NANGOF included active contribution to the umbrella’s work and 
at the same time it was my most important source of information about the sector 
because “how things happen is why they happen” (Tilly 2006:410).13 
 
The purpose of the focus on practices is not to evaluate how “true” stories told 
by and about NGOs are, but to ask more relevant questions about the meaning and 
work of civil society. The chapters that follow do not ask whether civil society works, 
i.e. how good it is (Edwards/Hulme 1992) or how well it achieves its goals 
(Alexander 1998; Bebbington et al 2007). Instead they seek to illustrate how it works 
by investigating what NGO employees were doing and how this relates to the 
                                          
 
12 This argument is made in more detail in chapter 4. 
13 A number of authors have pointed out how new the ethnographic approach to politics is 
(Baiochi/Connor 2008; Auyero 2006; Tilly 2006) and have contrasted participant observation’s interest 
in practices and micrsoscopic perspective with mainstream methods in political research like causal 
model building and statistics. Area studies, however, have a long tradition of ethnographic research and 
it thus seems unnecessary to repeat their arguments about the benefits of ethnography. 
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normative claims that have been made about the organisations.14. Whereas the 
literature has often painted a picture of NGOs as the linchpin of innovative 
development or emergency assistance, civil society organisations in Namibia were 
predominantly occupied with day-to-day administration. They hardly discussed 
substantial questions and even the occasional strategic planning meetings were 
designed to improve project implementation rather than to discuss overall objectives. 
When I asked where the organisations’ goals came from and why they were 
worthwhile to pursue there was often an uneasy silence, because respondents were not 
sure whether I was just (foreign and) extremely ignorant or really so foolish not to 
know.15 In informal conversations staff said they knew about Namibia’s development 
needs, because they lived in the country and they knew about the purpose of their 
organisation because they had been working for it for a long time. NGO staff were 
certain that their “doing civil society” was sufficient to understand the development 
imperatives in Namibia. Claims to knowledge about civil society’s mandate were 
always based on experiences rather than on consultations with recipients who hardly 
figured as reliable source of information.  
 
 
The history of civil society organisations in Namibia16 
 
Civic organisations were confronted with considerable difficulties during 
apartheid. The few organizations that were founded in the 1980s were neither 
accepted by the colonial regime nor fully endorsed by the liberation movement. The 
state had strict laws in place to curb freedom of movement and association and 
ensured that it was the only provider of education and social services as means to 
                                          
 
14 Kimberley Coles (2007:10) makes a similar argument when she states that the interesting question 
about democracy is not whether it works but how it works. 
15 The surprised reactions my enquiries about the goals show how difficult it was for people working 
in civil society to ask fundamental questions. At least at the start of my research I was regarded as 
outsider who would normally ask funny questions, but for somebody working in an NGO those 
questions would show real ignorance and challenge the person’s ability to work in the sector. 
16 Strictly speaking there is no legal entity called “NGO” in Namibia. The law distinguishes between 
section 21 companies (i.e. companies not for gain), Trusts, Welfare organisations and voluntary 
organisations. Only the last type of organisation is membership based and none of the organisations 
with regular contacts to NANGOF was a voluntary organisation. I decided to keep the generic term 
NGO because the difference in legal status did not result in different organisations. Most Section 21 
Companies and Welfare organisations had a Board of Trustees which was often part of the 
organisations’ funding obligations. Also, most people I spoke to referred to their organisation as NGO. 
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regulate native affairs and maintain minority rule. For the liberation movement 
SWAPO the political struggle was priority and it regarded civic associations geared 
towards bringing “development” with suspicion (Bauer 1998: 79; Geisler 2004: 
145/6). Additionally, SWAPO claimed to be the sole representative of the Namibian 
people and thought of any social association outside its rank and file as potential 
competition. The top leadership continuously stifled initiatives of younger members 
and did not encourage civic activism within Namibia. During apartheid, South West 
Africa’s economy was based on extractive mining and contract labour. The state, 
fearing any form of organized resistance coming from large mining compounds 
descended heavily on the nascent trade unions inside Namibia (Bauer 1998; Katjavivi 
1988a 1988b). Workers had to resort to other passive forms of resistance like “go 
slow” (Ndadi 1988), because they were cut off from the SWAPO-affiliated trade 
union in exile and the liberation movement hardly supported organized workers’ 
resistance within Namibia.17  
 
Education was the oldest battlegrounds in the apartheid state, and organized 
resistance to the racialised education system preceded any other political association 
in South West Africa. The first South West African student body was founded in exile 
in 1952 and later became the “South West Africa National Union”.  SWANU was the 
first political resistance movement in Namibia, long before SWAPO’s predecessor, 
the Ovambo Peoples organization (OPO) was founded in 1959. Civic activism on 
education had always attempted to represent all Namibian students irrespective of 
standards of and access to education due to skin colour, location and school type. 
Attempts to represent all students resulted in non-affiliation with SWAPO and 
financial difficulties which were only resolved with SWAPO’s official 
acknowledgement of the Namibian National Students’ Organisation (NANSO) in 
1988 (Maseko 1995).18  
 
                                          
 
17 When the unionist Ben Ulenga reported a workers strike at Rossing mine to SWAPO he was told 
that it was not up to the workers in Namibia to decide when to strike and they should have waited until 
SWAPO instructed them to do so (Bauer 1998) 
18 After independence the relations between student organizations and SWAPO remained difficult. 
Bauer reports that when the Namibian National Student Organisation (NANSO) voted in 1991 to 
disassociate itself from SWAPO, the party’s leadership called the initiators of the move ‘foreign 
agents’. After a split, a reconstituted ‘NANSO-affiliated’ voted to break away from SWAPO again in 
1997, after the organization’s president had been expelled from the party. SWAPO managed to retain 




Women were particularly affected by apartheid policies, the general 
conscription in the south, and contract labour in the north meant that they lost sons 
and husbands and were often left to provide for large households on their own. 
However, SWAPO’s Women’s Council did not address these issues echoing the 
liberation movement’s credo that the political struggle had to be won before relief 
assistance could be provided. In response a group of the Women’s Council members 
formed an independent organization, the Namibian Women’s Voice (NWV) to help 
women in providing for their families. Before long however, the NWV’s leadership 
was asked by SWAPO to dissolve, as their organization was seen as distracting 
women from the real struggle, i.e. SWAPO’s liberation war (Bauer 1998: 80; 
Leys/Saul 1995). 
 
Lastly, the independent churches had a long history of association with 
SWAPO and people from SWAPO’s rank and file often held high offices on church 
boards (Katjavivi 1988a:31). The Council of Churches (CCN) was formed in 1978 as 
umbrella for all independent churches and has been actively involved in the struggle 
alongside SWAPO (Haikali 1988). It first echoed SWAPO’s refusal to take on 
development issues. When SWAPO allowed development work in the 1980s the 
SWAPO-controlled CCN became the only approved channel for external aid. As 
Christo Lombardt (2001) argues the close association between the CCN and SWAPO 
long after independence compromised the churches’ independent position after 1990, 
and was especially problematic when they refused to support the families of those 
who were detained and killed by SWAPO during the liberation struggle. During the 
1980s the apartheid state relaxed some of its most controversial regulations as a result 
of international pressure, and as a consequence of the ongoing war with SWAPO in 
the north (Leys/Saul 1995). Grassroots activism expanded considerably in this decade. 
Colin Leys and John Saul list 29 NGOs in Namibia for 1986 and 54 for 1989 
(Leys/Saul 1995).  
 
Namibia’s independence in 1990 coincided with a funding boom for NGOs in 
international aid. The opening of the political space together with available funds led 
to the formation of many new NGOs which sought primarily to play more active roles 
in community development. Many focused on service delivery to specific target 
groups, such as the disabled, women, youth, communal farmers, small-scale 
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entrepreneurs, and later, people with HIV/AIDS. However, at the start of the new 
millennium international funding for NGOs declined and Namibian NGOs felt the cut. 
As chapter 6 demonstrates declining funds led NGOs concentrate on what proved to 
be successful with donors and contributed to an increasingly sharp contrast between 
strong and weak NGOs. 
 
Different criteria have been used to distinguish between strong and weak 
organisations. The arguably obvious measure of organisational strength was monetary 
resources, based on assumptions that budget size and staff numbers translated neatly 
into different NGO capacities. Indeed, a recent survey of civil society organisations in 
Namibia showed that there were considerable differences between organisations 
regarding their funding and staff numbers. The survey distinguishes between NGOs 
and Community-based organisations (CBOs) depending on the degree of their 
institutionalisation.19  While 27 NGOs employ nearly 1,300 staff and have access to 
over 4,000 volunteers, CBOs only employ around 7% of the full time staff and 31% 
of the part time staff within civil society. Budget figures were much more difficult to 
obtain, because organisations were particularly secretive about their income. 
Differences in employment structure could also be read as indicating differentiated 
spending power with NGOs being in a much better position to pay full time staff 
salaries than CBOs (NANGOF August 2009). This survey also shows that 73% of 
civil society support comes from bilateral donors with strict funding requirements. 
This means that only civil society organisations with an already strong fundraising 
capacity could attract more funding. Budget size was not the most important criterion 
for NGOs themselves to distinguish between strong and weak organisations. Instead, 
they used administrative processes as measuring sticks. A strong organisation had an 
established monitoring and evaluation mechanism, regular audits, an extensive 
reporting system and strictly adhered to its code of conduct (NANGOF June 
2009:19). This definition did not include the involvement of recipients as criterion for 
organisational strength 20 and focused on accountability, evaluation and transparency 
in NGOs’ relations to donors, peers and the Namibian government.  
                                          
 
19 NGOs had a written constitution, a governance structure which distinguishes between the Board and 
its secretariat; NGOs had regular audits and a bank account, all of which set them apart from a CBO. 
20 The survey states that international funding increasingly seeks to define projects before grants are 




However, this thesis shows that the most important criterion dividing strong 
and weak organisations was not procedure, but the position of an organisation. Strong 
organisations differed from weak ones above all in their strategic integration in civil 
society wide networks, their proximity to ministries and their established cooperation 
with international donors. An organisation’s overall position in Namibia’s 
development circle, and NGO staff’s personal networks to donor representatives and 
government officials were more difficult to quantify but were highly important for an 
organisation’s influence.21 Often organisations with strong strategic positions were 
those which had employed well known people with extensive personal networks for a 
long time, enjoyed a high reputation amongst policy makers and donors,22 were urban 
and well represented in the media.23 The strategic position could explain why the 
LAC’s women’s project with few staff could be far more influential than many larger 
women’s organisations. Good networks also provided a few organisations with a 
disproportionately loud voice in sector wide decisions. These decisions were often 
taken by the organisations that were closely involved with NANGOF. The umbrella 
maintains active contact with 30 organisations (European Commission 2002: 4). 
Considering that its database lists over a thousand civil society organisations the 
number is considerably low.  When the Namibian government took steps to regulate 
civil society through a “partnership policy” most well positioned organisations 
strongly opposed the policy. However a later survey found that 45% of civil society 
organisations outside the capital preferred a government regulation to a self regulatory 
code. The most visible and best connected organisations were therefore not 
necessarily representative of the majority of civil society groups. This suggests that 
any analysis of civil society needs to take the differences between organisations into 
account. A more explicit focus on the relations between member organisations of a 
national umbrella body will investigate the differences between organisations more 
analytically, and make a more explicit case to disaggregate the NGO sector. It will 
thus address the gap between normative claims and empirical work about NGOs in 
                                                                                                                         
 
notice, a process that ‘can sit uncomfortably with “maximum citizen participation” as one NANGOF 
report stated (NANGOF June 2009: 18). 
21 A PhD colleague told me that the situation was similar with Indian NGOs where, judging from her 
work experience, some organisations were funded mostly because they had extensive personal 
networks rather than good projects. Shishrui Pradhan, personal communication 15 April 2010. 
22 See chapters 2 and 6 
23 See chapter 7. 
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the literature. As David Lewis and Paul Opuka-Mensah argued, the NGO literature 
has not kept pace with the increasing complexity and internal diversity of the NGO 
landscape (2006:670). One of its greatest challenges is therefore to combine the 
empirical detail of case studies with theoretical insights about NGOs without 
repeating the normative statements about the intrinsic value of NGOs.  
 
 
Recently there have been more direct efforts to solicit input from those 
organisations beyond the small circle of strong NGOs. A “civil society baseline” 
survey and a biannual civil society salary survey were designed to keep track of the 
changing employment structure in the sector with a particular focus on the 
comparison between rural and urban organisations. Both surveys were commissioned 
by the organisation that was initially set up to address exactly the lack of 
communication in and information about civil society. Already in 1990, discussions 
had started to identify the possibility of more institutionalised NGO cooperation, and 
a series of consultations took place. NGOs decided to institutionalise networking in a 
forum with its own constitution and steering committee and created the “Namibian 
NGO Forum” (NANGOF) in April 1991. At that time there were different ideas about 
what NANGOF should be doing in the sector. A commissioned study came up with a 
large number of recommendations. A year later the General Assembly meeting agreed 
that NANGOF should focus on practical issues around which to develop cooperation. 
The following years showed that NANGOF needed its own infrastructure because 
member organisations could not cope with the additional workload for NANGOF, and 
NANGOF’s executives were already overcommitted and hardly took on civil society 
wide tasks. Things continued in this ad hoc fashion until the end of 1994. In January 
1995 NANGOF was established in its own offices, with agreement to set about 
recruiting a small team of staff guaranteed by its member base.24 
 
However, increasing pressure in the context of deline in funding for the non-
governmental sector led NANGOF to apply for its own projects towards the end of 
the 1990s. This caused serious critique from member organisations that feared that the 
umbrella competed with them for grants. Discontent grew when NANGOF 
concentrated so much on its own projects that it neglected its coordinating role in civil 
                                          
 
24 NANGOF 1998 
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society, and members lost trust in the umbrella and left. NANGOF’s final breakdown 
came in 2005 when the Namibian Ministry of Finance claimed that the umbrella had 
not paid (salary) taxes for a decade and billed the organisation for several million 
Namibian dollars at a time when NANGOF’s funding was running dry. The only 
solution was to close down NANGOF completely, request the ministry to write off the 
debt and set up a new legal entity, called the NANGOF Trust the following year. As 
the renewed institutionalisation of NGO coordination, NANGOF was the obvious 
place to observe how civil society was enacted.25 
 
Fieldwork: Doing civil society in Namibia 
Between August 2007 and July 2008 I spent twelve months as volunteer at 
NANGOF. My work there was split between helping with administrative tasks around 
the office and researching local funding opportunities for civil society on behalf of the 
umbrella. As my time at NANGOF drew towards a close and more and more 
administrative tasked were taken over by the newly employed full-time staff, I 
increasingly resumed my role as research student and interviewed directors of other 
NGOs, donor representatives and government officials as researcher detached from 
NANGOF.  
 
My time at NANGOF26 thus coincided exactly with the new start and the 
formation of the new NANGOF office. I participated in its re-launch and gained 
practical experiences of an NGO’s life cycle in a nutshell. When I first joined 
NANGOF there were only one part time secretary and a (voluntary) acting director 
trying to manage the very basic day-to-day tasks of the umbrella. By the time I left, 
NANGOF employed five full time members of staff through a generous grant from 
the EC, it had secured new funding from the Ford Foundation, and had already 
organised about a dozen events for its members. Civic organisations had started to 
join NANGOF again and were prepared to invest time, work and commitment in the 
                                          
 
25 Besides NANGOF there are a number of issue-specific umbrellas like the Namibian Network of 
AIDS Service Organisations (NANASO), an umbrella for organisations working on HIV/AIDS, 
NACSO, the Namibian Association for Community based natural resource management organisations 
and the Namibia Nature Foundation, both coordinating environmental organisations.  All these specific 
umbrellas were members of NANGOF. 
26 Unless explicitly stated I will use NANGOF as shorthand for The NANGOF Trust. 
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umbrella. The number of membership applications also increased considerably over 
the second quarter of 2008, my last few months there. 
 
My work at NANGOF mirrored the changes in the umbrella’s institutional 
capacity. At the start the small NANGOF volunteer team27  could only administer the 
daily office functions, especially after NANGOF ran out of money in October 2007 
and the secretary had to leave the office. We published regular e-newsletter, answered 
enquiries from members and ministries and kept NANGOF’s records updated.  After 
the new Executive Director took office in January 2008 I assisted in expanding 
NANGOF’s set up and scope. I sat on interview panels to select the new employees 
and participated in the selection of the consultants to write a training manual and the 
next business plan for NANGOF. Towards the end of my time all members of staff 
had taken office and my duties changed yet again. Now I assisted the permanent staff 
in organising and conducting workshops, coordination meetings and national 
conferences. My work profile mirrored the evolution of NANGOF during this year 
from the administration of everyday office work at the beginning, towards the 
building of organisational capacity and finally to the division of labour within a fully 
functional organisation. 
 
Besides my administrative work for NANGOF I pursued a couple of smaller 
“projects” for the umbrella. Over the year I conducted about thirty interviews with 
local donor representatives about their civil society funding programmes in Namibia. I 
spoke mostly to representatives at German foundations and small grants 
administrators at embassies and international organisations about their funding 
priorities and feedback requirements. The aim of the interviews was to set up a 
“funding database” for civil society organisations in Namibia that NANGOF wanted 
to provide as special service to its members. The interviews gave me the opportunity 
to find out more about particular donor perspectives on civil society in the country. 
The preparation of the survey and the data processing let me appreciate the difficulties 
umbrellas faced in deciding how to store and distribute data to make it most 
accessible and useful for a wide variation of civil society organisations. 28  
                                          
 
27 Besides the acting director and me there were two more volunteers from Voluntary Services 
Overseas. 
28 Difficult decisions concerned whether to store the data electronically or publishing a booklet. 




I also wrote a small number of occasional papers for NANGOF on different 
topics like funding for civil society, or civil society’s role in poverty reduction in 
Namibia. In writing those papers I had to adopt a particular “civil society perspective” 
and needed to employ strategies used in writing for civil society. I had to break down 
complex relations to simple categories and causal links, and had to back up all my 
claims with quantitative data. I learnt what civil society’s need to produce 
“accountable” reports meant for the thinking and writing process and started 
appreciating the difficulties that come with presenting intangible concepts like 
“awareness raising” and “poverty reduction” as measurable processes.29 
 
 
My work for NANGOF provided me with first hand experience of the 
particular challenges faced by an umbrella organisation. It taught me above all how 
difficult it is to coordinate a great variety of social activism and how challenging it 
can be to meet the needs of diverse organisations. Demands from strong and well 
funded organisations were typically very different from those of smaller, more remote 
and less resourceful ones. Smaller organisations wanted the umbrella to help them in 
finding funding and improving their relations with donors. Stronger organisations in 
contrast asked the umbrella to solicit opinions and coordinate responses to civil 
society wide issues like governmental policies. The umbrella very often favoured the 
stronger organisations’ demands for coordination at the expense of smaller 
organisations’ requests. The consultations very often represented the challenge to 
marry a quick response to pressing issues with the need for wide consultations. 
Members often expected the umbrella to do both simultaneously and they frequently 
criticised NANGOF for neglecting one aspect or the other. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
 
booklets were a slow form of distribution, making the information almost useless as donors had 
changed their funding regimes by the time the booklets reached their destinations. Difficulties also 
arose from donor preferences for particular topics and how strictly donors adhered to their own 
choices. Some donors would only fund very specific activities others were more lenient as long as the 
project seemed to be durable, but the categorisation of topics did not allow for these variations. See 
also chapter 6.   
29 See the description of NGO reporting in chapter 3. 
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Through my work for NANGOF I learned how new organisations were 
established and I gained insights into the specific tasks of an umbrella, but I also got 
to know the work and everyday challenges most civil society organisations face. 
Work at NANGOF included long and detailed procedures of compiling funding 
applications and the juggling of opposing demands for services and benefits.30 
Personal relations at NANGOF were not always smooth and tensions arose every so 
often between the full-time staff at the secretariat and the NANGOF’s Board of 
Trustees, the elected and voluntary governance structure of the organisation. 
Mirroring the experience of many other civil society organisations, NANGOF’s 
relations with the Namibian government varied considerably, oscillating between 
close collaboration and open opposition as chapter 5 will show in greater detail. Very 
often I experienced these relations from a NANGOF staff perspective, but at times I 
stepped outside the institutional attachment and talked to Trustees and government 
officials about these relations as a research student. 
 
The combination of insider and outsider information runs through most of the 
data in the thesis. I had access to “insider” data by working for NANGOF, gathering 
information in various staff meetings, NANGOF workshops and conferences and 
through the many informal conversations during tea breaks and around the office. 
Since civil society work consists of discrete acts, data on what people do on a daily 
basis and the meaning they give to their actions constitute the foundations for the 
analysis. I complemented this insider information with outsider information - data I 
gathered as research student detached from NANGOF. I interviewed donor 
representatives, government officials and people working in other NGOs towards the 
end of my stay. I left these long semi-structured and unstructured interviews until the 
end, in order to ask more informed questions about different aspects of civil society 
activism and was able to benefit from a stock of common experiences, acquaintances 
and knowledge. The interviews revealed the emphasis individuals placed on particular 
aspects of their work and helped me to appreciate the interactions between the 
institutional imperatives in civil society, and the agents who are involved in them and 
remodel them through their behaviour. The data presented here is a combination of 
                                          
 
30 One example concerned the funding database NANGOF had commissioned. It was long debated 
what data should be made public and which information was for the benefit of members only. Many 
member organisations felt that this information should only be provided to members, but some 
regarded the information as public and urged NANGOF not to hold it back. 
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these sources. The analysis draws on the advantages of both methods, the condensed 
talk about meanings with individuals in interviews, and the informality of everyday 
interactions that were less “censored”. 
 
The double role as insider and outsider31 had definite advantages for the data 
but it also had its drawbacks. At times I found it particularly difficult to separate the 
two positions. Especially towards the end it was hard to think of myself as outsider 
because discussions and interviews were based on shared experiences and knowledge 
of civil society. Lynne Hume and Jane Mulcock (2004) made the point that it is 
exactly this chosen imbalance between inside and outside that is productive for 
ethnographic research, but this did not ease the tension between sympathy and critical 
distance I felt simultaneously. 
 
Rather than dismiss these tensions I decided to stress the multiple and 
sometimes conflicting interpretations of the data in different chapters, and see them as 
enriching my understanding of civil society. David Moss (2005:13) has explained that 
his position between inside and outside development projects enabled him to offer 
critical insights to his colleagues, but at times also gave him the reputation of being 
the disruptive and unintelligible academic. My experience at NANGOF was quite 
similar, especially as I worked in a situation where a large number of foreign, white, 
mostly young and female professionals would spend some time at an NGO to gain 
some work experience in a relatively secure African state. This context had a strong 
influence on how NGO staff saw me, especially when we met for the first time. With 
more and more shared experiences and acquaintances this view slightly changed and 
it became possible to talk at length about common concerns. Over time the boundary 
between my activist colleagues and me therefore faded, but it never really vanished 
completely.  
 
Working for an NGO also meant that I myself experienced the fundamental 
contradictions between NGOs’ aspirations and their organisational reality. Being 
more often than not occupied for days with minute writing and report editing I often 
                                          
 
31 In my experience the two locations were not a neat binary but the two ends of a continuum. 
Depending on context and issue I was more or less of an insider or outsider, but very rarely completely 
integrated or totally excluded from civil society. 
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thought about NANGOF’s promise to be the linchpin of civic activism and as such to 
offer services to all Namibian NGOs - a promise that was arguably impossible to keep 
for remote organisations because Namibia has one of the lowest population densities 
in Africa. The tension between promises and reality was also visible in other areas. I 
participated in the polite but nevertheless serious fights for turf between NANGOF 
and other umbrellas in the context of limited funds for coordinating organisations. I 
was keen to emphasise to donors that NANGOF and its members were fundamentally 
different from private corporations whose main concern was the selfish accumulation 
of money, but I also spent entire days with grant applications and in discussions about 
how to “sell” NANGOF better to donors. I maintained contact to research based 
NGOs who stressed that they were not the “placard weaving” type of organisation, but 
who would often participate in all of NANGOF’s meetings about how best to oppose 
government’s attempts to regulate civil society. At NANGOF we were keen to set 
ourselves apart from donors and government agencies, but often discussed the 
possibility of NANGOF administering a Trust Fund for smaller organisations and to 
use the umbrella’s code of conduct as alternative scheme to the government’s NGO 
bill. We planned to model it on the experience of several environmental NGOs who 
had set up trust funds to distribute smaller grants to community based organisations 
throughout the country. The NGOs act as grant makers but also continue to implement 
their own projects, therefore blurring the distinction between donor and NGO. 
Chapter 5 will show how many NGOs have played important roles in policy 
formulation and implementation and thus have challenged the governmental-NGO 
boundary. All these examples show that in practice civil society organisations have 
blurred the theoretically neat distinctions between NGO, donor and government found 
in the literature, and also entertained by people working in the sector. 
 
My involvement with the umbrella organisation therefore provided me with a 
good starting point to investigate the fundamental tensions in NGOs’ work that are 
not necessarily articulated in dominant discourses about the sector. However, the 
focus on NANGOF and the interactions between organisations also had its limitations. 
 
Firstly, this thesis focuses on strong NGOs and leaves out the perspectives of 
weaker and more remote organisations. This bias is partly the result of the thesis’ 
interest in the intersection between organisations. Remote organisations tended to be 
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relatively isolated from the networks that I investigated. This in itself represents an 
interesting insight into the practicalities of NANGOF’s outreach, and puts the 
umbrella’s claim to represent all Namibian civic organisations into perspective. I 
would have been unable to reach any substantial number of remote organisations to 
explore their relations to the national umbrella in any meaningful way.  I am well 
aware that this repeats exactly the argument that NANGOF made for not being able to 
maintain closer contact with its rural members. I therefore experienced the structural 
obstacles to “outreach” work myself. I tried to address this gap by relying on 
NANGOF’s documentation about its members over the years. NANGOF’s latest civil 
society baseline survey suggests that rural organisations do not invest much in their 
relation to other NGOs and they do not seem to be occupied with defining the exact 
role of civil society in national development.  
 
The second major group I left out were Namibian government officials. My 
research interest in the workings of civil society meant that I focused on the civil 
society side of the relation and explored governmental institutions only in their 
significance for civil society. Additionally government only recently started a new 
attempt to formalise its relations to civil society through a special office. Although I 
interviewed this “help desk officer” I got the impression that I would have needed to 
work with multiple departments in several ministries to draw together a more 
adequate picture of the government’s perspective on civil society. This shows that just 
as there is no prototype NGO there is no homogenous entity called ‘the government’ – 
instead multiple ministries maintain different relations to individual NGOs and have 
various restrictions of access for external researchers. 
 
Finally, my methodological choice also implies limitations. As I have already 
pointed out, most of the data gathered came from participant observation and I only 
conducted a few interviews during my time at NANGOF, mostly with donor 
representatives, the government’s help desk officer and a few NGO executives. I had 
started fieldwork with an interview based approach but soon found out that this was 
extremely frustrating and non productive. NGO personnel, especially in executive 
functions, were often too busy to sit down with me for a two hour interview about 
their work. Even if they agreed to be interviewed, the context of talking to an external 
researcher about civic activism often only produced clichéd tales about the 
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importance of NGOs rather than generating interesting insights about the sector. This 
was very understandable as the general funding decline had made NGO leaders 
extremely wary about the information they provided in interviews with outsiders 
about their work. I therefore soon felt the need to demonstrate my loyalty to, and my 
insider knowledge of, NGOs before I could expect people to open up. Although I 
conducted some lengthy interviews towards the end of my stay, most data derived 
from participation rather than from interviews. This means that the findings are my 
own interpretation and were not necessarily explicitly stated by NGO personnel. I 
tried to compensate for this by providing a detailed description of the context that led 





The following chapters explore dominant practices and relations in civil 
society and by doing so discuss wider analytical questions about NGOs’ aspirations, 
accountability and agency. 
 
Chapter 2 sets the context of ‘doing civil society’ by investigating how people 
become activists. It explores how NGO staff distinguishes themselves from 
employees in other sectors and focuses on the stories they tell about activists. It 
argues that it is these stories that turn people into activists. People therefore do not 
become activists after they have received particular training and they are also not 
turned into activists by specific personal experiences - but activists are talked into 
being in various conversations between colleagues. Close personal networks between 
people working in the sector and a long history of shared experiences ensured an 
unusual level of cohesiveness and sense of belonging within civil society which made 
stories about colleagues highly influential. The chapter already indicates that 
recipients only played a marginal role in the NGOs’ definition of civil society’s work; 
and recipients’ peripheral position in civil society’s self definition is a recurring 
analytical topic that the following chapters illustrate in more depth. 
 
The following two chapters explore specific NGO practices. Chapter 3 looks at 
documenting civic activism and shows that gathering, storing and administering large 
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amounts of information had become an end in itself. Through their documents civil 
society organisations created the terms of their own engagement. They constructed an 
image of their intervention that was the direct result of their reporting requirements 
and had very little to do with recipients’ needs. The chapter illustrates how 
administrative imperatives, rather than ideological decisions about the projects’ 
purpose, defined the particular form of NGO engagement and demonstrates that 
recipients were merely supernumeraries in civil society reporting. Additionally, the 
chapter points to the centrality of the correct form in NGOs’ definition of sound 
projects. The chapter therefore picks up two overall analytical topics of the thesis, the 
marginalization of recipients’ demands and the sector’s prioritisation of protocol over 
substantial questions. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates how civil society coordination works. NGOs often 
claimed that the main mechanisms to ensure proper coordination in civil society were 
sector wide meetings. However, civil society meetings seem to produce only more 
meetings instead of resulting in increased coordination, which would reduce the need 
for more meetings. The chapter asks why this was the case. It shows that the sequence 
of meetings was a self perpetuating system with little external impact. The prime 
function of this system was to generate reasons for further meetings. Besides the 
primacy of protocol which has already been visible in civil society’s reporting, the 
chapter also shows a basic tension between NGOs’ aspirations to improve 
coordination and the reality of their work. The promise of improved coordination 
could not be fulfilled because civil society practices only reflect upon themselves. The 
chapter explores civil society practices as self - referential system, and the self-
referentiality of practices constitutes a third analytical topic in the thesis. 
 
The last three chapters look at civil society’s relation to external actors: to the 
government in chapter 5, to donors in chapter 6 and to the private sector in chapter 7. 
The de facto close cooperation between NGOs and government agencies stood in 
stark contrast to the sector’s claim about its critical distance to the state, and to be thus 
the prime guarantor of governmental accountability as chapter 5 shows. The idea that 
the two sectors were completely separate meant that they occasionally remained apart 
when close cooperation would have been the obvious choice. Relations therefore 
involved different degrees of contestation and collaboration depending on context, the 
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NGO’s self image and specific opportunities. This suggests that it is misleading to 
think civil society only fulfilled one particular role vis-à-vis the state. NGOs do not 
only check government’s performance, or extend state power, or mediate between 
grassroots and the central state, but they are agents in their own right who actively 
moderate their functions according to context and are reluctant to commit themselves 
to any exclusionary role. The chapter develops the analytical topics of the basic 
tension between NGOs’ aspirations and work reality shown in chapter 4 and the 
marginalization of recipients’ demands for civil society projects shown in chapters 3 
and 4. Additionally, it demonstrates how important it is to analytically disaggregate 
the sectors “civil society” and “government”, in order to examine the multiple and 
often contradictory relations between organisations; a topic that the following two 
chapters develop further. 
 
Chapter 6 examines civil society’s fundraising and argues that funding had a 
decisive influence on civil society’s work, but mostly through its technicalities. Grant 
selection criteria, the administration of budgets and the structural consequences of 
declining resources all had a much more profound effect on NGOs than any particular 
worldview donors propagated. The chapter disaggregates the NGO sector by 
illustrating how NGOs’ distinct administrative powers resulted in their very different 
capacities to secure grants. It also shows that donors were not one homogenous sector 
and varied considerably in their funding regimes and their influence on NGO projects.  
 
The last chapter compares civil society to the private sector. It shows that 
NGOs resembled private companies in many aspects, but faced a bifurcated 
“customer” structure which separated their customers into “buyers” (i.e. donors) and 
receivers of services (“beneficiaries”). The chapter shows that NGOs were much more 
closely connected to donors and peers, and thus constructed only their demands as 
dynamic and worth of close monitoring. In contrast they imagined recipients’ requests 
as unchanging and unattainable which allowed them to present recipients as 
organisational assets to advance their status with donors and amongst peers. The 
chapter shows that NGOs made a conscious decision to prioritise their relations to 
donors and peers. Although their actions are shaped by the structural constraints, 
organisations are agents in their own right rather than mediators between recipient 
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demands and donor requirements; NGO agency is the last chain of analysis that spans 
the thesis.  
 
All chapters show that practices in NGOs were always the result of their 
integration in different networks. Even “internal” issues like staff profiles or project 
documentation were in fact shaped by the interaction between organisations, because 
staff frequently met and exchanged experiences and ideas about how to ‘do civil 
society’. The boundary between internal and external NGO work is therefore blurred, 
and sector wide ideas about ‘proper’ civic activism were highly influential in the way 
NGOs were run. The conclusion draws out some of the overall themes in the chapters 
and asks what can be learnt from the Namibian case study for the understanding of 
civil society in Africa more generally. It shows that some aspects might be highly 
specific to a strong state like Namibia, such as the NGOs’ increased competition for 
funding from state agencies or their views on government as partner rather than as 
threat; other insights might be applicable to civil society organisations elsewhere, for 
example the important role of administrative concerns, the argument to see NGOs as 
autonomous agents instead of just as mediators, and the basic tension between civil 




Chapter 2 “I used to be an activist but now I’m doing 
something else”  
 
This quote came from the government’s civil society helpdesk officer, a 
person employed to strengthen links between the state and the NGO sector. He had 
been working for a development NGO in the 1990s and his helpdesk work still kept 
him in close contact with civil society. However, he did not consider himself to be an 
activist anymore. This suggests that being an activist in Namibia was not a choice of 
life, but that people turned into and ceased to be activists over the course of their 
careers. Being an activist was a role people could slip into and out of depending on 
their work. The chapter explores exactly how people turn into activists in Namibia. It 
starts by looking at conventional ways to explain how activists are “created” and 
reviews the existing literature that mostly focused on activists’ biographies. These 
accounts presented biographies as stories that created a sense of coherence and 
explained a person’s career choices and self image as activist. This chapter contrasts 
this approach with an understanding of activism as inherently social action and 
examines the specific context that produces activists.  
 
This chapter shows that people in civil society saw commitment, expertise and 
perseverance as essential characteristics of any true activist. These characteristics 
could only be learnt to a limited extent through formal training, but it was these 
qualities that distinguished true activists from mere NGO employees. This meant that 
people in civil society only appreciated formal training, if the training suited their 
predominant image about real activists. NGO staff constantly (re)defined this image 
in repeated stories they told about their colleagues. Stories with their wide variety and 
different levels of detail are therefore the most important method to understand what 
people working in Namibian civil society defined as true activists. 
 
Storytelling fulfilled several functions in Namibian civil society. It provided a 
platform for people to hone the exact meaning of “activist”. Stories also provided 
people with the opportunity to remodel past experiences and gain a greater sense of 
control over disempowering incidents when they retold stories of uncivil behaviour 
and unfair treatments that often contradicted their ideal version of civic activism. 
Finally the considerable amount of gossip and anecdotes amongst colleagues created a 
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shared moral interpretation of behaviour and helped to enforce particular ideas what 
civic activism ought to be about.  
The chapter’s conclusion asks what this concept of “activist” means for the 
understanding of civil society as set of technical practices. It points out that activists 
do not make civil society, but civil society makes activists through multiple anecdotes 
rather than through formal training. The chapter thus demonstrates that attention to 
everyday practices in civil society results in a better understanding of the sector than 
attention to any grand claim about what it means to do good.  
 
  
(Life-)Stories of activists: from roots to routes  
 
The literature on new social movements has tried to determine what turns 
individuals into social activists and did so mostly through looking at individual 
biographies. The focus on life histories assumed that there must be an decisive factor 
common to most activists that explained the difference between a vague sympathy 
with the cause and people’s active participation in a movement. For example James 
Jaspers (1997: 101) tried to understand people’s willingness to protest through 
individual biographies. This search for the root cause of social activism seems to 
assume that activism is a deviant condition that needs to be explained because normal 
people would not have made this choice (Jaspers 1998; Searle-Chatterjee 1999; 
Geiger 1987).32 Brian Roberts (2002) has argued that biographical research has the 
moral advantage of shifting the focus of analysis from the researcher’s interpretation 
to informants’ experiences. However, the method is still based on the researcher’s 
idea that biography is important in the first place. As Thomas Yarrow (2009: 336) 
pointed out it is a mistake to assume that people everywhere regard biographies as 
revealing as many in the West would think. In her “The Real World of NGOs” 
Dorothea Hilhorst (2003) also tries to understand NGO leaders through individual 
biographies. She retells the story of Amanda, an NGO executive in the Philippines, as 
a linear tale of increasing involvement in civil activism. Hilhorst explains Amanda’s 
                                          
 
32 James Jaspers made the connection between deviancy and protestors himself, although with a more 
positive connotation. Citing Karl Deutsch he states that social activists’ unorthodoxy was extremely 




civic activism with reference to her Christian values, her childhood experiences of 
discrimination and her higher education (ibid:174-181). However, Hilhorst only 
quotes Amanda directly when she speaks about her actual work and there is no 
indication whether she would agree with Hilhorst’s explanation. Similarly the idea 
that the reasons for people’s civic engagement can be found in their individual 
biography was never expressed by people in Namibian NGOs. Apart from their 
unproven relevance for Namibian NGO staff, biographies also tend to overemphasise 
individual decisions and to portray activists’ lives in isolation. However, as Michael 
Jackson (2002) showed, individual life-stories are never detached from a person’s 
social relations and Hannah Arendt argued that stories result from the combination of 
action and speech and are thus fundamentally social (1958: 184). 
 
One way of bringing social relations back into the analysis of activists is 
through changing the focus from roots, the importance of individual biographies, to 
routes - a closer attention to the paths individuals travel and cross throughout their 
life/career stories. Nicolas Guilhot’s study of global democracy promotion (2005) and 
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth’s account of the internationalisation of human rights 
law (2002) both  show that civic activism is always the outcome of interactions rather 
than the result of individual biographies. Guilhot argues that US institutions in various 
sectors work very much alike and promote very similar values. The institutional 
division into several sectors does therefore not mean that the organisations pursue 
different agendas. To prove his point he describes how people continue to pursue the 
same ideas and work on the same policy agenda, although they frequently hop sectors 
and seemingly change their careers. Guilhot compares these frequent sector changes 
with a revolving door between government institutions, NGOs and philanthropic 
foundations through which individuals constantly pass and thus create close links 
between the organisations. These individuals are often multiple agents who do not 
exclusively represent an NGO, an international financial institution or the 
government, but might stand for all depending on context (Guilhot 2005: 12). These 
frequent changes and multiple roles of individuals create the long term links between 
sectors that are so decisive for policy planning in all sectors, but that cannot be 
captured by a structural analysis alone (Gordenker/Weiss 1997:446). Dezalay and 
Garth developed a similar method, what they called “relational biography” (2003: 11). 
They studied how similar biographies of human rights activists in the US and South 
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American countries created “structural homologies” (ibid:14). Those similarities 
made it possible to export the US human rights regime and have influenced the way in 
which human rights law has been exported and received. Dezalay and Garth use 
biographies to understand the context of agency and the range of possible actions 
available to actors, instead of assuming that values were the same for everyone. Both 
have thus combined biographies and the analysis of systematic links, in order to 
appreciate the context in which individuals create values. 
 
This chapter shares the basic argument that the meaning of activism is created 
in the interaction between people rather than the outcome of isolated careers. 
However, in contrast to Dezalay and Garth’s case study, interactions in Namibian 
civil society took place between a particularly mixed group of NGO staff. Unlike the 
activists in Dezalay/Garth and Guilhot, the NGO directors in Namibia had very 
different backgrounds and did not change sectors as frequently as Guilhot describes. 
NGO executives had trained as lawyers, social workers, bank clerks or business 
managers. They had grown up on rural farms, in urban middle class families, in 
households at the centre of political resistance in South West Africa or in exile. 
Activists had graduated from Namibian school, from universities in South Africa or 
overseas. Despite their vastly different backgrounds activists turned out to be 
remarkably similar in how they perceived their work and the overall purpose of civil 
society in Namibia. The context relevant for understanding activists in Namibia is 
therefore not the structural homologies in activist’s biographies/life stories 
(Dezalay/Garth 2003), but the arena that civil society itself provided for activists. 
 
Analysing what activists regarded as essential characteristics of activists 
reveals that they did not turn to individual biographies, their roots, but to the links 
between people in civil society, their routes, in defining activists. Most people had 
very mundane reasons for applying for a civil society job – they were dissatisfied with 
their previous job or jobless, they were offered a job after an internship or knew 
somebody from the staff. No one told me that his/her specific upbringing made 
him/her apply. Only later did they express a distinct idea about what it meant to be an 
activist.33 The next section looks at how civil society turns people into activists.  
                                          
 
33 There is an interesting difference here between people’s self image and their ascribed identity. 




Activism and action: The activist as zoon politikon 
Action, Hannah Arendt wrote, is the only human activity that takes place 
entirely between people, not involving things or matter (1958: 9). In action we begin 
something and insert ourselves into the world; in this respect actions always define 
the actors. Activists are constituted by their actions, but the doer of deeds has also to 
be the speaker of words (ibid:179). In Namibian civil society it was not only actions 
that defined activists but also the ways in which people reinterpreted these actions 
through stories. Through narrative and action people made it clear what distinguished 
activists from other NGO employees and which behaviour made people discernible as 
activists in the in flow of everyday civil society work. The literature on life-stories has 
portrayed biographies’ main function as meaning making (Yarrow 2009) and 
imposing coherence (Linde 1993). In this view people tell stories about themselves to 
create a linear account of their life. However, Michael Jackson has argued that 
storytelling fulfils more complex social functions because it allows people to change 
the way they remember their past experiences. In his argument, storytelling provides 
people with the opportunity to remodel their experiences, to negotiate the balance 
between themselves and the world beyond and to navigate their way through their 
past life (Jackson 2002:26). Remodelling past experiences was especially important 
when people talked about the boundaries of civic activism, comparing their work to 
other sectors and talking about people and organisations that were seen as treating 
staff in particularly uncivil ways. Experiencing unfair treatment by their NGO left 
staff with a clear sense of disempowerment and telling stories about the virtues of 
civil society helped them to regain a sense of agency in those circumstances. This 
chapter shows that the content of these stories was inseparably linked to the way 
people told them and both the act of storytelling and the specific story combined were 
crucial to the production of activists. Analysing the elements in the ‘activist story’ 
                                                                                                                         
 
as such until they entered a formal employment with an NGO. Paid employment was therefore a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to turn people into activists. The temporary character of 
internships together with hierarchies in organisations let people distinguish between proper NGO staff 
and associates or volunteers. After having received numerous complaints from volunteers NANGOF 
drafted a Code of best practices that admonished NGOs to treat their volunteers correctly and to fully 
integrate them. Still, volunteers occasionally complained that they were never consulted during the 
project planning stage and were only tasked with implementing programmes, even if they had been 




therefore reveals what characteristics NGO staff thought any proper activist ought to 
have. 
 
Telling the activist story  
Activists distinguished themselves from private sector employees and 
government officials through their commitment. (Research Notes 11/07/ 2008). 
Especially NGO executives presented their commitment to the cause as the main 
reason why they chose to work in civil society instead of pursuing equally available 
and higher paid careers elsewhere. Three months into her contract NANGOF’s 
director received a request from the Board to provide a medical certificate, although 
she had not been sick since she had started her job. She refused and officially 
complained that she was not to be treated like this. She was a professional who chose 
to be in civil society and surely did not need to work for NANGOF as she also headed 
a successful consultancy firm (Research Notes 11/04/2008). When asked why they 
worked in civil society despite its lower pay, its comparable meagre benefits and the 
high insecurity of temporary contracts, many directors said that they enjoyed the work 
and found it much more fulfilling than the highly paid jobs in private businesses 
where people were only concerned about enriching themselves (Research Notes 
11/07/2008).34 One director of a human rights NGO pointed out that he would never 
earn as much as a private lawyer but he had made peace with that.35  They joked about 
their small salaries, and often made the comparison between their pay and the 
earnings of a similarly qualified employee in the private sector. Stories about 
government – civil society events often included the contrast between the luxurious 
cars of government employees and the NGO staff arriving by foot or in a communal 
taxi (Research Notes 10/07/ 2008). One NGO leader said that he by chance saw a 
bank statement of a private sector employee showing that his petty cash was more 
than the annual budget of some projects in his NGO.36  
As Janine Clarke and Wacheke Michuki (2009) noted, people working in civil 
society derive considerable satisfaction from the idea that their work makes a 
                                          
 
34 Especially people at senior level had often worked in the private sector and/or for the government at 
some stage in their careers. They therefore felt well equipped to make comparisons between the 
sectors. 
35 Interview Director /Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 18/07/ 2008. As Thomas Yarrow’s (2009) 
account of life stories of civil society workers in Ghana shows, the topic of personal and financial 
sacrifices were generally prominent elements in stories about activism. 
36 Interview Director /Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 18/072008. 
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difference in society. This was also true for people in Namibian NGOs who could find 
an ethical value in doing their particular work technically well (Feldman 2007: 693). 
When I interviewed the staff of the LAC in 2002 almost all my respondents named 
the impact their work made on society as one of the main reason for their job 
satisfaction. What exactly their contribution was depended to a large extend on their 
position within the LAC and their dominant practices. Lawyers said their work made 
the law more accessible and assumed that this was a benefit in itself, 37 people in the 
management stressed that they empowered people to stand up for their rights with a 
rather vague idea what this meant. Finally social workers spoke mostly about the 
difference they made in the lives of their specific target groups. 
 
“I think my work is important because it has got a positive impact on people who would 
otherwise end up as criminals and it changes their lives.”38 
 
“The LAC is the only organization that provides legal advice or legal assistance to people 
(…) who would not have access to justice otherwise”.39 
 
“I think our work changes people’s perceptions of the law since they experience the law as 
being more accessible and effective. Many are becoming aware of the law for the first time 
through our work.”40 
 
  Activists thought they could make a real difference in people’s lives 
because in their perception civil society was finely tuned in to the everyday concerns 
of ordinary people. One employee at the LAC said that the Centre reached down to 
the grassroots level.41 Activists often stressed that the close grassroots connection set 
them apart from government employees who rarely ventured out to consult “people 
under the tree” and “who did not know how it is to work with communities where 
nobody speaks English”.42 One NGO activist stressed that he wanted to avoid the 
impression of living in Windhoek’s rich neighbourhood Ludwigsdorf and never 
ventured into the poor ex-township Katutura when he spoke at a civil society 
conference about poverty alleviation. Occasionally this grassroots connection became 
part of the corporate identity of civic organizations. Sectorial umbrellas especially 
                                          
 
37 However, when communities asked the LAC for legal representation the Centre could often not help 
because a majority of the requests concerned labour or divorce cases, two areas of legal advice the 
LAC does not provide. 
38 Interview social worker Juvenile Justice Project/Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 22/08/ 2002 
39 Interview AIDS Law Unit Coordinator/Legal Assistance Centre Windhoek 19/09/2002 
40  Interview Gender Unit Coordinator/Legal Assistance Centre  Windhoek  20/09/2002 
41 Interview Librarian/Legal Assistance Centre Windhoek 27/09/ 2002 
42 Interview Director /Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 18/07/ 2008 
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tended to present members as “their” CBOs to stress the close links between umbrella 
and rural organizations (Research Notes 22/07/2008). This self image is especially 
interesting when compared to a recent survey finding about activities of civic 
organizations across Namibia (NANGOF June 2009). This survey found that most 
organizations concentrated on pre-defined service delivery instead of wide 
consultations and close connection to communities.43  In contrast NGO personnel 
often seemed to assume that they did not really need to consult people in 
communities, because they knew intuitively about the people’s greatest concerns and 
had both the expertise and altruistic drive to take those concerns into the public 
domain. When I asked the staff at the LAC how they knew which topics were relevant 
for society, most were irritated at first about the question but then answered that they 
simply knew because they lived in Namibia (Research Notes 24/08/2006). Presenting 
at a civil society conference one NGO director asked what civil society is. He 
answered his rhetorical question by way of an example of two old ladies who decided 
to take care of the birds in their village. In this image what turned the two ladies into 
civic activists was their altruistic concern. The director chose the image exactly to 
make the point that definition of activist does not depend on the person’s management 
qualities or the corporate efficiency the organization, but that it was passion that made 
all the difference.44 Tellingly in his simile the birds could not be asked what their 
needs really were.   
 
 Commitment to the cause was essential, but every real activist had to combine 
this altruistic concern with profound factual expertise. When civil society 
organizations advertised jobs the first criteria for potential candidates was expertise, 
i.e. education plus experience rather than insights into the sector, commitment or a 
particular close connection with beneficiaries; a close connection to recipients was 
therefore not the most important criteria for most organisations. In fact a good activist 
had to maintain a certain distance from beneficiaries to enable her/him to calculate the 
benefits of a project accurately. One LAC employee said “The work (of the LAC) is 
much more efficient than it has been (…) the system is much better than before 
because in previous times we were driving the whole country just to help one person 
                                          
 
43 For a similar finding in South Africa see Nauta 2004 
44 The idealized image of rural old women as prime focus of civic activism is analyzed in greater 
detail in chapter 3. 
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in Mariental and the next in Oshakati”.45 For him, previous results clearly had not 
justified the effort.  
 
For people in civil society, factual expertise prevented committed NGO staff 
to become partial because it enabled activists to weigh costs and benefits of their 
projects and to analyze their own work critically. Expertise was important for any 
good activist and essential for a successful civil society organization. The Legal 
Assistance Centre took pride in the expertise of its staff46 and several other NGO 
directors suggested that government should concentrate on policy making and leave 
implementation to the experts in civil society.47 When the director of the Desert 
Research Foundation (DRFN) introduced the NGO to the new NANGOF staff he 
emphasized that the DRFN represented the highest concentration of environmental 
experts in the country (Research Notes 29/05/2008). The project coordinator of the 
LAC’s gender unit said that her project was now so successful because it had 
produced high quality work over long time. 
 
 “The gender law unit is (…) one of the oldest units in the LAC, in previous times we 
experienced severe difficulties with our lobbying work to influence governmental decisions; 
but we always did high-quality work and eventually government could not ignore us any 
longer – people would ask why decision-makers did not take our reports into account. So now 
government relies heavily on our reports and findings and we have a high degree of influence 
on the making of gender-related laws – but it took us a long (…) time and continuous high-
quality work to get there (…) I think it is of special importance for the LAC to maintain a 
high standard of thorough and high quality work to maintain its credibility and reputation as 
this is the best way to overcome opposition.”48 
 
Her account reveals another important quality of true activists: patience and 
persistence in adverse conditions and despite repeated setbacks. The key in her 
success was that her project continued to invest in high quality research, and although 
they had been ignored for long time this finally paid off. Another organization has 
been trying for decades to talk to government officials about the fate of people who 
were detained by SWAPO during the liberation struggle. According to its national 
                                          
 
45 Oshakati is a town located in the north of Namibia, about a thousand kilometres away from 
Mariental in the country’s south. Interview Land and Environment Project Coordinator/Legal 
Assistance Centre, Windhoek  24/09/ 2002. 
46 Interviews AIDS Law Unit Coordinator/ Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 19/09/2002, Interview 
Gender Unit Coordinator/Legal Assistance Centre Windhoek  20/09/2002, Interview Director/ Legal 
Assistance Centre, Windhoek 18/07/2008. 
47 Research Notes 10/07/2008; Interviews 10/06/2008, 12/06/2008 and 18/07/2008. 
48 Interview Gender Unit Coordinator/Legal Assistance Centre 20/09/2002. 
 
 46
coordinator the organisation hoped that its persistence would finally pay off and its 
representatives would be granted a hearing with the president.49 The previous 
coordinator of the LAC’s Legal Education project said that the LAC was so important 
because “it remains steadfast even if everybody else is jumping the ship”.50 All these 
examples suggest that a proper activist does not seek short term success but invests in 
long term structural changes at considerable personal and institutional costs.51 
 
Perseverance was seen as essential characteristic of activists, because they had 
to stick to their cause in the face of adverse external conditions. But they also had to 
be persistent with regard to their own training and be willing to continuously improve 
their expertise, a pursuit that was above all visible in the high value civil society 
placed on training.  An entire section of civic organisations has specialised in training 
employees from other NGOs. There is a large market for this service, because 
organisations with sufficient resources invest in training for their staff, grant 
sabbatical leave and might even support their employees to attend professional 
development courses in South Africa. Donors too had funded capacity building for 
years and had especially supported project management workshops in order to receive 
better funding proposals. On the one hand, donor representatives complained that the 
continuing training did not result in visibly improved projects.52 NGO staff on the 
other hand often pointed out that the training they received did not add up to a 
recognised qualification and was too isolated to really build a new field of expertise. 
They said their training modules did not add up. They were consequently trained in 
one skill without having the necessary knowledge to implement it properly and it had 
only unclear relevance for their everyday work. As one NGO representative put it: 
“We have found training is often not as useful as it could be without time to 
implement and develop skills in the work place”.53 The next section asks why civil 
society employees continued to invest in training despite the widespread perception 
that training had only limited impact on people’s work. It shows that civil society 
employees invested in the training modules that confirmed the stories they told about 
themselves as activists. 
                                          
 
49 Interview BWS National coordinator, Windhoek  21/05/2008. 
50 Interview Legal Education Project Coordinator/Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek  05/09/ 2002. 
51 In many LAC interviews respondents said that the Centre had often been called names for its work 
and seemed to take a certain pride in this. 
52 Interview USAID Country Representative 23/11/ 2006. 




Training: Becoming better at doing good 
In 2006 donors and civil society organizations teamed up to establish the 
“Civil society management qualification” (CSMQ), a comprehensive training 
initiative for NGO staff. Three civil society organizations, !NARA, NANASO and 
NANGOF founded the NGO institute to host the scheme. The CSMQ is divided into 
seven broad areas of NGO management: Governance, General Management, 
Financial Management, Project Management, Resource Mobilisation and Leadership 
(NGO Institute 2009). Those seven areas contain 23 different modules or “unit 
standards” NGO employees can take up independently to build their own individual 
careers. They can also apply to be assessed without prior training in areas they feel 
already competent in. The CSMQ claims to train people in skills they really need and 
help them to build a competency based career path in civil society (NGO Institute 
2009). The CSMQ is based on the idea that civil activism is a craft and can be taught 
systematically through discrete complementary modules which will turn lay persons 
into activists. The training breaks with the common practice in civil society that 
people could work in a completely different capacity once they changed jobs within 
the sector. This practice allowed people to be a training officer at one NGO, an 
administrator in the next and a fundraiser in the third organisation. The CSMQ in 
contrast formalises and fixes career paths in civil society and prevents these vertical 
careers, which respondents in a survey of NGO workers in Jordan explicitly valued in 
their jobs (Clarke/Michuki 2009). The CSMQ’s training units are accredited with the 
Namibian national qualifications authority (NQA), the state agency to unify 
vocational training across Namibia. The CSMQ embodies the idea that civic activism 
is a trade to be learnt like carpentry and that it is technical skills and knowledge that 
are the most important elements in civic activism. 
 
The literature on new managerialism in NGOs seems to confirm these 
assumptions. It has argued that civic organisations are increasingly defined by 
management concepts like accountability, transparency, participation, and efficiency, 
as well as practices like double-entry bookkeeping, strategic planning, Logical 
Framework Analysis, project evaluation, and organizational self-assessment 
(Roberts/Jones/Fröhling 2005). Management skills are also the main focus of the 
Namibian civil society qualification. The CSMQ is supposed to include everything a 
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good NGO leader ought to know and is based on general ideas about the necessary 
skills in civil society anywhere, instead of taking into account the skills necessary in 
Namibia. The unit standards followed the civil society training modules in Botswana 
and Swaziland and were drafted by an international advisor to NANGOF with 
qualifications including a degree in business administration from London Business 
School. The CSMQ is based on the idea that training is a de-contextualised 
accumulation of universal knowledge that lead to the professionalisation of 
organisations and their staff. 
 
 
 An alternative view on training sees more in education than “just” a 
convenient tool to drive the sector to increased business efficiency. It argues that 
training is a mechanism through which individuals turn themselves into self-
governing subjects (Martin et al 1988, Bondi/Laurie 2003). This Foucauldian 
perspective on training therefore refutes the idea that there is a stable self whose 
essence remains unchanged by the knowledge or skills that training provides. It 
equally challenges the idea that people internalise external values conveyed through 
training and that education can mould individuals as passive recipients of external 
influences. The person is neither unchangeable nor completely determined from 
outside, but people actively engage training modules to raise their self-awareness and 
thus to regulate their own conduct in civil society. Self awareness and self governance 
were central in the civil society’s management qualification. For example the module 
on “manage organisational values and the legal framework of an NGO” attempts to 
teach Board members to “act in a social responsible way” and “understand their legal, 
social and ethical responsibilities.” Other units teach NGO personnel how to produce 
a “unique identifying idea” and how to implement the organisational vision (NGO 
Institute 2006). 
 
The technical knowledge training provides might add one aspect of what it 
means to be an activist and the idea that activism is a trade to be learnt reflects a 
widespread opinion in civil society. Seeing training as a technique of the self would 
explain why it has to be constantly repeated, because producing self governing 
activists depends on constant repetition.  However, the assumption that training 
moulds the activist self far overestimates the importance of training in civil society. 
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Most people in civil society saw their training as separate from their proper work. 
Training provided them with an additional qualification they could pursue if they 
wanted to. They said that one of the real advantages of working in civil society was 
that organisations often provided them with the freedom to pursue additional 
qualifications. Training was therefore not seen as inherent in activism. NGO 
executives complained that once their staff received training they would leave their 
organisation for better paid jobs in other sectors.54 None of my informants saw any 
direct link between his/her qualification and what it meant to be an activist and did 
not share the close connection between training and the activist self the literature 
made. Formal training had also limited influence on the professional standard in the 
sector. Donors complained that numerous fundraising workshops had not lifted the 
quality of NGOs’ funding applications55 and the main argument for the management 
qualification was that the continuous financial training did not significantly improve 
the financial management in a majority of NGOs (NANGOF March 2007). NGO staff 
often complained that the generic training they received was ill adapted to their NGO 
work and that they had often lacked the opportunity to implement their new skills 
(NANGOF June 2009). In sum, training was far too removed from their proper work 
in people’s understanding to be either a technique to constitute the subject or a tool to 
bring about professionalisation in civil society.  
 
However, training occupies an important place in civil society, because it is a 
measurable unit of activity. It is a central request from donors and it is a tangible 
project component. Training is qunatifiable and categorisable, the number of 
workshops can be included in (donor) reports and the certificates of attendance and 
achievement create the impression that the trainees have progressed in their career and 
done something concrete to bring themselves and their organization forward. Donors 
and NGOs are not the only ones investing in training. NGO employees themselves 
often spent considerable amount of their time and money on training, because they 
obviously believed in its value. Attending workshop and short courses should not be 
easily dismissed as window dressing for donors, because it had concrete value for 
people. Irrespective of its specific content, the training provided employees with the 
                                          
 
54 Interview Director/ Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 18/07/ 2008; Interview Country Director 
Project Hope, Windhoek 12/06/2008. 
55 Interview Country Representative USAID 23/11/2006; Interview Country Director Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, Windhoek 09/11/2006. 
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opportunity to leave the office and thus gave their work routine a new impetus. 
Meeting peers in training sessions and getting new ideas from them provided people 
with the necessary motivation to carry on.56 More importantly, training could be well 
integrated into stories people told about themselves because receiving and providing 
training spoke to people’s self image as experts.  
 
People in civil society evaluated training depending on how well it fitted the 
dominant storyline about activism and some courses were a better match than others. 
Modules like “Managing organizational values”, “promoting an organization” and 
“raising funds” usually spoke more to core elements in activists’ self image and were 
thus taken up by many more people than financial management courses.57 Activists 
particularly shunned training about purely financial or administrative issues, what 
they saw as the dispassionate side of the job. The contrasting attitudes to (different) 
training modules point to a fundamental ambiguity of training for people’s story. 
Training did speak to people’s self image as experts and was therefore highly valued, 
but training also attempted to create a dispassionate professional for whom civic 
activism was a task to be administered. Training sought to establish civic activism as 
vocation in the Weberian sense, where activists were the administrators of projects, 
efficient and sine ira et studio, ‘without hate and eagerness’ (Weber 1970: 95). 
Training did therefore not turn people into activists, but certain modules confirmed 
the story people told about themselves. This also explains why some workshops 
proved to be influential for NGOs’ work while other training units failed to have any 
visible impact. 
 
The limits of civic activism:  
Vanity and hierarchy  
The kind of expertise people thought to be essential for civic activists was 
therefore not purely factual. Technical knowledge had to be combined with 
                                          
 
56 Chapter 4 makes a similar argument about civil society-wide meetings as “hope-generating 
machines” (Nujiten 2006). 
57 NANGOF (March 2007a) shows a very low achievement rate in finance courses. When NANGOF’s 
director talked about the CSMQ she said that she once did a course on financial management for non 
finance people which did not help her daily work. The comment shows first that she did not regard her 
job to be mostly about financial skills and secondly that she thought that financial management training 
could not be transferred from the private to the non- profit sector, because their purposes were different 
in kind ; an argument that is elaborated in chapter 7.  
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experience and passion for the job if a person ever wanted to be a good activist.  With 
that self image of being true and committed experts in their field came a more or less 
open vanity of which Max Weber once said was a politician’s occupational disease 
but harmless (Weber 1970:116). Many activists were convinced that important events 
could not happen without their participation, even when they were hopelessly over-
committed and could not possibly attend. One member of the NANGOF Board 
announced a few days before the Board meeting that she had another appointment and 
demanded that NANGOF rescheduled the meeting that had been set for months. The 
secretariat should invite all 16 members for the following week so that she could 
participate. Another Board member asked whether she could send a delegate to the 
same meeting, because she was out of the country, but still wanted to have a say in the 
decisions (Research Notes 29/05/2008). 
  More seriously, ideas about one’s own indispensability and unrivalled 
expertise occasionally resulted in activists deciding single-handedly about projects. 
The LAC once agreed to represent a very poor neighbourhood that demanded free 
water supply from the Windhoek City council in court. A senior member of staff 
prepared the court case but decided to withdraw the lawsuit after the city council had 
approached him and asked for an out-of-court settlement. The LAC lawyer had 
decided to drop the case without consulting with his clients and without having asked 
any of his colleagues in the LAC. Many in the Centre at that time complained about 
the uncooperative attitude underlying this decision and also blamed him for the bad 
press the NGO received for its withdrawal (Research Notes 28/02/2008). The example 
points to the downside of activists’ self image as experts. Since they were so 
convinced by their own knowledge some activists felt they did not need second 
opinions from colleagues or recipients. One project lawyer at the LAC complained 
that there was no real team spirit in the centre and people were not interested in staff 
meetings, they would not prepare for them or did not even turn up.58 LAC staff who 
claimed to be well-informed about work of other departments in the Centre because 
they read the reports regularly, but this would be a matter of choice, as the coordinator 
of the LAC’s gender unit put it “we here in Windhoek are very “paper-oriented”.59 
This indicates that people talked very little about a project during its planning stage or 
even when it was running, they only informed colleagues in the same way they told 
                                          
 
58 Interview AIDS Law Unit Coordinator/ Legal Assistance Centre Windhoek 19/09/2002. 
59 Interview Gender Unit Coordinator/ Legal Assistance Centre Windhoek 20/09/2002. 
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the general public about it and only once the work had been done. The previous 
director of the LAC said that coordination within the centre was sometimes difficult, 
because some people did not want to collaborate with others until the management 
intervened to foster cooperation across units.60 
 
Tensions arose not only because of non-collegial solo efforts, but were also 
created through formal and informal hierarchies in organizations. Those rankings 
were often based on the corporate identity and the public image of the NGO. The 
LAC has always presented itself as public interest law firm, although it had hosted 
several projects that did not do any litigation. This resulted in a clear hierarchy 
between lawyers and other employees like administrators, accountants, social workers 
and educators. Several employees complained that the organization only treated some 
people as core staff and paid them considerably higher salaries than others. The 
project coordinator of one unit complained:  
 
If a lawyer who just started [at the centre] earns more money than a person who has been 
working for the LAC for years this has definitely an impact on the attitude of this person and 
will lead to a decreased job satisfaction. I think they [management] should look more at what 
the  person is actually doing rather than a certain label like “lawyer”, “social worker” etc.61  
 
Complaints about organizational hierarchies did not fit the image of civil 
society as benign sector and a good place to work. This often created a considerable 
ambivalence in employees who found their work and the organization important, but 
had really disheartening experiences of being treated unfairly by that same 
organization.62 Interestingly, employees themselves often tried to rescue the image of 
civil society organizations as good places to work, although their personal experience 
contradicted this image. When the post of the LAC director became vacant the then 
head of the LAC’s legal education project applied. He was short-listed and the LAC 
Board decided to offer him the job. However, this triggered massive resistance from 
other LAC employees and the job offer was withdrawn at the last minute, officially 
because of insufficient transparency in the decision-making process. When the job 
                                          
 
60 Interview ex-Director/Legal Assistance Centre/Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 27/08/2002. 
61 Interview social worker Juvenile Justice Project/Legal Assistance Centre 22/08/ 2002. 
62 The literature on civil society has long challenged the idea of civil society as particular benign 
sector, from theoretical accounts (Foley/Edwards 1998; Howell/Pearce 2002) to concrete case studies 
(Hirschmann 1998; Glaser 1997) and arguments about global civil society (Munck 2002) authors have 
repeatedly shown that many civil society organizations are based on steep hierarchies and are 
particularly uncivil to their employees. 
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was advertised again he re-applied, but this time the people who had opposed him in 
the first round encouraged another LAC employee to apply who was eventually 
offered the job. When the ousted coordinator told me the story he still felt treated 
unfairly. However he did not blame the LAC’s culture of favouring some people over 
others but made a few individuals responsible for the decision. As he himself noted 
with a smile, he is now employed by a completely different organization, but still says 
“we” when he talks about the LAC (Research Notes 15/02/2008). With hindsight he 
could even find some understanding for the people who had opposed him. He said 
most probably they had felt unsure about somebody who had not been with the LAC 
for long, because all previous directors had a long track record of employment with 
the LAC. He was the first one to apply after only a year of being with the centre, 
whereas the current LAC director has been with the LAC since its early days. His 
interpretation suggests that a proper activist had to prove her/his continuous 
commitment by working in civil society for some time before s/he could attempt to 
proceed to a senior position.  
 
A statement from NANGOF’s former interim director combines a belief in the 
good cause of the organisation with a note of personal hurt in a similar way:  
 
“For me, NANGOF is a good thing. But it has to earn the credibility through efficiency and 
action. (…) More generally, I have a sense that I have been thoroughly dropped by 
NANGOF. I believe that they have tidied up the database and destroyed a vast section of data 
bank. I have a sense that I am being blamed for the shortcomings in relation to PE1. It is quite 
an affront really, although bad for one's reputation. For some reason they seem to have come 
to the view that I should have done a full time job for the small consultancy fees that we 
generated. The other week, they "launched" the NANGOF Trust with a dinner. I was not 
invited. All sour grapes.” 63 
 
Both show this ambiguous opinion about “their” former organisation. They 
showed an intense sense of attachment and really cared where the organisation was 
heading, but also felt deeply disappointed with the way they had been treated, a 
feeling that only came with a profound fondness for the organisation and a sense of 
personal attachment. The strong loyalty that had distinguished them as true activists 
when they were still working for “their” NGO did obviously not cease after they had 
left the sector and stopped seeing themselves as activists. 
 
                                          
 
63 Email conversation, former NANGOF Interim Director, 30/06/2009. 
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Former NGO employees often pointed to an organisation’s special 
circumstances or its bad leadership to explain the apparent differences between 
negative experiences and their positive image of civil society organisations. Board 
members often justified smaller salaries and harsh employment conditions with 
imperatives of organisational survival. Organisational survival was said to be the 
reason why one NGO refused to release its sick director on extended leave and she 
had to come in a few days every week to secure her job. The same NGO did not pay 
its janitor and cleaners for several months until they had to seek employment 
elsewhere (Research Notes 02/05/2008). This was arguably a really exceptional case 
and many other organisations looked after their employees well, but still quite a few 
took advantage of people’s commitment by expecting them to work overtime and 
paying their salaries late in times of crisis. People occasionally said that some NGOs 
were run as one (wo)man show64 but they always presented this as result of bad 
(individual) leadership which could be rectified through a few management decisions 
and some staff replacements. Everyone who complained about the steep hierarchies 
within the LAC recommended that the management should rectify these artificial 
rankings through a payment review and a reversal of the unpopular decision to move 
one unit from the Centre’s headquarters into a suburb. Nobody saw hierarchies as 
integral part of the LAC’s corporate image as public interest law firm that sought to 
assert a high reputation amongst policy makers and donors as expert organisation in 
legal issues. And nobody questioned the Centre’s claim to be the linchpin of human 
rights culture in Namibia. 
 
Employees, not activists 
If comments on uncivil organizational practices show strategies people used to 
reconcile reality and ideal, comments about uncivil people reveal that in fact not all 
civil society employees were automatically regarded as activists. Activists and non-
activists were therefore not distinguished through their formal work contract with an 
NGO, but through specific traits of character like altruistic commitment, expertise and 
persistence as explained above. However these were not sufficient and proper activist 
had to show more elusive traits of character, which were all related to the way they 
behaved in civil society - wide processes. These characteristics were much closer 
                                          
 
64 Interview Country Director Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Windhoek  01/12/2006. 
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linked to incivility in the stricter sense of the term. Uncivil were those who overrated 
their own importance; those solo performers who obviously used civil society’s 
structures only to pursue their personal agendas. Uncivil people demanded that long-
arranged meetings should be postponed on short notice to fit in their full diaries and 
pushed their way into projects without considering other ideas.  
Comments about one director of a new NGO contained several elements that 
were seen as being uncivil. She had been working for the national right wing party 
before she was expelled and formed an NGO. From the very start she made it clear 
that she needed NANGOF to pursue an election monitoring project for the upcoming 
2009 parliamentary elections. She convinced people to vote her on the NANGOF 
Board, although she had been bad mouthing other Board members, saying they were 
inefficient, had no mandate and only served on the Board, because there was no 
mechanism to vote them out of office. Other directors found her pushy or focused, 
depending on sympathy and context. She was obviously not the only person who used 
civil society to pursue a particular project: in fact NANGOF has been promoting its 
facilitating role for civil society wide concerns and some of the most successful and 
highly regarded activists were driven by particular concerns. Comments about her 
tended to be much more critical, because she was new to the sector and could 
therefore not prove that she indeed had the persistence that was seen as necessary 
element in any real commitment to the cause. Some suspected she simply used civil 
society as shortcut to achieve her own political agenda (Research Notes 06/06/2009). 
 
As organisational incivility was usually explained with the organisation’s 
exceptional circumstances, uncivil behaviour of individuals was often ridiculed as 
personal oddity and never linked to the general self image of activists as committed 
experts that gave rise to their ideas about their own indispensability.65 Achille 
Mbembe stressed that ridicule is a form of distancing oneself from what is perceived 
as deeply tragic and potentially dangerous, but which lies beyond one’s control 
(2001:109). Activists ridiculed incivility in order to cope with the challenges to their 
own stories about civil society; challenges which were both profound and outside 
their influence.66 Explanations for incivility therefore always pointed to the exception 
                                          
 
65 One NANGOF ex-employee said that some Trustees were simply “glory seekers” Research Notes 
10/03/2008. 
66 This also confirms Michael Jackson’s (2002: 28) point that telling stories is an important 
mechanism to re-live experiences and regain some degree of control over them. 
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which left the image of civil society as usually benign sector with altruistic and 
committed people untouched.67  
 
 
Gossip and the banality of activism 
Ridicule often came in the form of gossip, small stories told to illustrate how 
things ought not to be done in civil society. When the NANGOF team discussed 
whether Board members should receive a small salary the previous interim director 
made it clear that serving on a Board was a prestigious office. Board membership was 
by definition unpaid, in order to avoid people taking up office for the monetary 
reward. He argued that one Board member in particular had repeatedly asked for 
compensation and indicated that this person was more interested in the benefits the 
Board membership offered than in NANGOF’s cause. The ex-director illustrated his 
point by telling how the same board member had missed a particular good funding 
opportunity for NANGOF and later tried to cover his mistake up. In his opinion this 
incident showed that the Board member was more interested in his own benefits than 
in the advancement of NANGOF and was “a difficult person” to work with (Research 
Notes 28/03/2008).   
 
Classical accounts have conceptualized gossip as an  informal way to assert 
group values, to determine group membership (Gluckman 1963) and to discipline 
individuals when an open confrontation was not viable (Herskovitz 1937). Robert 
Paine (1967) and John Roberts (1964) argued that gossip does not in itself promote or 
avoid conflict, but catalyses social relations and processes.68 NANGOF’s director 
mirrored this view that  gossip first and foremost created a negative public image. She 
warned against letting NANGOF critics participate in decision-making panels, 
                                          
 
67 As much as fending off challenges to the image of civil society, coping strategies also attempted to 
avoid ruptures in the coherent stories activists told about themselves. As Charlotte Linde (1989) has 
pointed out the need to create coherent stories twists evidence and memories and let speaker and 
addressee stress particular events and neglect others. For a literary treatment of this topic see Milan 
Kundera’s “Book of Laughter and Forgetting” (1980). 
68 Sally Engle Merry (1997) notes that this catalysing function is the main reason why it is so difficult 
for outsiders to fully understand gossip. Ethnographers have to understand the underlying values and 
master a vast amount of information about people and their relations, in order to grasp the full 
implications of gossip. It is therefore highly doubtful that my analysis can catch all layers of meaning 
in civil society’s gossip. 
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because they could spread misinformation and discredit the umbrella through 
gossiping about it (Research Notes 03/06/ 2008). 
The more recent literature on gossip has paid more attention to gossip’s 
organization and content, instead of focusing on its function alone. Jörg Bergmann 
(1993: 151) states that gossip is designed as news for a distinct social group, i.e. 
participants must know each other well and the gossiping process must be mutual 
(Merry 1997: 52). Gossip in civil society was usually shared amongst smaller circles 
of people who knew each other well and had very regular contact, and gossip was 
consequently most often exchanged between (former) colleagues or people who had 
been working in the same field for a long time. 
 
Sally Engle Merry has argued that most gossip concerns the gap between 
people’s claims to reputation and their actual behaviour (1997: 53). Gossip therefore 
naturally unfolds around topics where the social ideal is very demanding. NGOs’ 
claim to the moral high ground and their propagated pro-poor agenda were thus 
obvious targets for gossip. The greedy demand of the NANGOF Board member stood 
in sharp contrast to the altruistic mission of his NGO. At a national conference 
NANGOF staff joked about the director of a women’s organisation with a strong 
poverty agenda, because she drove a Mercedes (Research Notes 11/07/2008). Staff at 
a women’s rights project often gossiped about the authoritarian leadership style of the 
project coordinator which stood in sharp contrast to the project’s democratic agenda 
and empowering objectives. Through gossip NGO staff applied abstract rules of 
conduct to concrete situations and thus shared the interpretation of the moral meaning 
of these events (Merry 1997). As Sally Engle Merry (1997:48) notes, gossip only has  
any disciplining effect on individual behaviour if it endangers a person’s status, 
something that was highly unlikely when staff joked about superiors.  
 
The most important role of gossip was thus not necessarily to enforce 
particular behaviour, but to create a shared understanding of proper behaviour in civil 
society amongst the gossipers. Gossipy anecdotes were admittedly small and often 
told on the side more for entertainment than as intentional discussion of the right kind 
of activism. However, since they were small and could easily be inserted into 
conversations they were often repeated and thus achieved a particular salience.  As 
Michael Billig (1995) has argued it is the less dramatic symbols of and tales about big 
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concepts like nationalism that have the most lasting effect on our beliefs and actions. 
Gossip was an important element in this “banal activism” to paraphrase Michael 
Billig. Jokes about different salaries of government and civil society employees, 
anecdotes about the mismatch between people’s personal wealth and their NGO’s 
pro-poor agenda and side complaints about hierarchies in human rights organisations 
constantly reminded people of civil society’s ideals and what civic activism ought to 
be about. They did so much more frequently and thus more powerfully than the 
organisations’ mission or grand statements about civil society’s value in society. 
 
Ongoing conversations created lasting images of particular people working in 
civil society. Some people were seen as being inspired and motivated but overworked 
and thus rather unreliable, some had the reputation of being very ambitious but 
creating unrest. Still others counted as good natured and reconciling but as weak 
leaders. Once somebody had acquired the image of being uncivil, it stuck to the 
person and was particularly difficult to undo. The images were so resistant to change, 
because they were part of stories that were constantly retold amongst a small group of 
people over a long period of time. Many people currently employed by an NGO had 
been working in the sector since the country’s independence. The senior level had an 
especially low turnover rate. If an organization advertised for a new director, very 
often candidates were drawn from its staff pool or other civil society organizations. 
NANGOF’s new executive director was project coordinator in another NGO before, 
and all other candidates had worked on project management level in other NGOs.69 
People working in civil society therefore had developed long term professional 
relations and were connected through multiple links. They were not only colleagues 
who worked in similar positions; often one person sat on the Board of another; they 
were often peers in NANGOF’s sector working groups or other umbrella forums or 
competitors for funding70 or previous superiors (Research Notes 01/07/2008). People 
maintained multiple relations at once because activists in Namibia often fulfilled 
many more roles than “just” being employed by a civic organisation. Besides their 
regular full time job as NGO executives, financial managers or project coordinators, 
they usually served on Boards of several other civil society organisations, they were 
                                          
 
69 The only other good source for employees was international volunteering organizations. A lot of 
people came to Namibia as an NGO intern or through international work placement programmes and 
then stayed. 
70 See chapter 6. 
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members of permanent working groups set up by umbrella bodies or the government 
and many also ran their own business to take up occasional consultancy work. People 
thus met in different capacities and constellations and therefore knew each other’s 
work in various roles. They could rely on a good insight about how somebody acted 
as peer, superior, evaluator, or employee and brought all these insights to the 
conversation about specific people.  
 
 
Comments on people in civil society were everyday occasions that set the 
scene before the scheduled “proper” discussion started. In this they created a shared 
understanding of what civil society was all about. These stories created a closely knit 
network in a small sector with low turnover and a high degree of personal links 
between NGOs. The activist self is therefore narrated as the proponents of the 
biographical approach claim, but not as in a personal history but in ongoing 
conversations. Before they joined civil society many NGO employees had been 
working in other fields.71 NANGOF’s director had been working as a social worker 
for the government, another executive had been a teacher and a bank clerk, some had 
worked for a newspaper or the radio, were private consultants or lawyers. When asked 
why they applied for an NGO position none of the LAC respondents pointed to 
particular values in their upbringing that made civil society work especially attractive. 
They often knew somebody from the LAC or plainly needed a job.72 It was only after 
they had started to work at the centre that they became aware of the difference their 
work made in society, and it was only then that tackling injustices figured as major 
reason why they thought their job was sensible. People therefore first joined an NGO 
and then became activists.  
 
 
Since activists were essentially a product of civil society, people ceased to be 
activists by leaving the sector. The literature has admittedly paid far less attention to 
the unmaking of activists than it did to the analysis of how activists are created. 
However, arguing that activists are defined through his/her socialisation seems to 
                                          
 
71 This is especially true for older employees because most NGOs were only set up after 1990. 
72 This is quite different to Thomas Yarrow’s (2009) findings where people often told their life story to 
explain why they decided to work for civil society. 
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suggest that once a person turned into an activist this could not be so easily reversed. 
The end of activists in Namibia was much more banal than this. People did not change 
their basic values and quite a few pursued “civic activist” goals in other sectors, e.g. 
human rights promotion in academia or as private lawyers, development projects 
through the government’s development ministry, or they pursued their research 
interests through private consultancy firms. Leaving a paid NGO job did not mean 
that people automatically resigned from voluntary offices in the sector, and quite a 
few continued to serve on the Board of their former employer but they would no 
longer see themselves as activists. The end of activists thus relates to the quote at the 
beginning: people did not see themselves as activists anymore once they left their 
formal employment with a civil society organisation and started working somewhere 
else. It shows that formal employment with a civil society organisation was a 
necessary, but not sufficient, precondition for people to become activists. Just as 
people continued to pursue their activist goals in other sectors, they often continued to 
volunteer for their organisation, be it as Trustee or as external advisor without 
referring to themselves as activists. One of the reasons why formal employment might 
be so decisive for people’s definition of “activists” was that it provided the 
opportunity to regularly participate in ongoing conversations about peers and because 
it provided the person with a clear organisational affiliation.  Activist identity was 
therefore closely connected to people’s official status, their social networks, dominant 
practices and narratives within sector. 
 
 
Conclusion: Civic activists and civil society 
 
Stories about activists were usually weaved into general conversations about 
the nature of civil society and were often expressed in forums when people talked 
about the entire sector e.g. in its relations to the government or in comments on civil 
society’s contributions to national development. Any NGO had to employ people with 
the right traits of character in order to ensure organisational survival and to promote 
the strength of the entire sector. That was the reason why stories about activists were 
always also statements about civil society.  Personal commitment was often blended 
with good leadership and management skills, a good feeling for people, donors and 
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recipients, and good intuition for trends.73 However, the real activist did not measure 
these skills in monetary terms alone and those seeking highly paid jobs were 
unsuitable for civic activism irrespective of their other talents. Commenting on 
prospective successors for one NGO director, an NGO Board member said that they 
had found a woman well qualified and fit to do the job but who refused to be 
employed for the current director’s salary. This was seen as clear indication that she 
was not suitable for the job because obviously she had more interest in her salary than 
the work.74 
 
This chapter’s counterintuitive conclusion is thus that activists do not create 
civil society, but civil society creates activists and it does so not through formalized 
training but through everyday stories and ongoing gossip. The finding stands in direct 
contrast to the leading research question in new social movement theories that seek to 
unearth a distinct set of reasons why people become activists before they join social 
movements, and look for this set in people’s upbringing and value system. This 
chapter shows that activists were defined through ongoing conversations amongst 
their peers which also marked the difference between activists and government 
officials or donor representatives. Activists demonstrated expertise, persistence, 
loyalty and commitment vis-à-vis their peers, donors and government officials, but 
were not defined by their close relations to recipients. Instead, activists were produced 
by the particular ways in which civil society was enacted. It shows that if we want to 
understand civil society we need to explore how exactly it is done, which the 
remainder of the thesis will do. 
 
 
                                          
 
73 Interview Director /Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 18/07/2008; Interview Country Director 
Project Hope, Windhoek 12/06/2008. 
74 Interview Country Director Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Windhoek  01/12/2006. 
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Chapter 3 Documents and Databases 
Documents are the single most important artefacts in civil society. Legal deeds 
and constitutions found NGOs and lay out their basic modes of operation (Prior 2003: 
60). Project proposals and progress reports generate organisations’ revenues by 
making NGOs legible for donors and the state: “accountable” in development-speak. 
Databases arrange knowledge about organisational action and their designs highlight 
certain data at the expense of other information. By setting the legitimate frame for 
civic activism documents like ethical codes and terms of reference render particular 
interventions justifiable while excluding other activities. Reports give evidence of 
NGO activities to external actors and thus function as main proof of organizational 
action. They present a particular image of the organisation to the outside world, a 
representation often repeated in concise form in leaflets, banners and other 
promotional material.  In sum documents assemble knowledge about civic activism in 
particular ways and tend to present this order as natural (Heimer 2006; Latour 1996: 
35).  The analytical focus of this chapter is what documents do in civil society and, 
through attention to their aesthetics, how they do it. It argues that documents are 
“good to think with” (Henare et al 2006) and that seeing them as actants (Latour 
1996) provides a particularly apt way to understand civil society’s practice of 
documenting. Documents as actants instigate social action and are therefore far more 
than just tools, which civic organisations use to achieve particular goals. 
 
Funding agencies require so many documents from civil society organisations 
that the high level of papers within the sector could easily be seen as direct result of 
the accountability debate and a decisive push from donors for more transparency in 
civic activism.76 To document has become a practice in its own right in civil society 
and many of the buzzwords of civil society funding like transparency and 
accountability in fact call for documentation (Riles 2000: 6). Donors do not only 
require a description of the  proposed project, but also a high number of what Richard 
Harper has called “mundane documents” (1998: 13) about different aspects of the 
applying organisation, for example statements of employment equality, proof of 
                                          
 
76 See Riles 2006: 6. The academic debate in the 1990s about NGOs’ lack of accountability had a clear 
impact on this development. The literature of that time suggested that donors should enforce more 
documentation of NGO activity in order to make them more accountable and transparent. (Charlton/ 
May 1995; Edwards/Hulme 1996). 
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legality, bank accounts, constitutions, past reports and audits. When NANGOF 
applied for a grant from the Ford Foundation the Foundation asked for so many 
papers that NANGOF’s executive director complained that she had “never sent to 
many documents at once in her life” (Research Notes 12/05/008). 
 
However, documents play significant roles in civic organisations which go far 
beyond their function in the funding cycle and some documents are even projects in 
their own right for which NGOs regularly seek donor assistance. This chapter’s major 
case studies are databases, because they are often seen to be the core of a civil society 
organization.77 Databases generate their own projects – organisations often have a 
separate budget to establish and maintain databases and to create directories, reports 
or statistics from them. The number of entries and columns are often cited to 
demonstrate organizational achievements and the breath of an NGO’s network. 
Looking at databases, but also at grant applications, feedback reports and directories 
this chapter focuses on the multiple roles of such documents. It shows how documents 
delineate the space for the legitimate action which structures organisations’ 
interactions with beneficiaries, their peers, the state and donors. 
 
 
Documents as things 
This analysis takes an interest in the ways in which documents and people’s 
behaviour are shaped and transformed by their mutual relations. Documents are seen 
as interactive things rather than tools.78 It draws on ideas developed by a “thing 
theory” in archaeology and social sciences (Brown 2001, Gosden et al 1999; 
Domanska 2006), which argues that relations between people and things are not 
reducible to crude functionalism. This means that people do not only use documents 
for particular goals, they engage in a dialogue with them that shapes their social 
reality. Documents interact with people and through that interaction make particular 
social conducts possible. Agency is therefore not restricted to people but can be an 
                                          
 
77 All three organisations discussed in this chapter, NANASO, NANGOF, and Project Hope, rely 
heavily on their database in their project designs and invest considerable time and money in their 
maintenance as will be shown. 
78 See Martin Heidegger’s (1996:61) distinction between the Vorhandenheit (availability) of objects as 
tools handled by actors and the  Zuhandenheit (handiness) of things that interact with people to create 
something new and unexpected. 
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attribute of non- humans and non-individuals (Latour 1996; Debery/Turgeon 
2007:51). As Richard Harper (1998) argued the relation between text and user is 
always active and transformational, changing both the document and its reader in the 
process. His study of documents’ “career” within the International Monetary Fund 
shows how a document’s interaction with its readers changes over the course of 
passing through different organizational divisions and how the same document thus 
becomes a different kind of thing depending on which department handles it. An IMF 
country report is seen by its authors as proof of their detailed knowledge and long 
engagement with a specific country. The Fund’s ‘documents processing unit’ treats 
the report as a file to be tagged and catalogued, the Board finally uses reports as 
policy documents that guide decision making (1998: 4) and Richard Harper shows 
how documents establish a particular link with each of these different users. It is their 
“will to connect” (Brown/Capdevila 1999: 41; Hetherington 1997) that provides the 
very core of their agency, transforming documents into “actants” (Latour 1996:6) that 
instigate social action instead of being only the result of it.  
Accordingly the chapter’s analytical focus is on the kind of interaction 
documents enable (Riles 2000:126) by “drawing things together” (Latour 1990), i.e. 
by bringing diverse subjects and mediums together on a single sheet of paper and thus 
representing a particular view of the world in convincing and powerful ways (Harper 
1998: 35). Documents impose certain orders of meaning on the (users’) engagement 
that exclude alternative perspectives (Latour 1990). Carol Heimer (2006) compared 
biographical narratives about critically ill infants with their standardized hospital files 
and showed how these different types of documents produced very different kinds of 
knowledge about the same person, warranting distinct courses of action. The different 
accounts resulted from the specific categories the documents included, but also from 
the way those categories were arranged: numerical and comparative in hospital 
records, personal and over time in biographical accounts. In a similar way the chapter 
shows how content and layout of civil society reports produced a particularly 
technical knowledge about project recipients and about NGOs’ action, that made civic 
activism comparable across organisations which excluded all ambiguity from the final 
document. 
As Adam Reed (2006) has shown, condensed documents are valued by their 
authors for the stories they invoke. His study in a jail in Papua New Guinea analyzed 
how prisoners engaged with their own one-page self description of their situation. He 
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demonstrated that they valued their so-called “autographs” because the compressed 
expression with its many short forms invoked long strands of memories and prompted 
them to retell detailed stories about their prison life. Autographs therefore contracted 
social experiences in prison into a few abbreviations. Reed’s study shows that readers 
interact with documents in various ways and that documents are far more than simple 
tools for domination or resistance as an overtly strategic analysis of them would 
assume. He shows that documents are good to think with if the analysis explores their 
content and form instead of trying to determine their instrumental value. This chapter 
employs a similar analysis of civil society documents. Instead of seeing them as 
mundanely strategic tools to advance or resist particular agendas it shows how a 
document-centric approach can reveal the various roles of documents in Namibia’s 
civic activism. 
 
 The document-centric analysis of this chapter uses databases as case studies 
and pays particular attention to the database of NANGOF’s members and the database 
of beneficiaries in the micro-credit programme of one AIDS service organization. 
Databases are particularly central for civic organisations: Most NGOs have or plan to 
have some form of central data storage about members, recipients and donors. Civil 
society organisations use these databases to create various documents, from project 
proposals to donor reports, to statistical illustrations in leaflets and to directories about 
civic activism. Databases have thus often a value in themselves to NGOs, their 
maintenance is usually a separate item on the organisation’s budget and occasionally 
an organisation employed one person just to update the records in the database.79 
Umbrellas in particular presented their databases as the core of their activities and 
used the number of database entries to demonstrate how well the NGO was tuned in 
to activities on the ground (Research Notes 01/07 2008). 
The interaction between databases- with their columns and blanks- and people 
directly impacted on the way NGOs’ represented their projects. Database columns 
illustrate how civic organisations constructed the terms of their own engagement, but 
blanks in databases show clearly the limit of the social constructivism argument, 
because they reveal that documents did not entirely define NGO interventions. In this 
                                          
 
79 NANGOF and Project Hope, the two main case studies of the chapter both employed specific 
employees to administer their database, Project Hope paid a part time employee and NANGOF used a 
full time intern. 
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sense databases warrant particular forms of social interaction like NGO reports or 
leaflets do, but databases are also a highly specific sort of document because they 
represent social reality as quantifiable and give a quasi-statistical account of civic 
activism. As Mary Poovey (1998) has argued, quantifiable data has come to be seen 
as a self evident representation of the world that does not need any interpretation; she 
shows that it was the formal coherence of statistical accounts, not their analytical 
value that embodied credibility, based on the belief that the precision of the formal 
system signalled virtue itself. In a similar way databases’ appearance of precision and 
clear cut categorisation often laid the foundations for claims to credibility of the entire 
civic sector. As Annelise Riles (1998) has argued, the correct form is most important 
in NGO documentation and documents constantly swing between their status as 
concrete objects and as reproducible pattern.    
 
The NANGOF Database 
NANGOF created a database of civil society organisations in 2004 based on a 
felt need to know more about civic activism in Namibia. In July 2008 the database 
held information about 1111 organisations codified in 187 columns which covered the 
organisations’ contact details, staffing, area of work, funding patterns, beneficiaries, 
target population and membership status. This organizational data was linked to a 
table about the organisations’ main contact persons, usually the head of the NGO or a 
permanent volunteer. The NANGOF database is often presented as the core of the 
umbrella. It has been a major item on NANGOF’s budget over the years80 and the 
NANGOF employees often cite the high number of listed NGOs as one of the 
umbrella’s core achievements. According to NANGOF’s director one of the 
umbrella’s main task is to promote its members using its database (Research Notes 
01/07/2008). At the Directors’ Forum NGO executives dismissed the government’s 
argument that very little was known about civil society and pointed to the NANGOF 
database as the most comprehensive collection of data on civic activism in Namibia 
(Research Notes 27/06/2008).81  
                                          
 
80 It was the first item on the new NANGOF Trust’s first business plan (2007-9)  and still features 
prominently in the new Business plan for 2009-11 (NANGOF 29 September 2006). This is also true in 
other organisations. NANASO’s business plan 2004-6 lists the expansion of its database as the first 
item under its programme objectives (NANASO n.d). 
81 The dismissal contradicted the Forums’ later call for a detailed study of civic activism that should 




The database is created and frequently used by NANGOF staff who add and 
delete categories on an ad hoc basis, for very mundane reasons and through 
uncoordinated everyday practices. Staff could add another category if they felt that an 
organisation’s activity was not properly captured by the existing classifications and 
they could also merge columns they felt represented the same kind of work. The 
database’s design is therefore not the outcome of one overall master plan but resulted 
from numerous decentralised manipulations. The specific outlook of the database is 
important because NANGOF staff uses it to create a host of other documents, from 
the umbrella’s regular reports and newssheets to directories about civil society 
organizations working in particular sectors and attendance lists for workshops. The 
secretariat also relies on the database to answer enquires and to decide where to send 
workshop invitations. As the central location of information about civil society 
organizations the database structures NANGOF’s engagement with its members, and 
is the main channel for the distribution of opportunities amongst organisations. The 
NANGOF database is thus an actant in Latour’s sense (1996), it forges and forecloses 
relations between organisations, it holds NANGOF’s network together and distributes 
opportunities by slotting organisation in particular thematic groups. It also creates 
opportunities for people through the specialised knowledge its software requires. The 
consultant who set up NANGOF’s database also did a similar one for NANASO and 
because he is so familiar with both he continues to receive job offers to assemble 
regular reports and directories from them (Research Notes 07/11/2007).  
 
Categories: Columns and the limits of social constructivism 
The work with databases requires specialist knowledge not least because its 
language is highly idiosyncratic and column headings need to be decoded before they 
can be understood by outsiders. Columns therefore create rules of inclusion and 
exclusion among NGO staff by dividing those who understand the jargon and those 
who cannot make sense of all the acronyms. It took me several months to decipher all 
abbreviations, some of which were only used in civil society like SWG, FBOs, CBOs 
- and not until the second half of my stay did I learn PLWHA, RACOC and 
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CACOC.82 Some organisations were only called by their acronym and it was not 
always clear what the abbreviation stood for.83 Similarly the database employed its 
own shorthand in column headings and the user needed to have considerable 
background knowledge to navigate the records. Deciphering acronyms was thus an 
ongoing interaction between the database and its users. An initial comprehensive 
decoding was necessary even for the most basic work with the database like entering, 
reading or manipulating data, and this decoding shaped further interaction. The 
NANGOF staff reproduced the same acronyms they found initially so difficult to 
decipher and, commenting on a particular obscure text, the executive director said that 
“we in Namibia, we like acronyms” (Research Notes 02/06/2008).  
 
The database allocates opportunities and sets up networks, but it also shapes 
how civic activism is perceived. Its design gives a powerful image of civil society 
activism as a series of discrete events that can be neatly slotted into columns. These 
columns can subsequently be linked back together in different ways by querying the 
database, which made the data output highly specific - if the query did not include the 
exact category under which an NGO activity was catalogued, the organisation would 
not appear in the output. The database made it therefore possible to enter ever more 
detailed information about organisations without acknowledging that the classification 
itself was a highly specific segmentation of the world (Bowker/ Star 1999: 10, 24). 
There is nothing natural about NANGOF’s separation of civic activism into 
eight sectors, and the division was occasionally questioned by members. At several 
sector working group meetings people complained that their work would fit into more 
than one category but they could not attend all meetings and would like to be 
informed about other meetings to see whether these sectors fit their own interest 
(Research Notes 01/07/2008). NANGOF’s chairperson himself admitted that the 
umbrella needed an internal discussion whether the SWG topics still represented the 
major concerns of civil society.84 
                                          
 
82 The (over)use of acronyms is certainly not specific to civil society, and academia produces at least 
as many specialised abbreviations. See Brubaker 1999. 
83 Few people knew the full title of NACSO or NANASO and even words with meaning could be 
remade into acronym like the Basic Income Grant (BIG) and the PEACE Centre (People's Education 
Assistance, Counselling for Empowerment). On this point see also Riles 2000: 123. 
84 Interview Chairman of the NANGOF Board of Trustees/NANGOF, Windhoek 10/06/2008. 
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Field √ if covered 
Adult Literacy  
Agriculture  
Animal husbandry  
Appropriate Technologies  
Career guidance  
Child care  
Civil society development  
Community Development  
Community Planning  
Conservancy Development and management  
Cultural heritage  
Early Childhood Development  
Education  
Education - Special Needs  
Elderly  
Emergency Response  
Employment creation  
Energy and energy conservation  
Environment and conservation  
Food Relief  
Gender  
Good Governance & Democracy  
Health - Mother & Child  
Health - Traditional  
Health Care - Primary  
Health Care - Secondary  
HIV/AIDS  
Housing  
Human Rights  
Information Technology  
Land Reform & Resettlement  
Marketing  
Media and communication  
Natural resource management  
Organisational Development  
Population  
Roads  
Rural Development  
Savings & Credit  
Settlement Upgrading  
SME Development  
Transportation  
Urban Development  
Vocational and Skills Training  
Water and sanitation  
Youth  
Other (specify)  
Figure 2: NANGOF Database “NGO Activity” Fields  
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Discussion around the usefulness of SWG topics and other categories in the 
database shows that the current classification system did not necessarily reflect the 
main concerns of organizations. The umbrella had created those labels and 
subsequently tried to fit all NGOs into them. The classification allowed organizations 
to be in multiple categories, but NANGOF had difficulty in accommodating NGOs 
that did not fit into any of its given categories. When an NGO called “Forum for the 
Future of Africa” applied for membership at NANGOF and proved that it fulfilled all 
necessary requirements, the umbrella could not approve of the application because the 
NGO worked on a regional level and NANGOF did not have a category for this in its 
database. The application was left pending until staff at the secretariat found time to 
create the category (Research Notes 02/07/2008).  
 
NANGOF’s categories were the result of a conscious decision how to carve up 
reality (Bowker/Star 1999) which created the terms of the umbrella’s own 
engagement. Although members occasionally challenged the exact meanings of the 
categories, they did not question the basic assumption that discrete categories 
represented fundamental differences in NGOs’ work. The umbrella’s ability to present 
its categories as more or less reflecting reality ‘out there’ points to its power to 
convince people to accept one particular discourse as natural and obfuscate alternative 
narratives (Foucault 1980; Latour 2000). As Ian Hacking (1999) points out, social 
construction is a useful analytical tool to question the ostensible inevitability of 
categories and to show who is in a position to authoritatively establish distinctions 
and how those thus classified adhere to or challenge the particular categorisation.  
 
The explanatory vigour of the power/knowledge nexus and the social 
construction of reality has made this analysis the dominant way to think about 
concepts and categories (Bowker/Star 1999; Lau 2008). However convincing the idea 
of social construction and its embedded nexus between power and knowledge is, Ian 
Hacking (1999) rightfully warns against an overuse of the concept.85 According to 
him if everything is socially constructed, the concept ceases to be analytically helpful. 
Instead it should be explained what exactly is constructed and how social construction 
links ideas, people and various social practices and institutions, in order to see the 
                                          
 
85 See also Mosse/Lewis 2006.  
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limits of social construction’s explanatory vigour. There is an ongoing discussion in 
the literature exactly to what extent social construction makes up reality. Extreme 
constructivists would claim that reality is purely a result of the dominant discourse 
and could be very different if other power/knowledge relations prevailed (Pickering 
2006). However if categories of civic activism are purely the results of power 
relations and could have been completely different, it is hard to explain why no single 
categorisation seems to completely match activists’ accounts of their projects. People 
in civil society often modified the meaning of categories in their everyday use. They 
might apply categorisations in a comparative rather than absolute manner or disagree 
with the classification altogether. 
 
The gap between categories and activists’ accounts of their projects indicates 
that people could step outside of the classificatory logic of the database when they 
talked about specific activities. When NANGOF surveyed donors on funding for civil 
society, the questionnaire asked them to tick particular boxes according to their 
funding priorities. However, the interview often turned out to be a long discussion 
about the links between different programmes, because respondents stressed that their 
projects could not be broken down into discrete categories and it was impossible for 
them to talk about one part without mentioning others. Respondents acknowledged 
that project areas were all interconnected but argued at the same time that civic 
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Activists did not necessarily believe that any classification represented a 
“natural” order, but created and applied categories in a comparative instead of 
absolute manner. Their conscious manipulation of categories differs from dominant 
arguments in the literature about the ways in which classification shapes our conduct 
by representing a particularistic view as natural. Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Star 
(1999:10) argued that classification is a spatio-temporal segmentation of the world 
that substitutes ethical questions about content with ever more formal detail. Their 
analysis of the International Classification of Diseases shows that the Index 
foreclosed any substantial debate about health and illness by labelling non-fitting 
cases like witchcraft as non-existing disease. They thus demonstrated how 
classification could represent a particular definition of health and illness as natural 
and at the same time concealed the process of how categories were made. Bowker and 
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Star concluded that categories are such a powerful representation of the world because 
we are hardly aware of their work in shaping our conduct. In their analysis, 
classifications are based on multiple decentralised practices of categorisation that 
steer our conduct, manipulate our needs and manage our behaviour. People are hardly 
aware of how this system shapes the conduct of conduct (Dean 1999:2-3) and if they 
do recognise this influence they are only left with the choice of using it for their own 
ends or resisting it.87 Irrespective of whether people use systems of governmentality 
for domination or resistance they fundamentally believe in it and act within its overall 
framework. 
 
In contrast NANGOF staff was well aware that their categorisation of civic 
activism was subject to negotiation and constant change. They did detach themselves 
from the classificatory framework by consciously adding or deleting categories 
according to context. In their interaction with the database, staff adjusted categories to 
indicate tendencies in relations to other categories, e.g. an organisation worked more 
on HIV than on gender issues, an activist had more knowledge about training than 
about ICTs or a specific donor funded saving schemes rather than employment 
creation projects.88 The comparative nature of categories also explains how an NGO 
could move from one category to another depending on the predominant perception of 
its work. There was considerable confusion within the NANGOF Board whether the 
director of the “The Rainbow Project” was the representative for the gender or for the 
human rights sector. The Rainbow Project had traditionally advocated for the civil 
rights of people in same sex relationships and was thus categorised as human rights 
organisation, but it has recently focused on service delivery to sexual minorities and 
had thus been reclassified as working on gender issues. 
 
The literature on social construction has helped to render agency behind 
categories visible but this does not mean that powerful agents could steer the entire 
process (Schneider/Ingram 1993). Very often particular views became prominent as a 
                                          
 
87 Arjun Appadurai (2001) describes how a group of civic organisations in Mumbai used survey 
methods to produce their own representation of slums. Despite his celebratory appraisal of this 
“democracy from below” he represents slum dwellers’ “resistance” as still being trapped in the logic of 
surveys and census taking instead of challenging the overall idea of categorizing the “poor”. 




result of multiple processes which were only partly influenced by distinct individuals. 
Most categories of the NANGOF database were either informally adopted from 
members or were created by the NANGOF secretariat along the way. Any member of 
staff could add columns to the database whenever they felt that a particular activity 
was not covered. When NANGOF planned to set up a directory of all local donors the 
special programmes section at the Ministry of Health contributed money to publish 
the information about funding for AIDS service organisations. The information this 
part of the directory required was much more detailed than the NANGOF database 
provided. The database only had a column for “HIV” as a subcategory of health, but 
the ministry asked to distinguish between funding for projects on HIV counselling, 
condom distribution, home based care, workplace programmes and projects for people 
living with HIV and OVCs. In the course of data collection and processing, the 
NANGOF database’s section on HIV grew exceptionally as ever more columns were 
created to accommodate the detailed information required for the directory. This 
resulted in a considerable imbalance between the specificity possible for HIV 
programmes vis-à-vis the rather crude categorization in other sectors like environment 
or social justice. Although ever more NGO projects include AIDS related services the 
expansion of the database’s HIV section was not a result of this increased concern in 
civic activism but a side effect of donor priorities and a specific data gathering 
project. The example shows that classifications are not a straightforward 
representation of organisational activity and only a combination of multiple factors 
explains which categories are chosen and how detailed a classification will be.89 
 
The meaning of categories was often the result of a repeated shuffling of 
documents and the constant reproduction of form (Riles 1998) and content in the 
process. The specific meaning of the database’s “capacity building” category has been 
produced by constant repetition of the view that NGOs only have a limited knowledge 
of funding requirements and relevant policies and therefore lack an adequate 
overview of the context of their own engagement. NANGOF used similar phrases to 
describe the “lack of capacity in civil society” in its annual report 1997/8, on its 
website written in 2004, in its introduction to the civil society management 
                                          
 
89 According to Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Star (1999: 323) there is no simple prediction from how a 
given set of alliances or tensions leads to a classification. 
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qualification 2006 and in its 2007 publication spotlight on training.90 The example 
also shows how documents link the different elements of an organisation over time 
and thus craft an institutional perspective (Harper 1998: 46). Statements cease to be 
ascribable to one particular author and come to be used by the entire organisation. 
Civil society’s lack of capacity has been a prominent topic in many publications of 
other NGOs and the opinion is widely shared within the sector.91 What “capacity 
building” meant for civil society organisations was therefore a product of the term’s 
“career” and the frequent repetitions of phrases across documents,92 instead of just a 
(thinly veiled) attempt of the umbrella to survey and steer civic activism. 
 
In sum documents play an important role in the multiple processes that 
contribute to the social construction of categories. But how do these processes interact 
in a concrete case? The next section shows that classification is a structured process 
that is influenced by the materiality and the internal logic of construction. It thus 
supports George Lakoff’s (1987) argument that there is something inherent in 
concepts that makes them more or less convincing. Concepts are shaped by the 
materiality of their object, Hacking’s “what” (Hacking 2000), the structure of the 
concepts, their Gestalt, and by the entity doing the thinking, its body and its relations 
with its environment. As George Lakoff explained, a concept’s Gestalt is the set of 
interrelated assumptions that underlie its definition. In his case study the popular 
concept of anger as heat and pressure does not only constitute a coherent system of 
linked assumptions about anger, it also directly connects with the bodily experience of 
people. As the next section will show, civil society’s concepts of ‘orphans’ included a 
coherent set of related assumptions about orphans as being vulnerable and in need of 
                                          
 
90 The 1997/8 report notes “Limited capacity within (…)civil society organisations in terms of skills, 
funds, experience and time; Little focus on proper program design, prioritising of activities and 
implementation strategies. Limited access to information that causes difficulty in co-ordination of 
activities (…) No well co-ordinated advocacy and lobbying campaign.” The opinion is repeated as  
“CSOs are insufficiently aware of policy components and miss the opportunity to actively participate 
both in the formulation of strategies and the implementation of such strategies” in a funding proposal 
2004 (NANGOF 27 June 2004:2) which results in the view that “capacity building within specific 
organisations will strengthen them to carry out their programmes more effectively and to implement 
development programmes more efficiently” on the old NANGOF website (www.nangof.org.na last 
accessed 11/08/2008) .  
91 The opinion was repeated by NGO directors and voiced in various meetings and project descriptions 
(Interview Chairman of the NANGOF Board of Trustees/NANGOF 10/06/2008; NID website 
http://www.nid.org.na/CSSP.htm (last accessed 11/08/2008); idasa n.d.). 
92 Annelise Riles (2000: 78) talks about the patterning of documents, but she refers to the constant 
reproduction of documents’ form, not their content 
 
 76
help. The concept was also fundamentally connected to the self image and asserted 
roles of those organisations that came up with the definition. 
 
 
The making of OVCs in Namibia 
One column in the NANGOF database indicates whether an NGO works with 
“Orphans and Vulnerable Children” (OVC’s).93 This section looks at how this 
category was constructed, i.e. at the interactions between the idea, the people thus 
labelled and the institutions and practices linking the two (Hacking 2000). In 2002 a 
joint workshop of government, donors, AIDS service organisations and NGOs 
working with children (MoHSS 2002) defined who was an “OVC” in Namibia. The 
OVC definition adopted after two days of discussion was: “An OVC in Namibia is a 
child under the age of 18 whose mother, father or both parents or primary caregiver 
has died, and/or who is in need of care and protection.” (MoHSS 2002: 54) 
Who was an “orphaned and vulnerable child” was thus the product of a 
specific conference debate. The definition makes clear that an OVC did not 
necessarily have to be without parents or a caregiver. Most OVC programmes in fact 
supported primary caregivers of the children and thus shifted the emphasis in practice 
to the second part of the definition, the “need of care and protection”. This “need to 
care and protect” provided external actors like NGOs, governmental agencies and 
donors with the mandate to act on behalf of the child. The GRN passed a national 
policy on OVCs in 2004 and set up an OVC national steering committee to administer 
the new national OVC Trust Fund, UNESCO hosted one of its bi-annual consultations 
on OVCs in Namibia in 2005 and USAID commissioned a data collection on OVCs in 
the same year (USAID 2005). These policies, institutions and data gathering projects 
were designed to monitor and streamline OVC programmes. One delegate at the 
national conference on OVC summed up their rationale:  
 
I believe it is also important to have records or information emanating from the ground on 
how communities are dealing with OVC (sic). We are missing this crucial information in 
Namibia. At grassroots level people have started working with the OVC issue but their work 
                                          
 
93 The OVC category is chosen because it provides a particularly illuminating example of what 




is not being recorded anywhere and we do not know what they are doing. This information 
would help us to come up with appropriate inputs.94 
 
 
The institutionalised character of “OVCs” became especially apparent in a 
debate about the “OVC trademark” in Namibia. The same conference that had earlier 
on adopted the official OVC definition also decided on a single logo for all projects 
working with OVCs in the country.95 The trademark discussion indicated that 
attendees were very well aware that the specific definition of “OVCs” was negotiated. 
However the discussion also indicated that participants were convinced that the OVC 
label was based on ‘reality out there’, because the discussion revolved around 
particular wording and did not question the overall assumption that OVCs existed.96  
 
The process of defining OVCs illustrates some of the theoretical points made 
earlier. It shows that the crafting of categories reveals who is in a position to 
determine the terms of social engagement. It was a panel of expert delegates at a 
conference who defined what it meant to be an orphaned and vulnerable child in 
Namibia. The definition had serious material consequences for the people thus 
labelled. The government adopted the definition in its national policy on OVCs 97 
which set the criteria for a person’s eligibility to state support, access to the special 
OVC Trust Fund and inclusion in international aid programmes like the World Food 
Programme’s food relief for OVCs (GRN 2006).The conference resolution also 
delineated the space for those working with OVCs by defining the best care and set 
the standards for OVC programmes (MoHSS 2002: 62ff). 
 
                                          
 
94 MoHSS 2002: 51 
95 “The old logo was abandoned because delegates found that a more corporate and professional-
looking logo would be more appropriate. It was decided that the new logo should function as the 
‘trademark’ for all written materials or activities having to do with OVC in Namibia.” (MoHSS 2002: 
5). This was a clear effort of civil society to brand its activities and create a corporate identity around 
the OVC activism. See chapter 7 for a more detailed argument about branding activism. 
96 Annelise Riles 2006: 8 showed that discussions of documents revolved around formalities and 
specific wording  instead of addressing substantial questions. 
97 GRN 2005. 
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Cataloguing OVCs: The Project Hope survey 
 
The basic definition of an OVC was not as straightforward as it seemed and 
required a number of additional assumptions to be useful for NGOs in practice. One 
of the key points was to decide exactly who was “in need of protection” and how this 
need could be measured. This section illustrates how one NGO, Project Hope 
(Namibia), has conceptualised “OVCs” in its work. It shows how the organisation had 
to use numerous sub-categories in order to define and “measure” the vulnerability of 
OVCs, including decisions what was an adequate level of food, shelter, and 
psychological support below which a child became an OVC. It illustrates Georg 
Lakoff’s (1984) argument that categories are shaped by their Gestalt, the systematic 
way to think about the category, and how the Gestalt prescribed the kind of 
information the NGO had to collect about the children to design its programmes and 
to make them legible for its donors. This section shows that the complexity of the 
underlying assumptions becomes particularly visible if those presuppositions do not 
match the respondents’ perceptions of their own needs. 
 
Project HOPE (Health Opportunities for People Everywhere) is an 
international aid agency with its headquarters in Washington DC. The NGO primarily 
runs health education programmes with a special focus on Tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS awareness. In Namibia it has established a microfinance programme 
which provides interest free small loans to carers of OVCs, in order to enable them to 
start income generating activities. The NGO closely monitors its beneficiaries’ 
progress through bi-weekly compulsory business meetings and health education 
classes. Project Hope Namibia started its so-called “Village Health Bank” (VHB) 
programme in the densely populated Oshana and Omusati regions of the north of the 







Figure 3: Area of Project Hope’s micro-credit programme and survey 
 
Project Hope headquarters presents its overall success in numbers, and claims 
that it serves 50, 000 beneficiaries worldwide and holds 40, 000 regular health classes. 
The NGO therefore uses statistics of all beneficiaries to monitor progress, which are 
based on detailed counts from its branches.98 Project Hope Namibia therefore 
designed a questionnaire for all beneficiaries in its micro-credit programme which 
was administered by local interviewers and collected by one data entry person in each 
region. The resulting database was designed to include comprehensive data needed by 
Project Hope’s headquarters about attendance and progress of health education 
classes, but also data needed for the organisation’s main donors, especially the US 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPRAR), a donor agency that asked 
for concrete numbers of benefiting OVCs. The aim of the initial survey was to have a 
stock of baseline data on all beneficiaries and a repetition of the survey every three 
months to track the changes the micro-credits made to the OVC’s standard of living. 
                                          
 
98 This illustrates Mary Poovey’s (1998) point that statistical information is usually treated as self 




# OVC served by 
Supplemental Direct 
Support 
(subset of indicator 8.1) 
5341 4280 6610 6546 6610 
154.4% Please explain why you 
seem considerably ahead 
of schedule in achieving 
your COP07 target 
6610 is the cummulative 
number of OVC that are 
receiving economic 
stregnthening support 
through their care givers 
since project started in april 
2005 
# of OVC who received 
food & nutritional 
supplementation      217 27 244 
#DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
# of OVC who received 
shelter & care      201 50 251 
#DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
# of OVC who received 
protection      13 12 25 
#DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
# of OVC who received 
health care      71 78 149 
#DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
# of OVC who received 
psychosocial support            
#DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
# of OVC who received 
education & vocational 
training        4 4 
#DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
# of OVC who received 
economic strengthening  
    6108 6375 6375 
#DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
Figure 5: PEPFAR Feedback Report for PH; Key: SAPR: semi-annual programme results, APR annual programme results; COP 





























Explanation if SAPR 
Result < 40%  




















Q1 & Q2 
= I / F 
are you on track with your 
COP07 target?  If not, 
explain in column L 
write explanation here 
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The first round of data was collected between January 2005 and March 2006. 
The long time span of the data gathering indicates how difficult it was for 
interviewers to reach all respondents. They had to travel long distances to administer a 
questionnaire that asked about the carer’s education, about housing, assets, food 
sufficiency measured in number of meals per day, household income and risk, HIV, 
links with the community, children’s psychological support and views on children’s 
rights. Risk was measured through the regularity and reliability of remittances, the 
links with the community were determined through the period of settlement, 
attendance of meetings and the level of mutual help; questions such as whether 
children talked to adults about their problems, had a memory book and attended 
religious services were to measure the psychological support available to children. 
The interviews were conducted with caregivers, because they were the primary target 
of the health bank programme and because Project Hope assumed it would be easier 
to track them over the five years programme period than children who frequently 
moved between households. 
 
 
The 1601 interviews of the first round showed major blanks, information 
regarding the caregivers’ date of birth, civil status, major form of food preparation 
and sources of income, although Project Hope staff had thought these as 
straightforward questions.99 Data in the “community coherence” and “psychological 
support” domains were even patchier. The information about attendance at “meetings 
to address community concerns” (222 out of 1601 answers missing); items stolen (224 
blanks) and existence of support groups (203 blanks) was especially inconsistent. This 
was particularly problematic in a questionnaire that was designed to have no blanks at 
all. 
 
Reacting to the problems, Project Hope staff re-designed and shortened the 
questionnaire considerably and initiated a “recollection” (repeated survey) round to 
assemble a smaller but more coherent data set. The recollection survey from February 
2006 until February 2007 included only 495 interviews and contained only half of the 
original categories. It was decided to cut down on the number of questions to make 
                                          
 
99 Research Notes Programme Officer/ Project Hope 19/06/2008. 
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the questionnaire more manageable and because quite a few questions were thought to 
be inappropriate for later comparisons. As the recollection got underway the 
interviewers soon found out that the initial problems were aggravated by the fact that 
people were difficult to trace as they used different names and often the number of 
children in households had changed. It was thus particularly difficult to re-visit 
original respondents and match data from the first and second collection rounds. If it 
was hard to obtain reliable data about caregivers this was even more the case for 
OVCs. The database has a small section with data about particular children taken 
from the records of community health visitors who monitored children’s growth 
between April and October 2007. However the database only holds records of 67 
children and all children are identified with their name, which has proven to create 
problems in tracking down children for follow-ups as they frequently move between 
households and are often known by different names.100 
 
The gaps in the data could not be resolved by the staff in Windhoek because 
the data collection and entry was done by two different people outside the capital. By 
the time the staff in Windhoek saw the data it had become completely impossible to 
trace respondents and Project Hope staff anticipated that the problems would increase 
once the second survey round was due, to measure change in beneficiaries’ living 
standards. The blanks in the data were problematic because the organisation could not 
maintain close contact with its beneficiaries and the survey was the only way for 
Project Hope to know whether its programme had an impact. 
 
As it became apparent that recollecting the data would not close the gaps and 
was unlikely to produce data that was sufficiently sound to meet donor requirements, 
the Namibian branch contacted Project Hope’s headquarters and asked for help. 
Washington sent a database expert to help redesigning the questionnaire and PEPFAR 
granted the NGO a three months extension on their feedback deadline to “clean up” 
the data and provide the detailed explanation required.101 Work on the new 
questionnaire started during my last days in Windhoek with particular attention given 
to possibilities how to track people, adapt the wording and include pictures to make 
                                          
 
100 Research Notes Programme Officer/ Project Hope 19/06/2008. 
101 See the PEPFAR feedback form above. 
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the questionnaire clearer. Project Hope staff decided to prioritise questions about the 
training of VHB members, because the report for the headquarters was due earlier 
than the donor reports. 
 
Blanks 
The main purpose of the cleanup was to avoid the blanks the first survey had 
generated. For Project Hope staff the blanks were a source of embarrassment and an 
obstacle to the smooth running of projects which could be remedied by technicalities, 
i.e. rephrasing of question and reducing the length of the questionnaire. Gaps occurred 
in the initial data because people either did not answer the question or gave answers 
the interviewers did not record because they regarded them as irrelevant and/or not 
matching the questionnaire’s categories.102 Discussions about how to change the 
questionnaire and avoid gaps in the future show that Project Hope staff in Windhoek 
and Washington thought that the blanks were a clear sign that people did not 
understand the questions properly. The idea was that blanks could be filled within the 
logical framework of the database by rephrasing the questions. That was the reason 
why the only solution Project Hope’s headquarters could think of was to send a 
database expert from overseas. 
 
However, the database’s categories were based on a number of tacit and highly 
specific assumptions and the blanks might point to a fundamental difference between 
the questions and what people could and wanted to answer, a difference that cannot be 
reduced to improper wording. The blanks in Project Hope’s database are therefore as 
interesting as the completed columns (Reed 2006) and an enquiry into the reasons 
behind the blanks leads to deeper insights into how concepts take shape. As 
mentioned earlier blanks occurred above all in questions about the sources and level 
of income, about community coherence and psycho-social support. They were 
particularly difficult to redress because incomplete data on ID numbers and 
conflicting answers regarding names and their “village health bank” codes made it 
difficult to track people. Difficulties in tracking people point to the problematic gap 
                                          
 
102 Research Notes Programme Officer/ Project Hope 19/06/2008. 
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between a survey that relied on one fixed identity marker for respondents and the 
flexibility of people’s identities that changed according to context.  
 
Some questions were arguably the direct result of reporting requirements. The 
questionnaire’s main domains of shelter, nutrition, health, education and psychosocial 
support were all directly taken from the PEPFAR feedback form. The psychosocial 
support domain included a question whether the child attended religious services, 
which was as much evidence of PEPRAR’s Christian undertones as related to the 
considerable influence of the church in northern Namibia (McKittrick 2002 Hangula 
1998). The blanks thus indicate that the survey was as much about Project Hope’s 
feedback requirements as it was about the social context it tried to describe. Other 
blanks show that categories were based on a number of problematic assumptions and 
depicted concepts that were difficult to measure. Particularly often, blanks occurred in 
relation to questions that measured respondents’ “vulnerability”, like household 
income, community coherence and psycho-social support. Closer attention to these 
blanks shows how the survey crafted a specific understanding of “vulnerability” 
which made it difficult for respondents to answer its questions.103 
 
Being “vulnerable”, however defined, had far-reaching implications for people 
as the single most important criterion to become eligible for various support funds, 
from the government’s OVC Trust fund to food relief provided by UNESCO and 
micro-credits administered by NGOs like Project Hope. Answers about (concrete) 
levels of income and food security had thus consequences for both sides. For the 
caregivers the “wrong” answers might compromise the level of support they received.  
For the NGO, insufficient numbers of eligible people questioned the rationale for its 
project because vulnerability created the “powerless” the NGO needed to justify its 
intervention. As Barbara Cruikschank (1999:70-72) has argued “empowerment” 
                                          
 
103 Contrasting the NGO’s concept with “local understandings” or “local perspectives” risks to repeat 
the mistake of postcolonial theory by presenting only one side (the “West” or the NGO in this context) 
as ethical agents capable of making fundamentally wrong moral decisions, whereas the “others” (non 
Western people or project beneficiaries) are locked in their locality which reduces their behaviour to 




projects create the class of the ‘powerless people’ as targets of and justifications for 
interventions by the “empowering” side.104   
 
Blanks did not only point to the strategic function of “vulnerability”, they also 
provided an opportunity to think about the exact meaning of “vulnerable children”.105 
 
The “OVC” concept in the Project Hope survey was shaped by the 
‘materiality’ of the ‘objects’, by the concept’s Gestalt and by the body doing the 
thinking. The concrete “material” of the concept were the non-biological children in 
the caregivers’ households whose presence provided the first criteria for Project Hope 
to identify  potential Village Health Bank beneficiaries,106 the Gestalt of the OVC 
concept was visible in the numerous questions to determine the standard of living, 
which were all thought to be related to the meaning of “vulnerability”. In this 
definition vulnerable children had insufficient food and shelter, were likely to drop 
out of school early and were left without the necessary psycho-social support to cope 
with parental loss and other grievances. The concept’s Gestalt was therefore closely 
linked to a number of assumptions about the experience of these children which 
dictated the design of the questionnaire and generated a particular knowledge about 
the beneficiaries. For instance the survey redefined any child not living in his/her 
parental household as potentially vulnerable and ignored the common practice of 
moving children between households of extended families.107 It also assumed that 
foster children were automatically disadvantaged in comparison to biological 
children, because the NGO assumed that they were more likely to receive a lower 
education, were given more chores in the household and had fewer personal 
possessions than biological children.  
                                          
 
104 The survey did not only create the group of powerless, it also defined the means of empowerment 
by asking about community meetings as prime tool to empower people. As noted above the question 
was often not answered, indicating that respondents had very little to say about Project Hope’s prime 
tool for empowerment. 
105 See Stephen Devereux (2006) for a definition of vulnerability in social protection programmes in 
other southern African countries. 
106 However this criterion is highly problematic because child fostering is such a common practice in 
northern Namibia. It shows that from the three Lakoffian elements of concepts the “materiality of the 
object” is the most problematic, because there is hardly a straightforward link between this 
“materiality” and the concept. 
107 See Urassa et al 2004 for fostering in Tanzania. Renee Pennington (1991) lists various reasons why 
parents in southern Africa foster out their children and shows that parental death only explains a 




The assumption that foster children are automatically disadvantaged is 
contested in the literature about foster care in Africa.108 Non-attendance of school is a 
problematic indicator of disadvantage because orphaned children tend to be older and 
therefore likely to be beyond schooling age (Nyamukapa et al 2003). Equating 
orphans with vulnerability focuses on parental loss as the only factor to determine the 
children’s social status and neglects other aspects like gender, class, location and 
relations to the head of household (Nyamukapa et al 2003). Lastly the questionnaire 
evaluated the “vulnerability” of children based on tacit assumptions about a “proper” 
childhood indicated through a list of essential items every child needed. The survey 
asked whether the child had at least two sets of clothes, one pair of shoes, a memory 
book, a mosquito net and a shared sleeping mattress. The questionnaire instructed the 
interviewer to observe whether those items were present rather than just asking the 
caregivers. Questionnaire imperatives like observability did thus influence which 
questions were chosen to measure overall concepts. However, it remains doubtful 
whether personal possessions are the best indicators to evaluate deprivation in the 
context of rural poverty where most items were shared. Presenting a specific group of 
people as being at risk justifies outside intervention to achieve observable 
improvements. Risk anxiety thus provided the rationale for child supervision by adults  
(Scott et al 1998) and caregivers’ supervision by the NGO – Project Hope’s bi-weekly 
meetings were designed to train caregivers but also to check on the beneficiaries’ 
”progress” in health understanding and child psychology. Accordingly the Project 
Hope database had a column for workshop facilitators’ evaluations in how far 
attendees’ understanding of child health and psychology progressed. 
 
The questionnaire illustrated how specific the notion of vulnerability in the 
OVC definition was and what huge conceptual baggage the category carried. It is 
difficult to determine how far the specific notion of an OVC was in line with the 
perceptions of caregivers, let alone much deeper questions about different 
                                          
 
108 See Urassa et al; Zimmerman 2003 vs. Wadell/Brown 1997. The latter article is an account of 
fostering amongst Oshivambo speakers, Project Hope’s main beneficiaries. It confirms that foster 
children receive lower education than biological children but does not find any difference between 
orphaned and non-orphaned foster children. Although the literature does not allow for a final 
conclusion about the status of foster children, it makes clear that orphanhood does not automatically 
result in increased vulnerability. 
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understandings of childhood and adequate childrearing.109 However, the NGO did not 
anticipate conceptual disagreements or did not regard them as decisive for the data 
collection. The project was designed by Project Hope’s headquarters for Namibia and 
Mozambique without the input of (potential) beneficiaries. The project’s 
understanding of an OVC was an outcome of the ongoing conversation between 
policy makers, donors and caring NGOs from which caregivers and children were 
conspicuously absent. And even after the survey encountered serious problems, the 
NGO did not consult the beneficiaries or re-evaluate basic concepts, but presented the 
setbacks as problems of translation. 
 
Project Hope’s concept of vulnerability shows that blanks may point to a  
fundamental mismatch between categories and experiences. However, blanks occur in 
databases for much simpler reasons. This is especially true for blanks in data that 
seemed to be “easy” to collect. NANGOF’s database has many gaps in 
“straightforward” categories like members’ contact details, staff profiles and where 
NGOs work. This data, though quick to gather for a small data set, took up an 
extraordinary amount of work-time as the database grew. In July 2008 NANGOF’s 
database listed 1127 organisations and it would be a full time job to update even the 
basic information for all of them, plus the listed 1554 contact people. One intern at 
NANGOF spent three months updating the contact people list (Research Notes 
08/05/2008) and estimates were that by the time she had completed the organisations’ 
list she could start again with phoning organisations as their contact information 
would be outdated by then. Establishing and maintaining databases is very labour 
intensive. The NANGOF database was created as specific consultancy and the 
umbrella’s current and next business plans both list maintaining and extending the 
database as one of the first priorities.  
 
Blank Consequences 
The last section showed that there could be multiple reasons why blanks in 
databases occurred. Blanks might point to fundamental conceptual problems or be 
‘just’ the result of an organisation’s lack of staff to keep the records up to date and fill 
                                          
 
109 For the social construction of childhood in Europe see James 2004, Uprichard 2008. 
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all the gaps. Whatever the reasons for blanks, gaps structured users’ engagement with 
the data by directing their attention to particular information while downplaying other 
facts (Heimer 2006). Directing attention to specific fields had a direct impact on inter-
organisational relations. When the three capacity building officers started at 
NANGOF one of their first tasks was to invite NGOs to the umbrella’s sector working 
group meetings. Since all three employees were either new or returning to NANGOF 
after a long break, they all relied on the database to decide which organisations to 
invite and how to group them together. They designed queries to find suitable NGOs 
for the different working groups - queries they subsequently used to distribute 
information, forward invitations and calls for proposals. These queries only worked 
with clear cut definitions and did not allow for ambiguous data like brackets or 
question marks, neither did they recognise gradual distinctions indicating specific 
priorities in NGO work. Queries turned blanks and bracketed ticks into statements 
about value, a tick was a value in the column, a blank was negligible. Queries thus 
decided about inclusion and exclusion of organisations in networks and distributed 
opportunities amongst NGOs. Moreover the database created a distinct picture of 
what civic activism was all about. The comparably detailed differentiation of the HIV 
sector made NGOs’ activities appear more nuanced than civic activism in socio-
economic justice, which just had one column for all activities. Although the database 
should ideally have been expanded every time an NGO activity was not covered, in 
practice the information was not entered and there was often no indication which area 
the NGO worked in. Organisations that worked in new fields therefore hardly featured 
in any query. The database’s bias towards well established areas of work became 
especially apparent in publications like directories or handbooks about civil society 
which made an authoritative claim to represent civic activism.110 All vagueness, 
ambiguities and nuances that had been still present in the database were completely 
removed from the published accounts, tendencies could not be shown and emphasises 
on specific topics were lost. With their unambiguous picture of civic activism 
publications did not only present an account of what civic activism was about, but 
                                          
 
110 See for instance the claim of the “Namibian Network of AIDS Service organisations” that 
‘NANASO (…) seeks to be in contact with any civil society organisation that is active in the field of 
HIV/AIDS (…) its contact range is (…) spread right across the country and NANASO is succeeding in 
achieving a full national coverage as a network organisation.’ (NANASO website www.nanaso.com.na 
last accessed 10/08/2008). 
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also what NGOs ought to be working on. Their lists appeared to be complete and 
there was no indication of activism outside their register. If an organisation’s work did 
not fit any of the categories it was, it seemed, because the project was irrelevant.  
Directories were not only interesting with regard to what they presented as civic 
activism, but also how they presented it and how much (more) time and attention 
activists dedicated to the directories’ formalities compared to their content. Activists 
assumed that the content was already there, at hand in the database and what needed 
discussion was how to present it. As the next section shows, formatting issues were 
thus the main point of contestation across various drafts of the documents. 
 
 
Formatting Activism: Points, brackets, headings and tables 
The discussion of categories illustrated the analytical strength of seeing civic 
activism as socially constructed. However, the strength of the power/knowledge 
assumption and the argument for social construction has presented documents in a 
highly specific, i.e. mundanely strategic way (Reed 2006). Acknowledging that 
documents can be more than just tools to achieve set goals requires a closer attention 
to the aesthetic dimensions of a document and its status as artefact. Annelise Riles 
recounts how she started to give more attention to formatting than to contents of 
documents after she had started to work with NGOs in Fiji (Riles 2006:8) and I had a 
similar experience during my time at NANGOF. I was commissioned to collect the 
data for and compile a directory of funding agencies in Namibia. After the data 
collection was complete the project took another three months to finish because the 
NANGOF’s principal client was not satisfied with the formatting and a lengthy debate 
about the order and space of columns, the outlook of pages and the brackets around 
ticks followed. 
 
The discussion seemed to indicate that what was most important was that 
funding booklet had the same design as previous directories. Formatting comments 
were justified by a supposedly greater ease to use, but tables are a highly particular 
way to represent civic activism no matter whether they list donors in an alphabetical 
order or not. The later work on the funding directory thus confirmed Riles’ point that 
the intention in document drafting is to produce an object that fits the correct format 
 
 90
(1998: 386). The evaluation criterion is the replication of one specific format across 
drafts and what disappears from agents’ view is the document’s value as text. (Riles 
2000: 78-80).  
 
This considerable attention to formalities and the ordered appearance of tables 
represents more than a slightly odd focus on formalities. The underlying idea 
suggested that the orderly image of the directory was the truthful representation of a 
neatly organised civic activism. The directory‘s design suggested that every NGO 
work could be summed up in two sentences, and all possible kinds of projects 
corresponded to a tick in the table. It was possible for the organisation to work in 
more than one area, but every activity neatly fitted into one particular category 
without fuzzy boundaries. There were no projects that did not match at least one of 
the categories. The tables were usually supplemented by a list of keys explaining the 
use of brackets, letters and symbols. The keys and the booklets’ short introductions 
(NANGOF May 2008: 15) were the most obvious examples how documents 
instructed their readers how to use them (Harper 1998: 45), but documents also 
contained more indirect tools like boxes, graphs and headings to highlight particular 
information and make other parts seem less important. 
 
Debates around formatting were therefore not simply small-minded 
contestations around font sizes, but they forged one unified opinion about what was 
important in civil society and thus worth highlighting. People held divergent views on 
what was most important in civic activism and what should therefore appear at the top 
of tables. However those differences were eliminated from the final product through 
multiple formatting rounds (Harper 1998). The editing of the funding directory erased 
the links between funding programmes which interviewees had found so important 
and presented funding as a series of discrete programmes corresponding to particular 
ticks in the tables. It also added columns that had not previously been discussed like 
“prevention of mother-to-child-transmission” as a project area or the “general 
population” as target group. The final directory did therefore not represent what 
respondents actually said and found important, but mirrored what NANGOF’s 
funding agency found worth adding or deleting (Research Notes 04/03/2008). The 
formatting changed the character of the funding directory considerably, turning it 
from a document of respondents’ views into an institutional account without a clearly 
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identifiable author. The various stages of the directory therefore illuminate how a 
document as an “object in process” (Domanska 2006:  181) changed its character and 
social relations changed depending on the state of its development and the overall 
context.111 
 
The finishing editing usually contained a decision which pictures to include in 
the final report. Images in reports, directories and leaflets were especially interesting 
as they conveyed a meaning not explicitly mentioned by the text and were a subtle 
way of emphasising particular information and conveying a certain image of the 
organisation. As the next section shows, images were a particular good illustration 
that documents enabled particular forms of interaction with them and foreclosed 
others. Images directed readers attention to specific aspects and could manipulate 
understanding of NGO activism in ways that could not be justified in the written text 
as the next section will argue.  
 
Images 
 Legal Assistance Centre : Human Rights for All 
 
Most images in civil society documents represented either areas of NGO 
intervention or organisational activities. Especially publications from AIDS services 
and Human Rights organisations pictured, rather than explicitly named, 
‘womenandchildren’ (Enloe 2000) as their programmes’ main beneficiaries. 
Environmental and conservancy organisations often included scenes of Namibian 
wildlife in their publications. The choice of images highlighted some interesting 
contradictions. For example most pictures in documents of AIDS service 
                                          
 
111 Ewa Domanska (2006), however, criticised the tendency of thing theory to treat things like people 
and furnish them with individual biographies. 
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organisations featured the very old and the very young, the two population groups 
with the lowest HIV infection rate, and environmental organisations mostly used 
aesthetic pictures of a seemingly undisturbed nature rather than representing an 
environment in need of protection. The contradiction shows that the attraction of 
aesthetic presentation outweighed the arguments for a truthful depiction of NGO 
beneficiaries - as terminally ill AIDS patients, tortured prisoners and devastated 
landscapes usually do not make attractive report covers.  
    
(Website of the Namibia Nature Foundation www.nnf.org.na) 
. 
 Website of the 
National Association of  CBNRM Organisations (www.nacso.org.na).112  
                                          
 
112 The picture of the Himba woman is an interesting combination of the vulnerability and the nature 
topic. The Ovahimba are a pastoralist community who have turned into the poster group of Namibia’s 
indigenous peoples. Although NACSO does include a few Ovahimba conservancies, they constitute a 




In sum, images in NGO reports represented Namibia above all as vulnerable 
and wild and thus in need of external intervention to “empower” and domesticate. 
There is something unsettlingly similar about the representation of beneficiaries by 
civil society organizations and colonial images of Africans as simultaneously helpless 
and potentially dangerous, which provided the justification for foreign intervention.113  
Similar to the effect of Project Hope’s survey to prove “vulnerability” of OVCs and 
thus to justify external intervention by the NGO, the pictures simultaneously 
illustrated recipients’ vulnerability and provided proofs of organisational action, 
mostly in form of workshop images. They usually showed somebody in front of a 
flipchart and a half-visible audience typically outside in a scene of village workshops. 
These images thus represented rural communities as particularly vulnerable and in 
need of the training the NGOs provided. The reports’ images are an example of how 
documents, put together in a specific way, represent particular world-views in 
powerful ways (Harper 1998:35) by imposing  a certain order of meaning and action 
and excluding alternative narratives (Latour 1990). 
  
LAC      NACSO 
 
From aesthetics to activism 
As Annelise Riles (2006) notes “to document” has become a verb, and “to 
document” has developed into arguably one of most important activities of civil 
society. The trend amongst NGOs above all to document their own activities is partly 
a response to pressure for increased accountability and transparency from donors, but 
                                                                                                                         
 
depicting the majority of the NGO’s beneficiaries. See Sobania 2002 for a related argument about 
Maasai/Zulu. 
113 See Palma 2005; Hayes/Sylvester 1999; Dunn 2004; Vaughan 1991 
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very often civil society organisations promote those values themselves.114 Documents 
give a sense of organisational action and are used as main evidence of 
accomplishments, not only vis-à-vis outside actors like donors and the government, 
but to the organisations themselves. The number of reports was often quoted as main 
evidence and major goal of organisational action. When NANGOF’s director 
presented the umbrella’s main activities in the previous quarter to the Board she first 
mentioned the publications (Research Notes 07/04/2008). NANGOF’s main funding 
budget lists the publication of at least 3 newsletters for the first quarter and the 
compilation of an annual report for the remaining 3 quarters of the first funding year 
(European Commission 2002). 
 
Reports have thus arguably developed from tools to document organisational 
activities into a major form of civic activism.115 According to NANGOF’s director a 
central task of the umbrella is to “translate output into impact”, and to promote its 
members through its reports, documents and database (Research Notes 08/07/2008). 
One NGO director proposed that NANGOF should use each issue of its e-newsletter 
to document the work of one particular member.116 The “will to document”, the 
concern of activists to know and catalogue what was “happening out there” required a 
unified image of civic activism which resulted in attempts to establish a single version 
of civic activism in the form of several ethical codes like NANGOF’s Code of 
Conduct, its catalogue of best practices and the code for organisations working with 
volunteers. As Peter Pels (2000) notes ethical documents try to discipline members of 
a profession so that its clients could have trust in the technical and moral quality of 
the service rendered.  Documents therefore did not only catalogue organisational 
action, they also streamlined it and adjusted it to fit a unified format of civil society 
action. Terms of References, Codes of Conduct, constitutions and membership 
applications all regulated inter-NGO relations by making it explicit what was 
expected from NGOs and how the relation would be monitored, including potential 
sanctions for failure to comply (NANGOF March 2007b).  
                                          
 
114 On the ever increasing influence of terms like “accountability” and “transparency” in academia see 
Brenneis 2006; Strathern 2000. 
115 In a similar development human rights NGOs have increasingly focused on research and reporting 
at the expense of training and advice. The Legal Assistance Centre has closed all but two of its regional 
offices and has practically abandoned its free litigation service to concentrate on legal research. 
116 Interview Country Director Project Hope, Windhoek 12/06/2008. 
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Documenting the future: The document as vorausweisendes Geleit  
Documents delineated what was legitimate or even thinkable in contemporary 
civic activism, and they showed what activities were possible in the future. An entire 
genre of civil society documents was oriented towards the future and was thus civil 
society’s vorausweisendes Geleit (Heidegger 1998).117 Project proposals, concept 
papers, business plans and agendas functioned as roadmaps, structured the conceptual 
thinking about new projects and delineated the course of permissible action. At the 
Director’s Forum one delegate proposed to draw up a concept paper to define “what 
we want the Directors’ Forum to do” (Research notes 27/06/2008). Business and 
activity plans framed future civic activism in concrete and measurable ways and 
attached a timeline to projects which provided the main and arguably only reference 
point to evaluate a project’s progress. In a related argument Annelise Riles (2006) 
notes that in the absence of any external reference point the only way to measure a 
meeting’s progress was the ticking off of one agenda item after the next.118 Documents 
thus structured present and delineated future civic activism. Documenting created a 
path dependency that heavily influenced what NGOs could plan for in future projects. 
 
Conclusion 
  This chapter has proposed to analyse documents as actants which 
makes it possible to see the dynamics of people-document relations that transform 
both. It also allows us to conceptualise the role of documents in civil society beyond 
crude functionalism which sees them only as tools in funding applications and 
feedback regimes. Database columns construct the terms of civic engagement; blanks 
obscure activities and render others particularly visible. Tables present civic activism 
as ordered and coherent system without blurred boundaries, ethical codes regulate 
inter-organisational relations and concept papers delineate the scope and shape of 
future activism. Papers’ careers craft institutional perspectives and documents have 
arguably become the prime mode of civic activism. 
 
                                          
 
117  It is difficult to give an exact translation of Martin Heidegger’s phrase which implies that the 
person or thing accompanies and guides at the same time and by doing so delineates the field of 
possible future actions, an approximate translation would maybe be “guide pointing the way ahead”. 




Documenting as practice in civil society includes its internal dynamics, 
unforeseen and unintended consequences, because it results from the dynamic 
relationship between things and people. This relationship was usually not articulated 
in narratives that all too often presented documents as mere tools to achieve set goals 
in civil society. Analysing documents as more than just means to achieve a given end 
shows that documentation was a civil society practice that revolved around formalities 
and thus exemplifies the basic tensions between NGOs’ aspirations and their daily 
work. NGOs often presented reports and databases in instrumental terms, as tools to 
enhance their close involvement of recipients. However, documents had the exact 
opposite effect, because they systematically prioritised questions of form over content 
and constituted a self referential system, in which it was most important that each 
document reproduced formalities of previous documents. The case study showed that 
Project Hope’s documentation was shaped by the NGO’s relations to its donors and 
peers and did not match recipients’ everyday experiences. However the NGO 
presented the resulting contradictions as consequence of improper wording instead of 
indicating a deep contradiction between the two logics which would require the 
organisation to considerably rethink its project design. It shows that documents were 
usually designed without an external reference point and the blanks in Project Hope’s 
questionnaire indicated that NGO documents might not always adequately represent 
social realities of target communities. The absence of external references was also 







Chapter 4 Of Committees and Commitment  
 
REG: Right, now, eh. Item four: attainment of world supremacy within the next  five years. Eh, Francis, 
you've been doing some work on this. 
FRANCIS: Yeah, thank you, Reg. Well, quite frankly, siblings, I think five years is optimistic, unless we 
can smash the Roman empire within the next twelve months. 
REG: Twelve months? 
FRANCIS: Yeah. Twelve months. And let's face it... as empires go, this is the big  one, so we've got to 
get up of our arses, and stop just talking about it. 
LORETTA: I agree. It's action that counts, not words, and we need action now. 
REG: You're right. We could sit around here all day talking, passing resolutions, making clever 
speeches, it's not going to shift one Roman soldier. 
FRANCIS: So let's just stop gabbing on about it, it's completely pointless, and it's getting us nowhere. 
LORETTA: I agree. This is a complete waste of time. 
--[Judith runs in, panicked.]  
JUDITH : They've arrested Brian!! They've dragged him off. They're going to crucify him. 




LORETTA: New motion? 
REG: Completely new motion. Eh, That, ah. That there be, ah, immediate action... 
FRANCIS: ... ah, once the vote has been taken. 
REG: Well, obviously once the vote has been taken, you can't act on a resolution 'till you've voted on it! 
JUDITH : Reg, for God's sake, let's go now, please! 
REG: Yeah, yeah. Right, right. In the, in the light of fresh information from, ah, sibling Judith. 
LORETTA: [taking notes] Ah, not so fast, Reg. 
JUDITH: Reg, for God's sake. It's perfectly simple. All you've got to do is to go out of that door now, and 
try to stop the Romans nailing him up. It's happening, Reg! Something's actually HAPPENING, Reg! 
Can't you understand? Yaaargh! [She rushes out in a rage.] 
FRANCIS: Oh. Oh dear.119 
 
 
Meetings are ubiquitous in civil society. People meet in working groups, 
committees, in Councils, Boards or expert panels. In June 2008 the new NANGOF 
secretariat was fully staffed and started to organise regular meetings. This June was 
also the last month of my yearlong fieldwork with the umbrella and I gained a first 
impression what work for the fully established NANGOF meant when I attended 20 
meetings in 23 working days. NANGOF worked with eight Sector Working Groups 
that met regularly every six months, but often resolved to have a follow up meeting, 
thus doubling the number of SWG meetings. The elected NANGOF Council met once 
a quarter, the general meeting of all NANGOF members was held once a year and the 
umbrella also organized meetings for all sector specific umbrellas, for all NGO 
managers and issue-based conferences.120 Spread across the year there was hardly any 
                                          
 
119 Monty Python, Life Of Brian, Transcript of the Screenplay 
http://orangecow.org/pythonet/scripts/Life_of_Brian_Screenplay.txt 
120 For one example see the next chapter’s description of NANGOF’s Consultative Conference on the 
government’s Civic Organisations Partnership Bill. 
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week without a scheduled meeting in addition to the weekly staff meeting. It could be 
argued that the experience of NANGOF is exceptional, because an umbrella existed to 
coordinate civic activism and thus organizing meetings for its members was its raison 
d’être. However, these meetings were attended by delegates from “regular” NGOs. 
NGOs were very often also members of specific umbrellas that in turn organised 
meetings and had standing committees of their own. NGOs usually had their annual 
general meetings and several specific workshops for their members throughout the 
year. Most large NGOs had their own weekly staff meeting and those registered as 
Trusts like NANGOF also had a governing Board of Trustees that met several times 
throughout the year.  Meetings were therefore not as specific to umbrellas as it may 
appear at first glance. 
 
Meetings were often presented as enhancing civil society’s effectiveness by 
providing opportunities to network, by coordinating activism and enhance information 
sharing. However, the experience of meetings was often very different. They hardly 
produced any concrete outcome and large parts of the discussions centred on protocol 
issues and the planning of further meetings. Like in the Monty Python piece at the 
beginning, it seemed that meetings never resulted in any actions outside the 
boardroom and they entirely revolved around protocol issues.121  The meetings’ 
inefficiency stood in stark contrast to the ambitious goals people set for them. In fact 
these aims were often so wide-ranging that it was impossible for any single meeting to 
address them. The Directors’ Forum Planning Session in September 2003 set out to 
“assess the current situation of NANGOF in general” (NANGOF 12 September 
2003), NANGOF’s Executive Council meeting was to find ways how “NANGOF 
[could] represent civil society [and how to] reinstall donor trust in Civic 
organizations; [achieve] greater commitment from the private sector; [and devise] 
focused activities to support its member organizations (NANGOF 13 July 2005). 
Usually at the end of a meeting the ambitious plans were postponed to a follow-up 
meeting. 
 
                                          
 
121 See also Riles (2000: 52) point that networks between women’s organisations in Fiji were mostly 
tools to create further networks. 
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This chapter looks at the contradictions between image and reality of meetings 
and argues that meetings fulfilled important functions in the organisational life of civil 
society, but had little impact outside the meeting room. Participants were well aware 
of the contradiction between expectations and outcomes, but still attended regularly. 
The chapter argues that they did so because meetings fulfilled an entirely different set 
of functions than they were set up for; in meetings people could rally support for their 
projects, reinforce personal friendships and close links between organisations; they 
could question other’s integrity and agendas and exercised control while they 
formally talked about business. People also attended meeting after meeting because 
the inherent logic of coordination always required yet another meeting to seemingly 
finally bring about closure. Meetings continuously postponed outcomes and therefore 
created a system of perpetual meetings. Coordination was thus a practice, i.e. a 
coherent system of individual actions with an inherent logic. As such coordination 
was inherently self-referential and meetings produced above all one thing: more 
meetings. 
 
Meetings – the Paradoxes 
The “real” work 
People in civil society spend a large share of their time in meetings, but they 
never referred to them as their “real” work. Proper NGO work, in their opinion, was 
project implementation - giving training, conducting research or advocating for 
particular policies. Most meetings started with an introductory round where people 
presented their organisation’s work and which thus re-affirmed the distinction 
between “proper work” and meetings. Nobody said that s/he was above all attending 
meetings, but always presented their work in terms of “projects” like environmental 
research, HIV counselling, litigation or communal training. One NGO director said 
that meetings were like “holiday” compared to his “proper” work which was far more 
demanding.122 However, civil society activism was shot through with all kinds of 
meetings, coordination meetings at the umbrellas, meetings at different ministries, 
meetings with donors and meetings with regional and international NGOs. We were 
                                          
 
122 Interview Director /Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 18/07/2008. 
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left wondering how much time activists actually spend at their “real work” and what 
exactly this true work was.123 
 
Protocol  
Meetings might not figure as “real” work, because many people in civil 
society saw them as an informal exchange of ideas and experience amongst those 
whose “real” NGO work was similar, be it because they worked on the same topic or 
because they held the same positions in their organisation. NANGOF’s Sectoral 
Working Groups124 were established as common platform for organisations working 
on a similar topic to exchange ideas and agree on common priorities in the sector.125 
The Directors’ Forum was set up as an informal exchange amongst senior managers 
to exchange experiences of leadership across the sectors. (Research Notes 
27/06/2008).  
 
The idea of an informal exchange however stood in stark contrast to the often 
strict adherence to protocol and the central role of written formalities. The NANGOF 
secretariat sent out an official invitation with an agenda two weeks before each 
meeting it organised and reminded participants with a formal letter a few days before 
the date. The agenda was repeated at the start of the meeting together with an official 
registration form followed by a formal introductory round of the participants. One of 
the first items on the agenda was the adoption of the previous meeting’s minutes and 
often also a discussion about the proposed agenda for the current meeting.126 During 
the meeting one NANGOF staff member took minutes circulated a few days later with 
the official resolutions and a short summary of the way forward. After the first round 
                                          
 
123 One director admitted that 80% of her work was communication with other NGOs to “coordinate” 
work and only 20% were conversations about their “proper work”. Interview National 
Coordinator/Namibian Association of CBNRM support organisations 24/06/2008  
124 The eight Sector Working Groups are environment, gender, health, human rights, training, 
development, education and social justice. 
125 Interview Chairman of the NANGOF Board of Trustees/NANGOF, Windhoek 10/06/2008 
126 The NANGOF Annual General Meeting  (AGM) on 7 July 2005 illustrates this procedure well. 
The AGM started with the approval of the agenda, followed by a formal welcome and two 
presentations. After that the assembly adopted the minutes of the previous AGM, followed by reports 
from the NANGOF chairperson, the Treasurers and the Sector Working Groups. The new NANGOF 
directory of civil society organisations was launched, before delegates elected the new Executive 
Council. The strict protocol contradicts the idea of the AGM as informal exchange between all 
NANGOF members to generate new ideas and the absence of any discussion of substantial issues  
contrasted sharply with the idea that the AGM should decided on the course of the sector wide 
umbrella and thus arguable on the course of a major player in Namibian civil society. 
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of Sector Working Group meetings, the Directors’ Forum and the Consultative 
conference on the partnership bill there was a week or two at the NANGOF secretariat 
when all three Capacity Building Officers did nothing but write and distribute the 
minutes of all previous meetings (Research notes 21/07/2008).127 
 
Participants in meetings were often aware that their plans to meet informally 
stood in stark contrast to meetings’ actual procedures and occasionally complained 
about the rigid structures of meetings. One director threatened to leave immediately if 
a meeting proceeded in this formalised manner and another questioned the necessity 
of an introduction round, because according to her “we all know each other well 
already” (Research Notes 24/07/2008). However, most of the time people went along 
with protocol issues and even requested the formalities. At the Consultative 
Conference on the partnership bill participants asked for the provisional minutes mid-
way through the conference to remind them on what had been discussed (Research 
Notes 13/07/2008). Attendees at the Directors’ Forum asked for the meeting minutes 
from previous years to discuss the re-launch of the Forum. 
 
Networks 
Although meetings were seen as “additional” work, people attended, because 
they saw meetings as good opportunities to exchange ideas and “network”. In every 
SWG meeting in June 2008 participants hoped to find out what others were doing or 
“what was happening” in the sector (Research Notes 01/07 2008). Civil society 
executives saw the Directors’ Forum as useful arena to learn how others managed 
NGOs and hoped to receive some tips from their peers (Research Notes 27/06/2008).  
However participants in meetings said very little about their specific activities and 
meetings hardly provided people with insights into ‘what was happening out there’. 
Very often attendees resolved to have a specific inquiry into civil society activism 
before they could plan the next steps (Research Notes 27/06; 13/07 and 01/07/2008). 
At this point - usually towards the end of the meeting- participants seemed to have 
forgotten that it was part of the present meeting’s purpose to gather more information 
about civic activism.  
                                          
 
127 Annelise Riles makes a similar point when she argues that attending meetings and “networking” 




The expectation to “network” and learn what others were doing was quite 
surprising considering the fact that most meetings brought together the same group of 
people over and over again. As chapter 2 has argued, most people in civil society had 
been working in the sector for a long time and encountered each other in numerous 
meetings throughout the year. As one NGO director pointed out, out of 26 participants 
at the Directors’ Forum ten sat on the NANGOF Board and another director 
anticipated that attendees of the Directors’ Forum would also be the delegates for the 
NANGOF AGM. Meeting the same people over and over again might have prevented 
participants from picking up new trends in other’s work. Most had only a vague idea 
about what others were doing, although people occasionally did try to give a more 
detailed description of their work, especially when their organisation had shifted its 
focus. “The rainbow project” (TRP) has recently moved the focus of its activity from 
advocacy around LGBM rights to service delivery. TRP’s director highlighted this 
very important shift for his organisation during one of NANGOF’s Board meetings, 
but people did not seem to have taken the information in. During the consultative 
conference a fortnight later Board members still referred to the TRP as advocacy 
organisation (Research Notes 13/07/2008). Even if people gave a more detailed 
picture of their work the organisation’s dominant image obviously prevailed and was 
very resistant to change.  
This indicates that people did not use the information they shared during 
meetings. Annelise Riles makes a related argument about the confusion about how 
exactly greater information sharing would benefit people’s everyday work (2000: 50). 
She demonstrates how NGO members, donor representatives and UN officials in Suva 
use meetings to create ever more networks without discussing how an improved 
coordination would advance their specific cause. To coordinate thus becomes an end 
in itself and coordinative meetings are integral part of wider activists networks which 
she defines as internally closed system of institutions, knowledge practices and 
artefacts thereof (2000:3). In this sense, meetings are one manifestation of networks, 
which in the Namibian context complemented more institutionalised forms of 
“networking” like sectoral umbrellas. The Namibian Association of conservancy 
organisations lists networking as one of its main aims, the Joint Consultative Council 
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seeks to enhance networking in the small enterprise sector, NANASO‘s vision is to 
provide “networking services amongst members”128 and enabling networks across 
civil society is one of the three key goals of NANGOF. As with Fijian activists, 
Namibian umbrellas hardly explained why networking was so essential in the first 
place and how exactly greater coordination would contribute to greater environmental 




The “single voice” 
Meetings were often said to increase civil society’s impact by providing the 
sector with an opportunity to find and “speak with one voice” as the director of one 
sectoral umbrella expressed it.129 This was seen as essential because civil society 
needed to reach consensus in broad questions of advocacy, in order to have more 
impact on policy making.130  One NGO director said at the Directors’ Forum that 
NGO executives needed to ask themselves what the Forum could do better than 
individual organisations and answered himself saying that the Forum could have more 
impact through combining participants’ influences (Research Notes 27/06/2008). 
However, meetings hardly coordinated work. Taking up sector wide concerns 
would have meant additional work for already overcommitted activists.131 Attendees 
were thus reluctant to take up additional work, let alone to coordinate a whole series 
of tasks amongst themselves. The meetings’ resolutions were hardly the selection of 
the most urgent issues at the end of long deliberations on alternative priorities. In 
every meeting I attended for NANGOF the participants chose to act on the issues that 
were well prepared and presented without discussing alternative topics. After the first 
SWG meeting in July 2008 the NANGOF staff felt that the discussion needed a more 
structured approach and started to suggest their own priorities, above all advocacy 
work around relevant new policies and bills. They suggested this to all SWGs and all 
                                          
 
128 See www.nananso.com.na (last accessed 28/04/2010). 
129 Executive Director NANASO 22/07/2008. 
130 Interview Chairman of the NANGOF Board of Trustees/NANGOF, Windhoek 10/06/2008 and 
Research Notes 22/07/2008. 
131 At the NANGOF staff meeting after the Directors’ Forum the secretariat thought that the high 
turnout of senior managers at the Forum was a “small wonder”. Usually only a few senior managers 
attend any civil society wide meeting because most were out of town (Research Notes 30/06/2008). 
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working groups adopted this as priority. The SWG gender has focused above all on 
law reform reflecting the decisive influence of the two strongest organisations in the 
sector, the LAC’s gender unit and Sister Namibia. In SWGs where no organisation 
pushed a particular issue the group usually did not agree on a common priority 
(Research Notes 01/07/2008). Meetings were thus not platforms for free deliberation 
and often presented a particular predefined opinion as consensus. Meetings therefore 
provided already strong organisations with an even louder voice, because they could 
prepare a convincing presentation which was likely to gain support. Meetings were 
thus good opportunities for participants to rally support for their position because 
resources were often too scarce to investigate alternative options and well presented 
points of view were often accepted.  
 
The expert forum 
Institutionalised meetings like NANGOF’s sector working groups were 
usually presented as the backbone of the umbrella, the location of the real expertise 
and source of legitimacy for anyone claiming to represent civil society. NANGOF’s 
director said that even the umbrella’s chairperson could not claim to represent civil 
society if he was not mandated by the SWG or by the annual meeting of all NANGOF 
members (Research Notes 14/ 05/2008). Meetings were presented as pooling expertise 
in civil society and thus arriving at truly informed decisions. The SWGs as 
NANGOF’s “expert forums” usually appointed an organisation, which acted as 
mouthpiece for the group and was usually presented as leading expert in its specific 
field. But very often lead organisations were chosen on more mundane grounds. The 
Urban Trust for example became the lead organisation for the Sector group on Urban 
and Rural development because they had a boardroom large enough to host the 
meetings.  
 
Contrary to the image of meetings as generating expert decisions most 
meetings only identified the need for further information before anything could be 
decided or done. Very often deferrals were a set point on the meetings’ agenda, often 
under headings like ‘thinking about the way forward’. This ‘way forward’ usually 
took the shape of another meeting, committee or task force. Decisions were thus 
constantly moved forward to the next meeting or shifted into even smaller 
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committees. In many meetings the participants felt they could not arrive at a decision, 
because they either knew too little about the issue and needed to have more 
information or because an important group was not present and needed to be 
consulted before a final decision could be made. The continual deferral of decisions 
and resolutions stood in stark contrast to the overall idea that what committees were 
all about was decision-making. Meetings above all announced decisions rather than 
bringing them about and the constant shift of action into the next meeting resulted in 
no action at all. When NANGOF’s Executive Council was to be reconstituted the 
outgoing council decided to hold a special “brainstorming” session about the way 
forward instead of discussing the matter then and there (NANGOF July 13, 2005).  
The Directors’ Forum resolved at its very first planning meeting to have an additional 
session a week later, in order to work out the exact role of the Forum within 
NANGOF (NANGOF September 12, 2003). 
 
In sum, the meetings that were designed as platforms for exchange amongst 
experts were often caught up in discussions about procedures and formalities and 
hardly discussed substantial issues. Both participants and outsiders would later 
present those meetings as source of knowledge within civil society and as place where 
civil society meets and interacts; and meetings were indeed an important source of 
knowledge albeit a particular kind of knowledge. Meetings did not lead to a better 
understanding of other organisations’ work or provide people with clearer ideas about 
areas for cooperation, but they supplied people with knowledge about procedures, 
protocol and information about other meetings. Riles (2000: 59) observed that 
speakers at meetings in Fiji often alluded to decisions of previous meetings and used 
acronyms that excluded any new participant. They thus stressed their affiliation to 
wider activist networks and demonstrated that networkers were above all defined by 
their personal and institutional connections. 
Information exchange was a value in itself and did not have to be discussed in 
reference to external issues. As Helen Schwartzman (1989:276) argued, meetings 
always reflect dominant norms of interaction and interpretation. Civil society’s 
meetings therefore mirrored dominant perceptions in the sector that consultations 
were desirable as ends in themselves and that decisions had to be taken collectively 
rather than in a hierarchical manner. In this sense meetings were the central place 
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where people displayed the emphasis civil society placed on consultation and 
negotiated rules of proper interaction.  
Assigning representation 
Meetings did not only constantly shift decisions forward, they also transferred 
their action to particular individuals by appointing delegates. Whenever the meetings 
needed to nominate a spokesperson usually the same few individuals were chosen, 
despite the fact that those were the people already so overcommitted that they could 
hardly be expected to fulfil their new duties. In fact they already had a reputation for 
not being able to realise their commitments, but they were still appointed over and 
over again. When the new advisory committee on the government’s partnership bill 
needed two representatives from civil society, the sector nominated the NANGOF 
chairperson and the founder of the NANGOF Trust. Both were well known for being 
overcommitted, and doubts were raised whether either of them would really be able to 
attend any of the committee meetings. NANGOF’s director expected already that she 
would have to stand in for them (Research Notes 02/06/2008).  
 
It was quite strange that over-committed people got nominated and it was even 
more surprising that people took up the responsibilities knowing perfectly well that 
they would not have the time to live up to the task and really fulfil their role. Why did 
they not just decline the offer and suggest somebody with more time? Part of the 
explanation was surely that some committees had significant influence and 
committees like Boards were held in high esteem. Boards were often seen as the 
embodiment of an organisation’s democratic principles and as having wide-ranging 
influence on the work of NGOs. They selected and monitored the organisation’s 
management, they approved the budget and the Board’s chairperson, rather than the 
executive director, acted as the official spokesperson for the NGO. NANGOF’s Board 
of Trustees had run the organisation in the years when NANGOF could not afford to 
employ any fulltime staff. When new funding was secured the Trustees selected the 
incoming executive director and when the new NANGOF Secretariat took shape some 
Trustees still felt they had a say in the umbrella’s management. The new director once 
said she really did not know why the Board had appointed her in the first place, 





The powers of Boards and their image as the embodiment of democracy and 
transparency stood in sharp contrast to the secrecy of their meetings. NANGOF Board 
meetings were not open to members and their minutes were only distributed amongst 
the Trustees. No written evidence of them was found in the umbrella’s annual report 
or any other publication. It seems that accountability and transparency, so much 
emphasised in the daily administration of NANGOF, did not concern its Board. The 
wide-ranging power to steer the umbrella’s course was often opposed to the Trustees’ 
little knowledge of the organisation’s daily routine and duties. 132 Sitting on a Board 
was a political office and trustees were elected and not chosen because of their 
profound knowledge of the NGO they governed.133 The Boards’ prestige might have 
partly explained why over-committed activists volunteered to be delegates, but Board 
meetings embodied a new set of internal contradictions. 
 
Explaining the paradoxes in meetings 
Participants were well aware that meetings were not necessarily informal 
exchanges between experts to network and coordinate work. If meetings did not do 
what they were supposed to do, why did people have them in the first place? Why did 
they spend so much time at them, and why did they continue holding onto the idea 
that they were important?  The managerial literature on meetings has often focused on 
this contradiction. Nicholas Romano and Jay Nunamaker (2001:11) conclude that  
 
several decades of studies [in management science] reveal [that] meetings are very costly in 
both terms money and time (…) In general meetings are unproductive, wasteful and suffer 
from a myriad of problems, making managers and workers alike dissatisfied with the process 
and the outcomes in many cases. [However], meetings are essential to accomplish tasks that 
individuals cannot complete by themselves.  
 
Scholars have often assumed that meetings’ effectiveness was decreased by 
faulty implementation and lack of proper planning. They thus advised to increase 
meetings’ rates of return by selecting participants more carefully, by preparing better 
                                          
 
132 The elitist tendencies were occasionally criticised by staff and volunteers at the NANGOF 
secretariat, e.g. the Board members were once referred to as “glory-seekers” in a staff meeting 
(Research Notes 10/03/2008). See also Schwartzman (1989: 148). 
133 There were notable exceptions though. The LAC’s Board for example consists mostly of the 
NGOs’ former directors who have a profound knowledge of its work.  
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and implementing agendas more rigidly (Kloppenborg/Petrick 1999; Nixon/Littlepage 
1992; Tropman 1996). However, Nicoals Romano and Jay Nunamaker’s (2001) 
overview reveals that a long tradition of advice literature has not resulted in meetings 
that are effective enough to make further advice redundant. The continuing failure of 
the literature to make meetings more efficient might indicate that the gap between 
expectations and outcomes might not be a question of better planning or improved 
implementation but might lie at the very heart of the meeting’s design. This chapter 
therefore sees the gap between expectations and outcomes as a valuable starting point 
for an analysis that seeks to understand what meetings in Namibian civil society 
actually did instead of trying to determine how they ought to function.  The section 
will start with a typical example of a civil society meeting by describing the SWG 
education meeting of July 1st 2008. SWG meetings were in fact all very similar and 
the NANGOF staff sometimes left the boardroom in their 6th or 7th SWG meeting to 
read the paper next door, because they had heard it all before. Procedures and topics 
were constantly re-occurring across different types of meetings and over the years. 
Since meetings resembled each other over the years and across thematic boundaries I 
will give one detailed description of a meeting to demonstrate some generic features 
of civil society meetings. 
  
 The Sector Working Group Education Meeting 1 July 2008 
 
The meeting is scheduled for 8.30 in the morning and starts with tea/coffee for 
30 minutes which is necessary because about half of the attendees arrived just in time 
for the proper meeting to start. Those who had been in early chat over coffee as they 
obviously know each other well. At 9am a NANGOF employee welcomes everybody 
and asks participants to do a short introductory round in which everyone is asked to 
say their name, organisation and what they expected from the meeting. From the 
seven people attending the meeting, three hope to find out how the SWG can assist 
their organisation, either because they have just started an NGO or they manage an 
established organisation that is taking on a new project in education. All seven wish to 
get more information about other organisations working in education and hope to 
establish a forum to speak about education from a civil society perspective. One of the 
participants is from an international donor agency and has come with several reports 
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the donor had commissioned. She had brought the reports in order to solicit comments 
from civil society before the findings are officially launched.  
 
Following the introduction NANGOF’s director gives a presentation on the 
role of the secretariat, stressing very much how important the SWGs are for the 
umbrella’s functioning. Then she opens the floor for a general discussion about which 
issues in education the SWG wishes to take up. During the following discussion 
participants agree that formal education in Namibia is in bad shape and civil society 
should do something to improve the standards. However, what form this intervention 
should take exactly is not agreed. One lady is keen to further the agenda on early 
childhood development, two others are interested in school boards,134 and two women 
propose to work on educational programmes in the mass media. Everyone explains 
why his/her particular concern is central to improve the standards in education, and no 
one is prepared to give it up in favour of a common priority.  At the end the group 
resolves to comment on the reports the donor representative has brought and to have a 
special workshop to deal with them a fortnight later. Everybody agrees to read the 
reports until then and two people are asked to prepare a small presentation on the 
reports to facilitate the group’s input. 
 
The meeting included most paradoxes outlined in the chapter’s first section, 
the heightened expectations of meetings for networking and information sharing, the 
participants’ self image as experts and the modest results after 2 hours discussion. It 
was my first SWG meeting and I left it considerably disillusioned. My colleagues at 
the NANGOF Secretariat felt the same, but other participants did not appear to share 
our disappointment and seemed to be used to this outcome. The NANGOF staff was 
so disappointed because the meeting did not create a closer network between 
attendees. Everyone was so occupied with his/her priorities that they did not take up 
other people’s arguments or try to combine their interests. The meeting’s main 
resolution to comment on the reports was not the result of expert agreement on the 
most important topic. The reports concerned very different topics in education, school 
boards, inclusive education and a new project called etsip (education and training 
                                          
 
134 School boards are regular committees in schools made up of teachers, learners and parents. 
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sector improvement programme). The SWG simply decided to comment on all of 
them and thus acted on what was tangible instead of on what was urgent.135 
 
NANGOF staff had expected the meeting to produce a common project that all 
organisations in the Sector Working Group would take forward and hoped that the 
meeting would also create a closer link between the umbrella and its members. We 
were quite disappointed when it did none of the above and this had surely to do with 
our inexperience in civil society’s meeting culture and our unrealistic expectations 
about the outcome. But what were then “realistic” expectations on meetings and what 
did they actually do if they did not fulfil the purpose for which they were arranged in 
the first place? The next section will argue that meetings displayed and reinforce 
social relations between organisations and individuals, they provided activists’ 
commitment with an ever new impetus by constantly deferring hope to the next 
meeting, and most importantly- and most obviously- they generated more meetings 
and thus enabled the organisational life of civil society to constantly renew itself.  
 
The social life in meetings - Repetition and Relevance 
The formal procedures of very different meetings were almost always the 
same. Most meetings started with tea and an introductory round followed by the 
adoption of minutes from the previous meeting and some form of presentation and a 
general discussion. The very rigid regularity was consistently enforced and made the 
course of any meeting highly predictable. Writing about a political meeting in the 
Kilimanjaro region in Tanzania Sally Falk Moore (1977) has argued that the formality 
of meetings as “secular rituals” limits the range of improvisation and thus conveys the 
message that certain things are unquestionable and simply cannot be changed. This 
way ceremonial form domesticates the indeterminacy of the event and turns any 
particular ceremony into a part in a wider chain of similar events. Participants use the 
same phrases and behave in similar ways as they or their predecessors have done at 
similar occasions (Bloch 2004:68). This repetition creates permanence (Myerhoff 
                                          
 
135 Finding priority issues in education was already discussed in 2006 when the SWG education  
decided it needed a clearer focus and nominated three people to “look into the matter”. The three 
delegates were typical nominees, they were well connected, already very busy and usually received 
most nominations from the sector. Judging from past minutes it does not appear that the delegates ever 
delivered those findings. 
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1984) and provides participants with a sense of continuity of self and the world 
around them  (Kertzer, 1988:9-10).  
 
Participants in meetings displayed and negotiated social relations in meetings 
by formally talking about business. From this perspective it becomes less important 
that people did not share important information in meetings and hardly found a 
common priority. Meetings in Namibian civil society consolidated relations and 
confirmed closeness between organisations. The SWG gender could agree on a 
common priority because the two major organisations, the LAC gender unit and Sister 
Namibia, worked closely together. Where organisations did not work together the 
SWG was weak: this was the case with the Sector Working Groups “Training”, 
“Education” and “Social Justice”. Meetings not only displayed organisational 
cooperation, participants also used them as an opportunity to stage togetherness. In 
civil society wide meetings NGO representatives from the same sector usually sat 
together.136 NANGOF and several other NGOs organised their Board meetings as 
working lunches. The official reason was that Trustees did not receive a sitting fee 
and the NGO pays for their service with a free meal.137 However, lunching together is 
a social occasion and strengthens the relations between Trustees and consolidates 
their personal attachment to the organisation. Meetings did not only display closeness 
between organisations but also within NGOs.  As Helen Schwartzman (1989:42) 
argued, in meetings attendees could comment on others’ personal commitment or 
assert their position vis-à-vis their organisation while they made factual decisions. 
This minimised the risk for open conflict, but very often power relations were only 
thinly veiled. NANGOF’s director said that the NANGOF Trustees who opposed her 
often asked petty questions about her management style and always found something 
to criticise whereas those supporting her tried to fend off the critique. One Trustee for 
example demanded that the director’s probation period was extended from three to six 
months, but the chairperson replied that the probation time was set out in the contract 
and could not be changed retrospectively. While all were talking about business the 
                                          
 
136 At the Consultative Conference the NANGOF staff and the chairperson of the board sat together, 
and so did the directors from environmental organisations, and the heads of organisations working with 
disabled people. 
137 The free lunch seemed to be a popular motivation for Trustees. When the Joint Consultative 
Council’s (JCC) new director changed the catering for “her” Board from a full lunch to fat cakes 
attendance started to decline rapidly (Research Notes 19/02/ 2008). 
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director suspected that the question was a comment on her performance and a power 
struggle between NANGOF’s Board and executive rather than a remark on the 
probation period (Research Notes 26/02/2008). 
 
 
It is striking that contested discussions in Board meetings were around 
protocol issues, and critical questions were asked about personal performances rather 
than about substantive issues like which projects NANGOF should take up or how the 
organisation should relate towards the government. Those points were usually 
“acknowledged” or “noted” after the fact rather than decided.  Helen Schwartzman 
(1989: 238) notes that the discussion about particular persons in board meetings 
allowed participants to comment on their relation to the organisation and talk 
themselves in and out of the organisation. By critiquing the organisation’s director 
Board members displayed their commitment to the institution and reaffirmed their 
prominent position in the organisational hierarchy in the guise of talking about 
work.138 Conflict was legitimate, because it was presented for the sake of the 
organisation. By criticizing the director NANGOF Trustees made a statement about 
their personal connection to the umbrella. Asserting the right to comment on 
particular management decisions meant that Trustees had a meaningful role in the 
running of NANGOF and showed that they had the umbrella’s best interests at heart. 
It allowed them to present themselves as the guardians of the umbrella. By criticizing 
the director Trustees claimed their special privilege to speak on behalf of the 
organisation, especially vis-à-vis the appointed staff. Finding fault with the director’s 
management was therefore not only a statement about the relations between particular 
persons, it also displayed the conflictual relations between the elected and appointed 
NANGOF group. The discussions in Board meetings mostly concerned protocol 
issues and were arguably about hierarchies and interpersonal relations between 
people, as well as between people and organisations. What was left undiscussed, 
however, was the direction NANGOF was heading and what constituted meaningful 
civic activism more generally. The next section argues that the rules for proper 
conduct in civil society were the result of multiple smaller attempts to control and 
streamline activism.  
                                          
 




Hierarchies and Civil society’s “one voice” 
People regarded meetings as essential, because they coordinated civic 
organisations whose aim should be to “speak with one voice despite our diversity”.139 
A sector wide common position was thought to bring civil society much more 
influence in policy making and vis-à-vis donors. This “single voice” was all too often 
articulated by few vocal individuals from strong and well-connected organisations.140 
The Directors’ Forum, the consultative conference and all SWG meetings in 2008 
relied on a small group of presenters and outspoken participants for input. All 
opportunities to speak at length were distributed amongst these 8-10 people.141 
Meetings publicly displayed the dominance of strong individuals and organisations by 
providing them with a reserved space to voice their opinion. This is not to say that the 
right to speak was consciously withheld from others, but it was only a small number 
of people who had both the image as competent expert and the relations to people 
deciding on those slots in order to be asked to give a presentation.142 However, an 
even distribution of voice is a central precondition for an open discussion of 
alternatives and consensus finding. The meetings’ structure therefore foreclosed the 
chance of discussing alternatives and arriving at any resolution other than those 
suggested in the presentations. As Marilyn Strathern (2000:2) notes only certain social 
practices create accountability, i.e. take a form that will convince those to whom 
accountability is rendered, that accountability has indeed been achieved. In theory, 
plenary discussions in meetings provided all participants an equal opportunity to 
participate in decision finding which spoke directly to civil society’s central value of 
consultation. Activists could therefore present meetings as major forum to create 
                                          
 
139 Executive Director NANASO 22/07/2008; Interview Chairman of the NANGOF Board of 
Trustees/NANGOF, Windhoek 10/06/2008 
140 See the distinction in chapter 1 between strong and weak organisations. 
141 The NANGOF chairperson presented at the Directors’ Forum and the Consultative Conference, the 
director of the LAC presented at the same conference and he also spoke at length at the Directors’ 
Forum, one director of a children’s organisation gave different presentations in the sector working 
groups ‘education’ and ‘training’ and NANGOF’s director gave a presentation in each SWG meeting. 
This anecdotal list of presentations indicates that in different forums a same group of individuals shared 
all opportunities to speak at length. 
142 This confirms the general distinction between strong and weak organisations. Typically the 
directors of strong organisations would be in a position to present at meetings and thus decisively 
influence the overall decision. 
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accountability in the sector while neglecting that meetings silenced alternative 
opinions through an uneven allocation of voice. 
 
The prominent role of particular individuals and organisations in civil 
society’s (one) voice was also visible in the patterned delegation of tasks assigned to a 
small number of people. Legal issues were usually referred to the LAC and not to the 
National Society for Human Rights that also employed a number of lawyers. When 
NANGOF needed to be represented, usually the chairperson of the Board was 
nominated although any Trustee could fulfil the task and delegates for committees 
around HIV/AIDS usually came from NANASO, although a lot of other organisations 
worked on the topic. Appointing representatives was as much a statement about 
individual or organisational prestige in civil society as it was about delegating tasks. 
This explains why the same people were nominated over and over again despite 
considerable doubts that they would have time to fulfil their duties and had to send a 
deputy. NANGOF’s executive director often stood in for the chairperson in NPC- EC 
meetings143 and went to the regional conference on poverty alleviation in his place 
(Research Notes 28/02/2008). Overcommitted people did not refuse to take up a new 
responsibility as they knew they would not necessarily have to do it themselves. By 
accepting the nomination they were acknowledging their status rather than making a 
definite commitment to the job. 
 
The “common voice” and the disciplining project 
The very idea of having a sector wide common position indicated that some 
people wished for a more homogenised civil society. Directors of sectoral umbrella 
organisations were especially keen to create “synergies” in civil society through 
denser information exchange and a more centralised data storage. They were 
concerned that if umbrellas did not know about their members’ activities this would 
ultimately lead to confusion. One director said that what he saw as chaotic state of 
civil society was brought about by “organisations coming into our land and work with 
                                          
 
143 These were regular meetings between NANGOF, the government’s ‘National Planning 
Commission’ and the ‘Delegation of the European Commission to Namibia’ which was NANGOF’s 
major donor. For a more detailed discussion about these relations see chapter 6. 
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our constituencies and the umbrellas don’t know about it”.144 Similarly NANGOF’s 
director argued in each SWG meeting that members ought to provide NANGOF with 
information about their activities so that the umbrella could promote and support 
them. Directors of umbrellas stressed how important the coordinating role of their 
organisations was. NANGOF’s chairperson said that it was only through coordination 
that civil society could demonstrate its contributions to development and that the 
sector risked over-investing in one area and neglecting important topics if 
organisations did not share information and coordinate their activities.145 Occasionally 
civil society organisations would question this “will to know” and emphasised that the 
umbrella did not own them, i.e. could not demand services or information from them 
that they were not willing to share (Research Notes 17/06/2008). This indicated that 
some organisations saw meetings not as harmless service by umbrellas to enhance 
communication amongst members, but regarded them as intrusion into their work and 
as part of a centralised information gathering. Resistance often came from smaller 
organisations whereas directors of strong organisations said that NANGOF should 
ensure certain standards in civil society and thus wanted the umbrellas to survey civic 
activism more closely.146  
 
Defining and maintaining standards was thus a way to delineate what counted 
as “proper” civic activism. More coordination in civil society presupposed a 
centralised decision which areas organisations should work in. “Coordination” and 
“ensuring standards” were thus subtle mechanisms to steer the sector’s activism. The 
most important mechanism governing civic organisations were thus not the elected 
Boards147 but patterns of peer review in which the stronger organisations and 
umbrellas usually assessed smaller organisations. 
                                          
 
144 Executive Director NANASO 22/07/2008. 
145 Interview Chairman of the NANGOF Board of Trustees/NANGOF, Windhoek 10/06/2008. 
146 Direct forms were attempts to enforce self regulation described in the next chapter and the often 
voiced opinion that NANGOF should “ensure standards” in civil society (Interview Chairman of the 
NANGOF Board of Trustees/NANGOF, Windhoek 10/06/2008; Research Notes 22/07/2008). The 
umbrellas tried to monitor civic organisations directly but also used indirect forms of surveillance like 
peer review and peer pressure. A director of a sectoral umbrella explained that she published success 
stories of members so that non-performing organisations felt embarrassed and doubled their efforts  
Interview Coordinator, National Association of CBNRM Organisations, Windhoek 24/06/2008. 
147 This stood in stark contrast to the way NGOs presented accountability within civil society.  When 
asked how to deal with organisations pursuing quite contested projects NANGOF’s chairperson smiled 
and said those organisations should be held accountable through their internal governance system and 




Meetings as meetings 
 
Error consists in seeing what is not there, and not seeing what is there.  
     D.H. Lawrence 
 
The last section argued that meetings were arenas where people enact and 
display solidarity, hierarchy and commitment. This was surely an important function 
of meetings, but Namibian civil society is very small and people have plenty of other 
occasions to meet and negotiate their relationships, especially as most activists had 
been working in the sector for a long time. It is thus questionable whether people 
attended meetings for the sake of interpersonal relations. Helen Schwartzman (1989) 
argued that meetings fulfil a number of social roles for their participants. Her 
ethnographic account of meetings in a mental health institution demonstrates how 
meetings provided staff with an opportunity to make sense of their interpersonal 
relations by drawing together what would otherwise remain disparate actions and talk 
(1989:9). In her argument meetings were good to see organisational values as they 
clearly embodied the institution’s dominant forms of interactions and relations. 
Meetings’ form and content displayed and challenged hierarchies, bonds and conflicts 
between management and workers and between staff and the organisation. 
Schwartzman’s ethnography took the analysis of meetings beyond the purely 
functionalist explanations of meetings when she proposed to use meetings as central 
unit of analysis instead of looking at meetings as one manifestation of small group 
dynamics, decision making in organisation or specific speech acts in organisational 
communication. However, her account is still based on the assumption that meetings 
reveal some concealed truth about organisations and that the real reasons why people 
attend meetings lie outside meetings. 
 
Assuming that the meetings’ real aims remained hidden and were only 
indirectly addressed remains speculation. In the end all explanations of meetings as 
something else, be it as rituals (Peck, Gulliver/Towell 2004), speech acts (Myers 
                                                                                                                         
 




1986), communicative events (Hymes 1974) and arenas for social relations 
(Schwartzman 1989; Owens/Suttons 2001) run the risk of error in D.H. Lawrence’s 
sense, because none of my informants ever saw meetings as anything other than 
meetings.  
 
I therefore propose to pay more attention to what meetings actually do and 
how people create links between them. As Eric Wolf stated “how do we get from 
viewing organization as product or outcome to understanding organization as process? 
For a start, we could do worse than […] look at "the flow of action," to ask what is 
going on, why it is going on, who engages in it, with whom, when, and how often.” 
(1990:591). The following section argues that the key to understanding meetings in 
Namibian civil society might lie in what seemed their most paradoxical features: that 
they were mostly about protocol issues when they were supposed to address 
“substantial” questions and that they produced above all one thing: more meetings.   
 
The “Hope-generating machine” 
Running the risk of stating the obvious I suggest to see a meeting as a concrete 
event where participants do things: they leave their offices, talk to their peers, make 
notes, they may even give a presentation. Meetings are immediate, i.e. happen at a 
fixed time and place; they produce evidence in form of minutes and reports and they 
are different from office work. The change between settings - the office and the 
meeting room - creates an impetus in the daily routine and might provide activists 
with the motivation to carry on. The Directors’ Forum was established as opportunity 
for managers to break away from their offices and reflect on common issues. The 
Sector Working Groups were also set up as arenas for people working on similar 
topics to come together and reflect on common priorities away from their everyday 
project work. Meetings were thus frequently presented as opportunities to “break-
away” from the routine office work to reflect on common issues and find fresh 
approaches to widespread problems. 
 
Interestingly, the mismatch between high expectations and poor outcomes of 
meetings was part of the impetus meetings provided. The disparity perpetuated the 
hope that things might change and that the next meeting would deliver better results 
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than the previous one.148 The high number of follow-ups point to this continued 
deferral of hope. The SWG Education’s decision to have a special workshop on the 
reports expressed the hope that participants were able to produce demonstrable results 
at their next meeting. The sequence of meetings was thus what Monique Nujiten 
(2003:16) called a “hope-generating machine” as it constantly moved the 
accomplishment of goals to the next meeting and by doing so created ever new 
possibilities for the fulfilment of goals. Nujiten’s ethnographic account of the 
interaction between a peasant community in Mexico and the institutions of the central 
state has shown how Mexican agrarian bureaucracy continuously fosters hope in 
peasants by ever deferring decisions and by giving the impression that cases will be 
resolved when in fact they are always just postponed. In a similar way meetings 
hardly forsake cases and people could pursue and hope to fulfil their ideas over the 
course of many consecutive meetings.  Meetings were especially powerful “hope-
generating” machines amongst NGOs, because participants often felt the pressure to 
be seen as doing something and to live up to the popular image of civil society as the 
embodiment of activism.149 
 
Meetings as paper tigers  
Paper was so important in all committees, conferences, workshops and task 
forces, because it provided the central link between meetings. Participants in a 
meeting referred to their previous meeting through the adoption of its minutes and to 
the next through the “thinking about the way forward” item on the agenda, which 
usually turned out to be a discussion about the next get-together. Agendas were thus 
an integral part of the hope-generating function of meetings. After a particular 
meeting had ended people could go back to its minutes, write resolutions and press 
statements as the main evidence of organisational action (Schwartzman 1989: 40). 
That was the reason why formalities often seemed to be more important than the 
actual topic of the meeting. 
 
                                          
 
148 See Ernst Bloch’s description of hope as the “not yet” (Bloch 1986 cited in Kelly 2009:12). 
149 As David Lichterman observed: “We think of activists as storming barricades, lying down in roads, 
confronting police. But just as frequently, activists discuss.” (Lichterman 1998: 403). 
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The SWG Education decision to concentrate on the donor reports is an 
example for the important role of paper as basis for action. In the first meeting nobody 
could have read the reports and the SWG could not have concentrated on them 
because they were about particularly important issues in education. They were simply 
taken up because they were a concrete objective people could act on. In the following 
workshop it became clear that only the two people giving a presentation had read the 
report and the discussion thus remained superficial. Eventually the group decided to 
send delegates to the governmental Education Councils and comment on the reports 
through them. These comments, it was agreed, should be discussed in another 
meeting.  
People relied heavily on protocol issues to structure meetings and to pretend 
that meetings without preparation made sense. At the Consultative Conference 
attendees demanded the preliminary minutes on the second day to have a written 
proof of their own resolutions and actions. Considerable part of every meeting went 
into the discussion of paper, be it the minutes of the previous meetings, the agenda of 
the current one or the plan for the following.  
 
Meetings were hardly organised as immediate response to an external occasion 
but resulted from decisions in other meetings. Meetings therefore had few immediate 
links to their environment and did not need any; everything outside the meeting was 
merely a background before which the sovereign system of consecutive meetings 
unfolded.150 The succession of meetings was a self-referential system, concerned 
about and driven by internal factors as the next section will show. Seeing the 
sequence of meetings as an internally closed system explains why meetings produced 
above all one thing: more meetings. 
 
The autopoietic system 
Meetings are elements of what Niklas Luhman called an “autopoietic system” 
(auto=self poiein= produce). In autopoietic systems different elements of the system 
interact to reproduce its elements (Seidl/Becker 2005: 25). The system itself depends 
                                          
 
150 In a similar argument Annelise Riles shows that there is no outside to “network” of women’s 
organisations in Fiji (Riles 2000:171). 
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on the constant reproduction of its elements, once the production stops the system 
disappears.  
 
Meetings produce further meetings. The Consultative Conference in 
interaction with the Advisory committee “produced” consultations throughout the 
country. The SWG Education with the following workshop decided to have a separate 
meeting to agree on the advocacy agenda and to organise meetings with other NGOs 
and students about educational policies; all SWG meetings together set up a special 
committee to look into civil society’s position in governmental advisory committees. 
The constant production of different consultations or committees shows that the 
autopoietic system relies on the constant reproduction of difference to continue. Its 
elements are about to vanish as soon as they have come about and must be replaced 
by different events.  
 
Meetings are evanescent. They cannot be stored and the continuing dissolution 
of the system is in fact a necessary precondition for autopoietic reproduction. Minutes 
and written resolutions do not preserve the meetings themselves but their structure 
generating power. Minutes are not identical to meetings, but they show that meetings 
are capable of producing further meetings. The idealistic image of meetings as 
informal exchange and the fact that participants do not prepare for meetings  and often 
do not fulfil their delegated tasks indicates that they treat events as self-contained 
units. The continuous deferrals provide the rationale for new meetings and thus for the 
reproduction of elements which cannot be stored. 
  
Protocol issues establish the connection to other meetings and are given 
considerable attention, because elements of an autopoietic system are what Niklas 
Luhman called recursive interlacing operations (Seidl/Becker 2005:60). One element 
can only be understood in relation to what came before and what followed. Adopting 
minutes from previous meetings and agreeing on the agenda for the next one locates 
the singular meeting in a sequence of similar events, allocates it a particular place in 
the sequence of events and thus provides it with a purpose. 
 
There will always be a need for another meeting because autopoietic 
reproduction reduces uncertainty but at the same time it generates new ambiguities. 
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Most attendees at SWG meetings wanted to find out what other organisations in the 
sector were doing. However, once people had introduced their organisations, the 
meeting’s participants decided that they needed to know how representative this was 
for the sector and how this linked with policy making. They usually decided to 
establish a steering committee to do the necessary research and then report back to a 
follow up meeting before coordination could progress. The perpetual creation of hope, 
the feeling that another meeting was needed to finally clarify things, was the central 
impetus of the autopoietic system. The fact that meetings achieved very little 
coordination became the central drive to ever more meetings. 
 
According to Luhman elements of autopoietic systems are seen as more or less 
meaningful but the system itself is never evaluated in these terms (Seidl/Becker 
2005). The series of meetings around the partnership bill for example, or 
institutionalised structures like the sector working groups were judged to be more or 
less worthwhile. If people in civil society felt they had ceased to be relevant they 
abolished them, but they never questioned the very idea of having meetings. For 
example the NANGOF chairperson said in an interview that the umbrella needed to 
hold an internal discussion as to whether the themes of the SWG were still relevant as 
new issues like HIV had emerged since the SWG had been established. According to 
him, NANGOF members might have to redefine the themes and the modus operandi 
of sector working groups, but he did not question the idea that the best way to deal 
with new issues was improving coordination of civic activism.151 Meetings were 
treated as given background for civic activism and holding meetings was therefore 
beyond question.152  
 
Meetings did not have any immediate connection to the issues they were called 
for. They did not alleviate poverty, decrease the HIV infection rate or broaden 
people’s access to the law, and activists did not evaluate them according to these 
goals, but judged them according to their coordinating effects within civil society.  
                                          
 
151 Interview Chairman of the NANGOF Board of Trustees/NANGOF, Windhoek 10/06/2008. 
152 Helen Schwartzman (1989:49) makes a similar point when she argues that meetings hardly feature 
in social science analysis, because they are so common in people’s experience that nobody had thought 
about them as issue worth analysing. As Annelise Riles (2000:4) points out the methodological 




Meetings therefore did not speak immediately to problems in education, health 
care or social justice, only about them. The actual topics remained separate from the 
system of consecutive meetings and were not more than a background to the system’s 
self-referentiality. In a self-referential system there is “no communication with the 
environment, only about the environment” (Rottleuthner 1989: 781). Similar to 
networkers in Riles’ description, participants in meetings paid considerably greater 
attention to the interrelation of the system’s components than they cared about the 




In sum, meetings fulfilled a number of important functions in civil society 
which were related to but not identical with networking, coordinating and pooling 
expertise.  In meetings people could enact and renegotiate their social relations, 
relations that were in fact much more contested than the oft-quoted “networking”. 
Nominating delegates for example was always a clear statement about the prestige of 
particular activists in civil society. The “coordination” meetings provided publicly 
displayed the “single voice” within civil society. Meetings functioned as important 
mechanisms to define and control the proper conduct of civic activism and provided 
an opportunity to check and comment on organisations’ conduct. Expertise was not so 
much produced as continually sought by moving decisions to the next meeting. These 
deferrals postponed the expectation to make truly informed decisions and 
continuously generated new meetings, thus reproducing the decisive elements of civil 
society coordination. Similar to documentation, coordination thus demonstrates the 
basic tension between aspiration and reality of NGO work. 
 
The sequence of meetings as autopeietic system shows that NGOs set their 
own agendas albeit in circumstances that were always shaped by external demands. 
They redefined civil society coordination as diligent administration of meetings out of 
their own accord. However, in doing so they reiterated general ideas about the 
importance of the right procedure for accountability and transparency. These ideas 
were often moulded in civil society’s relation to other sectors, a relation the thesis will 
explore in more depth over the coming three chapters.  
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Chapter 5: Relations to the Government 
 
It is Monday morning in early May 2008, the new NANGOF is hardly a year 
old and today the Capacity Building Officers start their employment. The offices are 
still in a state of chaos, unopened boxes with computer equipment pile in one corner 
and the desks have just arrived the Friday before. In this situation nobody has thought 
to provide a proper induction so the Executive Director just starts on an impromptu 
tour of the shared building interwoven with little anecdotes about the organizations 
working in it. When the little delegation has almost done its rounds and arrives at the 
last room, the director says this is the NANGOF Boardroom, a rather grand title for 
small room dominated by one huge table with a few chairs tucked in the corner and a 
dying palm tree next to the too small window. It is called the Boardroom, because the 
NANGOF Board meets here once every quarter. She is finished with her guiding tour 
but then just as an afterthought, she adds that the Board is the government of 
NANGOF and the chairperson, the “Head of State”. It is only half-jokingly that she 
invokes the image of NANGOF as republic, after all the Board members are all 
elected and the chairperson, as the official head of NANGOF, is the organization’s 
public face. In her simile the secretariat is the bureaucracy, employed rather than 
elected and responsible for the day-to-day administration and with a much lower 
public profile. 
 
On the one hand the comparison was just a filler in the guided tour and the 
joke was to round up the short induction, but on a second thought the (self-) image of 
a civil society organization as state is striking, especially when this organization 
carries the NON governmental in its name. It made me reconsider the exact relation 
between civil society organizations and the Namibian government and I started to 
wonder whether the literature has not overestimated the distinction between NGOs 
and the state. William Fisher observed that the literature applied the NGO label to 
such various organisation that it seemed to describe “everything a government is not” 
(1997:444).153 While the difference from the state is often the only common 
denominator for a range of organizations in the literature, the division might not be so 
important for NGOs’ self image.  
                                          
 




During my time at NANGOF I realised that non-governmental organizations 
were closely linked with governmental agencies in their everyday practices. A high 
number of joint workshops, mixed committees and government tenders taken by 
NGOs were a clear indication for an ongoing close collaboration between the two 
sectors.154 This cooperation existed alongside serious contestations between civil 
society and government agencies around particular issues. For instance, the AIDS 
Law Unit at the Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) has worked closely with the Ministry 
of Health and Social Services to publish a rights charter for people living with 
HIV/AIDS, but they also took a sub division of the same ministry to court over 
several cases of alleged forced sterilization of HIV positive people. Sister Namibia, a 
feminist NGO, has recently published a report on child labour in Namibia, which was 
commissioned by the ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. However, the directors 
of the same organizations fought a long court case against the Ministry of Home 
Affairs to achieve recognition of same sex relationships as grounds for permanent 
residency in the country.  The multiplicity of simultaneous links between government 
and civil society questions whether it is really helpful to ask how far NGOs are “in” or 
“out” of the policy making process (Lewis/ Opukuh- Mensah 2006). 
 
But how can we make sense of these multiple relations between the two 
sectors in Namibia? The literature on state- NGO relations in Africa has often 
represented particular links between the state and civil society as the result of careful 
calculation on both sides.  John Farrington et al (1993) argued that it can be beneficial 
for NGOs to cooperate with state institutions to access more resources and coordinate 
their activities more efficiently than they would be able to do on their own. States on 
the other hand are said to tolerate NGOs if their presence means an increase in 
international aid and/or their presence is in other ways economically beneficial for 
governments (Sen 1999). By contrast Michael Bratton has shown that states tolerate 
NGOs irrespective of economic benefits from civil society. In his argument strong 
states tend to be much more accommodating towards NGOs whereas insecure 
governments try to limit civil society’s influence. It is thus state’s political security, 
                                          
 
154 It is difficult to give exact numbers of those joint events, but hardly a day went by at NANGOF 
without an incoming invitation for a governmental conference or workshop. The section attempts to 
give an impression of the sheer number and the wide variety of more or less institutionalized forums. 
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rather than its economic calculus, that decides whether NGOs are allowed to operate 
unhindered or not. Whereas these accounts tried to find particular factors for a 
seemingly unchanging relation between states and NGOs, ethnographic description of 
state- NGO relations demonstrated that link between sectors far more dynamic, and 
that both sides change in emphasising cooperation or contestation according to 
context (Kelsall/Igoe 2005).  
 
Sara Rich Dorman (2005) shows how competing claims of national NGOs and 
the government of Zimbabwe to represent the people’s voice in the country’s 
constitutional referendum resulted in a change from close cooperation between state 
and NGOs to civil society’s exclusion from governmental projects. Marie-
Emmanuelle Pommerolle (2005) by contrast gives an example of the reverse 
dynamics: the increasing intertwinement of party and NGO politics in the run-up to 
the 2002 presidential elections in Kenya. Stephen Jackson 2005 shows how state and 
non state spheres have merged in Eastern DR Congo when NGO activists took on 
quasi governmental duties in the absence of any recognisable state. 
 
In a similar way the chapter shows that governmental –civil society relations 
in Namibia changed according to context. However in contrast to other accounts it 
shows how the relations between weak and strong NGOs shaped the sector’s relations 
to the government and the ways in which relations were shaped by dominant 
perceptions on both sides, above all by the tension between dominant ideas of the two 
sectors as separate and the multiple de facto interactions between them. The chapter 
starts by giving a background to NGO- government relations in Namibia before 
looking in detail at examples of cooperation, externally driven links, contestation and 
disengagement. By giving examples of all these relations the chapter seeks to tease 
out the reasons behind particular kinds of links. It closes by adding intangible but 
important factors like personal networks, reputation, spatial proximity and informal 





 Civil Society – Government relations in Namibia 
As chapter 1 already set out, hardly any civic association existed during 
colonial rule. The few civic organizations that were founded in the 1980s towards the 
end of apartheid were neither accepted by the colonial regime nor fully endorsed by 
the liberation movement. The state had strict laws in place to curb freedom of 
movement and association and ensured that it was the only provider of education and 
social services as means to regulate “native affairs” and maintain minority rule. For 
the liberation movement SWAPO the political struggle was priority and it regarded 
civic associations geared towards bringing “development” with suspicion (Bauer 
1998: 79; Geisler 2004: 145/6). Additionally SWAPO claimed to be the sole 
representative of the Namibian people and thought of any social association outside 
its rank and file as potential competition. The top leadership continuously stifled 
initiatives of younger members and did not encourage civic activism within Namibia. 
The ambivalent relationship between SWAPO and civil society organisations 
continued after independence. 
 
Post liberation regimes are often said to maintain ambiguous relations to the 
non-governmental sector (Rich Dorman 2006). On the one hand civic organisations 
are widely believed to represent the grassroots and are thus an important source of 
legitimacy for any regime claiming to represent the people. This drive towards 
inclusion of NGOs is counterbalanced by the NGOs’ tendency for critical advocacy 
which governments often see as endangering their claim to be the sole representative 
of the people by questioning the ruling party’s carefully constructed image of national 
unity forged in the anticolonial struggle (Rich Dorman 2006, Höhn 2010). Post 
liberation regimes often tried to reconcile this ambiguity by tolerating NGOs in 
principle but requiring them to go through lengthy registration processes which could 
be used as lever to monitor or control the civic sector (Puplampu 2000). This is also 
true for Namibia where civil society organizations need to register with the state, a 
process that is decentralised, confusing and long. There is no single registering 
authority and civil society organizations need to register with different ministries 
depending on their legal status and their activities. As chapter one mentioned 
Namibian law distinguishes between Voluntary Organizations, Welfare 
Organisations, Trusts and Section 21 Companies. Voluntary Organizations fall under 
common law and are quite informal  They do not need to register but are usually 
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encouraged to seek association with a relevant governmental institution, e.g. 
organizations working on HIV/AIDS can seek affiliation with the semi-public AIDS 
coordinating committees and those working on education are encouraged to link with 
schools. Welfare Organizations are registered with the Ministry of Health and Social 
Services and Trusts have to file their legal documents with the Master of the High 
Court; Section 21 Companies are companies not for gain and register with the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. All these different kinds of organization require 
different forms and procedures and for many people thinking about starting a civic 
association the very first decision about the legal frame is off-putting. NANGOF has 
published a 35 pages long manual to help organizations decided and go about 
registration (NANGOF December 2005), but potential founders still experience 
difficulties, very often because the relevant ministry does not have the necessary 
forms and refers them back to NANGOF or advices them to consult a lawyer. 
 
Registration is a basic legal requirement for all Namibian organisations, which 
leaves ample room for all kinds of links between the sectors, ranging from no contact 
beyond the formal registration to close daily cooperation between NGOs and 
ministerial divisions. The following case studies also show how important it is to 
unpack the label “government”. The state is not a homogenous bloc, but it consists of 
a large bureaucracy divided into a high number of ministries, subdivisions and other 
administrative layers.155 Joel Migdal (1994, 2001) has suggested seeing states not as 
free standing organisations but as multiple processes in society that lay claims to 
regulate people’s personal lives in distinct ways (2001: 15). He argues that states are 
sets of multiple practices based on various rules rather than homogenous blocs that 
resemble more or less closely Max Weber’s ideal state. 
An NGO’s good links to one division does not mean cordial relations with the 
entire ministry, let alone with the whole national government. The considerable room 
for manoeuvre the legal process allows together with the multiple layers of 
bureaucracy that constitute “the government” mean that civil society organisations156 
                                          
 
155 For example from the 10 000 people working in health in Namibia only 3000 are doctors and 
nurses. The remaining 7000 are employed in administration (SEEN n.d.) 
156 As chapter 1 already explained the thesis concentrates on case studies from a small number of 
organisations that are (arguably) representative of strong and well-connected NGOs in Namibia. The 
analysis presented here is therefore true for a particular kind of civil society organisation. 
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fulfil a number of roles vis-à-vis the government; they simultaneously monitor, 
advocate, help, criticize, collaborate and implement. 
Cooperation  
This section looks at two examples of close governmental – civil society 
cooperation, the collaboration between NANGOF and the government’s National 
Planning Commission (NPC) around poverty alleviation and the LAC’s legal drafting. 
The examples are chosen, because they are well documented and commented upon by 
people working in NGOs and the legal drafting constitutes a grey area between the 
governmental and non-governmental in which an NGO took on governmental 
function. 
 
Poverty Alleviation  
 
NANGOF closely followed the government’s poverty alleviation programme 
from the second National Development Plan (2001/2-2005/6) onwards.157  NANGOF 
organized several workshops in late 2000 to pool inputs from civil society 
organisations to the NDP 2. The final version of NDP 2 was published in May 2001 
and included some of the recommendations. When the next development plan was 
drafted NANGOF again organized a series of events, it published a newsletter on 
poverty in Namibia and held a conference on poverty alleviation in April 2007. The 
umbrella explicitly invited government representatives to attend the conference and 
together find ways to maximise civil society’s contribution to poverty alleviation.158  
 
 
Improved cooperation with government on poverty alleviation was indeed a 
goal for people working in civil society. The NANGOF Trust chairperson said that 
government and NGOs needed to find areas where their work can be complementary 
                                          
 
157 The government started in 1996 to publish a national development plan every four years. The latest 
is NDP 3 which started in 2006/2007.  
158 The title of the conference -“How can we make the national development planning process and 
various instruments and strategies more effective in reducing poverty in Namibia”- was broad enough 
to include government, and NANGOF invited a senior official from the NPC as keynote speaker 
(NANGOF April 2, 2007). 
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to achieve goals in poverty alleviation. 159 He was of the opinion that government now 
provided more space for civil society input, because NANGOF had been invited to the 
President’s Office three times since its reconfiguration in the previous year, which 
was an unprecedented level of contact making from government’s side. The 
chairperson thought that civil society needed to make more use of this space.160 Others 
went even further and suggested a division of labour between government and civil 
society instead of “only” cooperation. The directors of the Namibia Nature 
Foundation and Project Hope both suggested that government concentrate on policy 
making and leave  implementation to NGOs (Research Notes 9/07/ 2008; Interview 
Country Director Project Hope, Windhoek 12/06/2008).161 
The three invitations to the president’s office can indeed be read as sign of 
high-level interest in a closer cooperation with civil society.162  In 2002 the 
government’s National Poverty Reduction Strategy paper stated that: 
 
The government efforts to improve co-ordination and partnership with NGOs include the 
formulation of a policy framework for NGOs and civil society, the establishment of an annual 
consultative forum for effective co-ordination, the establishment of a National Development 




Cooperation between the two sectors on poverty alleviation was often 
supported by third parties, be it regional organisations or international donors. In the 
first half of 2008 the SADC Secretariat organised a regional conference on poverty 
alleviation. The “International Consultative Conference on Poverty and 
Development” was held in Mauritius in April 2008 and brought together all Heads of 
State of the region and a large number of civil society representatives. SADC paid for 
                                          
 
159 Interview Chairman of the NANGOF Board of Trustees/NANGOF, Windhoek 10/06/2008. He 
also expressed this opinion as official civil society representative at the annual Cabinet retreat in early 
2008. 
160 Interview Chairman of the NANGOF Board of Trustees, Windhoek 10/06/2008. 
161 This division of labour is often reported from other African countries where governments are keen 
to encourage the service delivery of civil society. However, at the same time governments are often 
reported to discourage critical human rights organisations. See Susan Dicklitch (1998) for Uganda, Tim 
Kelsall (2005) and Jim Igoe (2005) for Tanzania, Erica Bornstein (2005) for Zimbabwe and Stephen 
Jackson (2005) for the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
162 But some suspicion between the two sides remained. NANGOF’s executive director disagreed 
with this interpretation and saw the invitations merely as trick to gain votes in the upcoming 
parliamentary elections. 
163 GRN 2002: 75 
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two representatives of Namibia’s civil society and organised a civil society 
preparatory conference in Johannesburg to consolidate the sectors input in the main 
conference.  Some donors were also keen to see government-civil society cooperation 
on poverty-related projects. The Global Fund operated in funding rounds with one 
main recipient who was expected to issue tenders to local organizations. The main 
recipient of the last funding round was the Ministry of Health and Social Services 
which in turn contracted a number of governmental and non-governmental agencies to 
deliver services to poor and particularly vulnerable communities. Just before I left 
Namibia news reached NANGOF that the main recipient for the upcoming Global 
Fund Round was NANASO, the non-governmental umbrella for HIV/AIDS service 
organizations. In that case NANASO would issue tenders and ministerial subdivisions 
could apply, flipping the current relation round. 
 
The example shows that external incentives were important in bringing about 
cooperation between civil society and the government because these incentives 
provide opportunities and funding for collaborative projects. However the mutual will 
to work together was still vital, visible in the government’s acknowledgement of civil 
society’s role in poverty alleviation and NANGOF’s signal to government through 
joint events with the NPC. Civil society organisations were willing to cooperate with 
government, if they thought they could play a useful role in policy implementation or 
assumed they could do better than governmental agencies. The (self-) image of civil 
society organisations as the more effective deliverer of services was also important for 




The Namibian government often relied on few experienced human rights 
NGOs to help in policy formulation or even to draft entire policies and bills.  The 
Gender Research and Advocacy Project (GR&AP) at the LAC drafted amongst others 
the bill for the Married Persons Equality Act, the Combating of Rape Bill, the 
regulations for The Combating of Domestic Violence Bill and the Children’s 
Maintenance Act. The AIDS Law Unit at the same NGO drafted the National AIDS 
Policy and developed national HIV/AIDS workplace policies. The LAC’s Land 
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section, together with the Ministry of Environment and Tourism and the Office of the 
Attorney-General, redrafted Namibia's environmental legislation amongst others the 
Environmental Management Bill and the Integrated Pollution Control and Waste 
Management Bill. It had its input into the Tourism Bill, the Aquaculture Bill, the 
Forestry Bill, the Fisheries Bill and the Environmental Investment Fund Bill.  
 
Very often these drafts were consultancies and the LAC got paid for it. 
However, monetary compensation was only part of the motivation. The real reason for 
taking up the work was that staff thought they could do a better job than government, 
since they were motivated by the cause rather than governmental benefits. Assuming 
that there existed a straightforward relation between law and empowerment LAC staff 
often claimed that they could make the law work for people, because they were really 
committed to its empowering capacities. The Director of the LAC commented on a 
government consultant who took six months to formulate the six pages draft of the 
NGO partnership bill (see below) and said the people at the LAC would do the same 
job in a day (Research Notes 18/07/2008). Perceptions of being more effective also 
came from the self-image as being closer to the people who should benefit from the 
law and this was different from governmental employees who just sat in their offices 
(Research Notes 18/07/2008).164 Staff at the LAC therefore thought that the only way 
to ensure that the law worked for people was to draft it themselves.165  
Interestingly the LAC presented itself as the mouthpiece for communities vis-
à-vis the government, but invested very little in its actual relation to recipients. 
Neither the LAC nor any other NGO researched extensively communities’ ideas what 
should be done for them. A few years ago I joined an LAC team on a tour to ‘consult 
the communities’. The LAC was running a campaign to change the old marriage act 
that prescribed that all marriages in the north of the country were automatically out of 
community of property. This regulation often left widows without any personal 
possessions, because the families of the deceased husband had the right to repossess  
                                          
 
164 In interviews people of LAC often said their work was so effective because they went out to talk to 
people (Interview Gender Unit Coordinator/Legal Assistance Centre  September 2002; Interview social 
worker Juvenile Justice Project/Legal Assistance Centre August 2002; Interview Director /Legal 
Assistance Centre, Windhoek 18/07/2008). NANGOF’s director criticised a donor agency for only 
talking to government about poverty alleviation when it was civil society organisations that were “out 
there” working with the people (Research Notes 03/07/2008). 
165 See also James Ferguson’s (1990) argument that NGOs very often cannot conceive of a solution to 
poverty alleviation outside their own engagement. 
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his land and livestock. The LAC had prepared an alternative bill that allowed all 
Namibians to choose between different marriage regimes.  By the time the LAC team 
went out to ‘consult’ the communities the centre had already drafted the bill and 
needed evidence to back their claims that there was indeed a need for a legal reform. 
The questions the LAC team asked were highly directive and left no room for doubt 
about which answers they wanted to hear.166 
 
In sum NGOs were willing to cooperate and even take on governmental 
functions if people at the organisation felt they could provide equal or even better 
services than the government. Cooperation was encouraged through external 
incentives, funding available for joint projects or regional cross-sectoral cooperation. 
But where NGOs thought their work made a substantial difference, the availability of 
funding was only side consideration.167 However, donor funding could also be the 
decisive factor for joint projects. Some collaboration would have not been realised if 
substantial amount of money was not earmarked for them. Cooperation between civil 
society and government is therefore not always the outcome of their own choice. In 
fact the funding regime can be so rigid that civil society organisations and 
governmental institutions are wedged into cooperation without much room for 




Externally driven cooperation: Civil Society, the state and Donors 
 
Donors supported civil society as an important partner for government 
(USAID 2004) and less explicitly as counterweight to the state.168 In this description, 
                                          
 
166 In a similar way Harri Englund (2006: 101) showed that Malawian human rights NGOs 
represented “the community” as having a distinct problem for which NGO (education) provided the 
solution. 
167 The LAC receives donor funding mostly for its research and training, policy drafting is not an 
explicit funding priority. 
168 I asked one donor representative why his organisation supported a particular NGO. Instead of 
answering me directly he told me that they were also supporting a similar NGO in a neighbouring 
country, because there political parties were weak and this NGO was one of the strongest (unofficial) 
critic of the ruling party. I concluded from this that the support for the Namibian NGO had similar 
reasons. Interview Country Director Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Windhoek 01/12/2006. 
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donors were removed from the civil society - state equation. 169 However, 
ethnographic accounts on the state - civil society - donor triangle have shown how 
donor interventions have a direct impact on state – civil society relations. Jim Igoe 
(2005) showed how a donor driven project broadened state control in Tanzania’s 
Barabaig district. In his case study civil society helped to solicit consent to a 
governmental project and thus promoted the interests of the ruling elites.  Claire 
Mercer (2003) has shown how the new emphasis on partnerships in international 
development involved some NGOs in the Tanzanian PRSP process. Arguably donors 
are increasingly keen to fund partnerships between civil society and the state (Agg 
2006; Lavergne et al 2006; Mundy et al 2008; Rosenberg et al 2008; Robinson 1997; 
Wadell/Brown 1997). Relations between the three actors have thus changed from the 
parallel funding structures to increasingly intertwined networks. 
 
The example of the EU grant below is an illustration of how donor 
requirements forged a collaboration between a civil society organisation and a 
governmental institution. It shows how the official trend to public-private partnerships 
created mutual obligations between government, donors and civil society. The 
government had to show visible efforts to include civil society more in public service 
delivery, the EU had to change its funding procedures to channel money to an NGO 
instead of to a state and NANGOF had to reconsider its relation to a government 
institution that acted now as donor.  
 
 
The EC Grant170 
NANGOF was able to establish a full secretariat with the help of an EC grant 
of 1.6 Million Euros over three years. The EC had decided to fund NANGOF, 
because it estimated that a stronger civil society would contribute more meaningfully 
to the country’s development and add value to future Namibia-EC Programmes. To 
                                          
 
169 Nitza Berkovitch and Neve Gordon (2008) argue that the main argument in the literature on 
donors, states and NGOs still assumes that the relations between them are linear and unidirectional 
(Donors  NGOs  State). 
170 The official title of the local agency is the “Delegation of the European Commission to Namibia”; 
the donor is the European Commission. The source of the funding is part of the overall EU 
development assistance but is located in the Commission, that is the reason why I decided to use EC for 
the specific programme and EU for the general regulations. 
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release funds for civil society’s capacity building, the Namibian government, 
NANGOF and the EC agreed to a programme which supported the core costs of 
NANGOF in a similar way as the EU supports governments. Due to EU requirements 
the programme had to involve a governmental agency and thus included the National 
Planning Commission (NPC).  
 
In 2004 the EC invited NANGOF to submit a funding proposal for a civil 
society capacity building programme, which was followed by several rounds of 
consultations and redrafting during 2005. In 2006 the EC accepted the improved 
proposal, but it had to find new ways of using the procedures the EU had designed to 
fund governments. Additionally NANGOF still had to fulfil several preconditions 
before the money could be released. By mid- 2007 NANGOF had realized all criteria 
and Brussels approved the funding. The first instalment arrived in NANGOF’s bank 
account in January 2008, four years after the initial invitation. 
 
 At the beginning of the programme NANGOF was sceptical towards NPC’s 
involvement in the programme, because past experiences with a similar method had 
been not encouraging. In 2006 the EC attempted to channel some funds to civil 
society through the NPC. In this specific instance the planning commission issued a 
call for proposals for a participatory poverty reduction programme. However, the 
application requirements excluded a majority of civil society organisations by asking 
for a concept paper and a fully worked project proposal for the initial application. 
Those organizations that were finally chosen encountered difficulties in getting their 
contracts signed and receiving funding in time. This and a similar experience in the 
preceding year left NANGOF suspicious whether the NPC was really capable to 
channel funds effectively, as one report on the EC grant remarked  “the will is there 
but the delivery is problematic” (One World Action 2007:13). 
 
In Namibia, funding priorities of some donors have changed and now favour 
public-private partnerships and decentralization, both resulting in a decreased role of 
government and mounting pressures on government to contract out services to the 
private sector but also to civil society organizations (One World Action 2007). The 
Namibia-EC Country Strategy Paper and the National Indicative Programme 2008-
2013 set aside 5 million Euros for non-state actors to present the central government 
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now as providing an ‘enabling environment’ for non state actors to operate. The EC-
NANGOF grant seemed to confirm the argument that donors would release more 
funds if government made visible efforts to include civil society more in programmes. 
 
The new funding paradigm has exerted considerable pressure on the Namibian 
government to include civil society in its projects, but government has also found 
ways to assert a gatekeeper function in the tripartite relation. The National Planning 
Commission was aware that the EC’s assistance to civil society could only be realised 
with governmental involvement. The NPC has used small signposts to stress its 
gatekeeper function. For example, it insisted on being the first institution to sign any 
form related to the grant and the donor contacts the NPC with any queries regarding 
protocol issues. All meetings were held either at the National Planning Commission 
or the EC delegation, the parties never met at the NANGOF office, emphasising the 
fact that it was the government who was the principal partner of the EC. 
In this particular grant, civil society, the state and the donor were closely 
bound together. The EC needed the NPC because it could not directly fund NANGOF 
as the EU only funds governments. The NPC could not receive the grant because the 
money was earmarked for civil society, NANGOF finally could not access the money 
directly and needed to maintain good relations with the gate-keeping NPC.  
 
The example of the EC grant shows that funding regimes can compel 
government and civil society to partner up when neither side had originally the 
intention to do so. The new donor enthusiasm for partnerships might have been part of 
the reason why the government introduced a partnership policy to formalise its 
relations with civil society and is now keen to turn the policy into law.171 However, 
civil society organisations were very sceptical about the partnership bill and 
suspicious about the reason behind it. The next section looks at this partnership 
process as an example of contested relations between government and civil society.  
 
                                          
 
171 Similar Acts exist already in other SADC countries.  Zimbabwe has introduced a Private Voluntary 
Organizations Act in 1996, which gave government wide-ranging powers over organizations it 
regarded as deviating from its constitution. South Africa passed a Nonprofit organizations Act in 1997, 
which provided the blueprint for Namibia’s partnership bill, including the idea of registering civic 
organizations centrally. However, the South African version included the possibility to appeal against 
non - or deregistration, an Article that is missing in the Namibian draft. 
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Contestation: The Partnership Bill 
 
  This section looks at the history of the government’s “Civic Organizations 
Partnership Policy”, the bill it proposed and the reactions it triggered from civil 
society. It traces the civil society’s reaction from the reluctant approval of the policy 
in previous years to the open rejection of the bill in the last round. It asks why civil 
society now rejected the policy and bill, despite their previously positive opinion and  
although civic organizations admitted that the actual text did not contain any obvious 
threats. It argues that the reaction was based on the deep fear of loosing the current 
flexibility of the sectors’ links.  The end to this flexibility would force NGOs to 
choose one fixed role vis-à-vis the state and thus restrict their access to various 
sources of funding. 
 
History of ( an unequal) Partnership 
The first time the government mentioned a comprehensive framework for its 
relation to civil society was in its draft NDP 2 in 2001. Shortly after it had received 
the draft, NANGOF organised a Working Group on the planned partnership policy. 
The group produced a discussion document and held a national workshop in March 
2001, resulting in a position paper submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The 
discussion paper was included in the final version of the NDP 2. Later in the same 
year the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit, an economic research institute 
close to government, was tasked with drafting the first version of the policy. At the 
time, in September 2001, NANGOF had already conducted a national workshop and 
civil society seemed to be well prepared to have a timely and meaningful input into 
the policy. When the NPC set up a steering committee to oversee the drafting process 
of the NGO policy, two representatives from civil society were included. 
 
The NPC completed the first draft of the policy at the end of 2002, and in 2003 
one NGO, the Forum For the Future took it up to solicit civil society’s response to the 
first draft. At a national review workshop, the then director of the LAC cautioned that 
the policy could be used to control civil society. However, he also stressed the 
opportunity for civic organizations to use the new partnership arrangement to demand 
better inclusion in government programmes. The overall tenor of the meeting seemed 
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to have been critical appraisal. The participants expressed concerns about particular 
issues that were left out,172 and did not follow government’s argument that a new 
frame was essential - but they accepted the provisions of the policy and the new 
registration process, which was later seen as government’s attempt to control civil 
society. The participants at this first workshop only asked for a common platform, 
which was later established in the form of an Advisory Committee. 
 
In 2004 the National Planning Commission invited tenders to draft the policy, 
which was approved by Cabinet in December 2005. In 2004 NANGOF stated in a 
funding application that the policy was not intended to regulate civic organizations, 
but to harmonize their activities with the development efforts of the government.173  
The proposal suggested that NANGOF play a key role in realizing the policy’s 
partnership through its capacity building project and through its code of conduct.   In 
mid-2006 the NPC published the final version of the “Civic Organizations Partnership 
Policy” whose aim was to “create a partnership that works for the entire country, its 
citizens and their civic organizations and for the Government” (GRN 2005a: 10). The 
policy reviews the existing registration mechanisms for civil organizations and 
suggests a parallel registration with the NPC who should hold a database of all 
organizations working in the country. The overall aim of the database and registration 
at NPC was to provide government with a clearer picture of which organizations were 
operating in the country and to open opportunities for civic organizations to partner 
up with government on particular projects. The registration was voluntary but the 
policy promised a “clear advantages to those organizations that do voluntarily choose 
to register” (ibid: 13). However, the Registrar could refuse to list organizations or 
deregister them if they were seen as unaccountable (GRN 2005). The partnership was 
planned to become law through a Civic Organisations’ Act whose bill was distributed 
through the NPC in 2007.  
 
From 2005 to 2007, NANGOF was dissolved and reconstituted and with no 
overall organization coordinating civil society activities, the sector did not respond to 
                                          
 
172 Interestingly, the policy draft was mostly criticised for not addressing substantial issues like 
poverty or land distribution. The discussion five years later in contrast was all about procedures and did 
no longer mention poverty or land reform.  
173 NANGOF 27 June 2004. 
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the partnership proposals. Only at the beginning of 2008 was a re-established 
NANGOF able to secure funding from the Ford Foundation to draft an alternative 
partnership paper. The umbrella promised to solicit input from a wide variety of civic 
organizations into its response to the governmental bill. By mid-2008 NANGOF had 
hosted a couple of events about the policy and draft bill where it was decided that 
further consultations throughout the country were necessary before the umbrella could 
instruct the civil society representatives on the advisory committee to speak on behalf 
of the sector. 
 
The 2008 events: The Directors’ Forum and the Consultative 
Conference  
The partnership bill was much discussed in all events NANGOF organized in 
the first six months of 2008 and two events were entirely dedicated to the bill, the 
Directors’ Forum and the National Consultative Conference on the Partnership Bill. 
The “Directors Forum” was held in Windhoek in May 2008 and brought together a 
high number of heads of civic organizations. The four-hour Forum was intended as an 
exchange of opinions about the bill and to decide on the way forward. The plenary 
discussion at the beginning agreed quite quickly that the partnership bill was a veiled 
attempt by government to control the NGO sector and should be rejected.  Participants 
felt that the entire rationale of the bill was so against the interests of civil society that 
even a substantial redrafting would not lead to an agreeable outcome. They criticized 
that the partnership bill did not talk about partners but registration, and rendered all 
powers to the government to grant or refuse registration, which it could use to gate-
keep organizations’ access to funding and recognition. 
 
The national conference about a month later echoed the conclusions of the 
Directors’ Forum. Like the Directors’ Forum had done before, the conference called 
for an entirely new process with substantial civil society integration from the onset. 
Since both events had taken place in Windhoek, the participants asked the NANGOF 
Secretariat to organize similar events throughout the country to secure the input of 
organizations outside the capital, before the representatives on the partnership 





The rejection of the bill at the two forums is surprising, because the bill’s 
major critical points were already included in the policy which was drafted with at 
least some input from civil society and which for almost three years had not triggered 
any fierce resistance. Surprising also were the claims that civil society had been left 
out of the entire policy drafting process. The history shows that the sector’s input may 
have been erratic, ad hoc and far from systematically sought and rendered, but the 
track record of past consultations proves that civil society did have a say in the 
process. Claims of being left out often came from the same people who had sat in 
consultations and steering committees in previous years and back then, had agreed to 
the policy.174 
 
It is startling that civil society remained long inactive on an issue it now 
claimed to be of vital importance. Nothing at the 2008 events pointed to the fact that 
there had been similar events around the same topic in previous years. Nor did 
participants mention these events during the discussion, and there was no written 
evidence of those consultations. There was thus no institutional memory to create a 
sense of coherence of the process and to remind participants of their previous 
opinions. Contradictions and repetitions occurred often over the years but also within 
the latest round of consultations. People could dwell on criticisms at length and 
remain completely silent about them in different forums. The NANGOF director 
agreed with civil society’s criticism on the partnership bill during the conference, but 
supported the policy during a donor meeting at the NPC.175 
 
Civil society representatives repeated the same arguments over and over again 
because they agreed so quickly that there was no real need for discussion and the 
plenary “debate” soon reached a dead end. During the national conference participants 
agreed that all the government was talking about in its “partnership” papers was 
regulation. However, the target of their critique, the “government”, was absent from 
                                          
 
174 These were usually the few very well connected key actors in the closely-knit civil society network 
explained in chapter 2 on activists. 
175 Research Notes 11/07/2008 and Interview Civil Society Help Desk Officer/ National Planning 
Commission, Windhoek 17/07/2008. 
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the forum. Despite the often-repeated commitment to dialogue expressed by both 
sides, the government and civil society remained strangely apart.  
 
Why did the two sides remain so apart when both the policy and the bill were 
all about working together as partners? Why did civil society leave a gap of several 
years between the consultation rounds and only acted when the bill was already 
drafted? Why did participants claim to be left out when there was a clear track record 
of consultations and why did they change their opinion about the partnership policy 
from agreement to refusal. How could the same people both agree with and reject the 
bill at the same time in different forums? 
 
Government and Civil society - partners apart 
Funding requirements and the idea of the primacy of internal consultations 
were the main reasons why the two sides hardly met to discuss how they should work 
together. NANGOF had to show to its members and its principal donors that it 
consulted a number of civil society organisations from around the country before it 
entered into dialogue with the government. The underlying idea was that civic 
organizations were closer to each other than they could be to any governmental 
institution. Civic organizations all belonged to the same sector and were assumed to 
share basic ideas and a common identity. However, it remained highly doubtful 
whether this was indeed the case. Many well-connected NGOs had a much closer 
working relationship with particular governmental institutions than with their rural 
peers. They also might have very different opinions about the dangers of cooptation 
than rural organizations. The NPC’s Help Desk Officer suggested that it was 
especially rural organizations that would benefit from and thus support the partnership 
policy, because it would give them better access to funding opportunities. Stronger 
organizations, he argued, were afraid to loose their privileged positions and tried to 
bloc smaller organizations’ access to funds.176 It is quite doubtful whether strong 
organizations indeed pursued such an agenda, especially as their proven expertise and 
extensive networks provided them with secure positions in the government’s tender 
books. However, rural organisations might feel more pressure to broaden their donor 
                                          
 
176 Interview Civil Society Help Desk Officer/ National Planning Commission, Windhoek 17/07/2008. 
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support and might thus be tempted to register with the NPC as the Help Desk Officer 
suggested. 
 
The Help Desk Officer’s opinion that strong organizations use their influence 
to guard their privileges shows a deep suspicion between the two sides. The 
government had set up the Help Desk at a time when civil society grew increasingly 
sceptical about the motives behind the bill and the new institution had a difficult start. 
However, the new officer did little to disperse these suspicions. He was present at 
both of civil society’s partnership events, but hardly spoke then, and when I 
interviewed him he refused to acknowledge NGOs’ worries about the bill’s potential 
threats. 
 
A new impetus 
Civil society’s reaction to the bill only took shape after NANGOF had been re-
launched, and the sector obviously needed an overall umbrella as a driving force. The 
previous grant for the Forum for the Future was a rare example where one member 
NGO had taken the initiative and applied for funding for a sector-wide project. This is 
extremely unusual and after the consultant had been paid and the workshop held, the 
Forum did not have the capacity to organize follow-ups. The lack of institutional 
memory may also explain why those who participated in consultations years ago now 
claimed civil society had been left out of the process. It is not the case that they had 
completely forgotten these events, but the lack of context to these workshops meant 
that the events remained isolated occasions and did not add up to a “proper” 
consultation.177 The re-establishment of NANGOF was extremely important to create 
a sense of coherence in the sector. Participants at the Directors’ Forum only decided 
to revive it because NANGOF again employed full time staff who could follow up on 
decisions. They said that without a NANGOF secretariat the Directors’ Forum’s 
decisions had been inconsequential and people had lost trust in the platform and left. 
It needed an umbrella to provide the necessary institutional memory, because 
organizations did not link the partnership process with their relations to ministries in 
                                          
 
177 One director told me that the previous consultations had been patchy and more governmental 
window dressing than anything else. He said that only a few handpicked representatives from civil 
society were invited so that the government could say it had consulted the sector. Interview Director 
/Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 18/07/ 2008. 
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their other projects. To my knowledge no organization included the debate around the 
partnership policy in any of their project proposals or considered what the bill meant 
for its specific projects. 
 
The possibility to have a coordinated position of civil society through 
NANGOF coincided with government’s move to turn the policy into a law. The 
policy was only a guideline that could be ignored in everyday practice. With the 
prospects of the partnership as legally enforceable, civil society might have 
recognised the need to secure its input to the bill. The threat of an impending law 
might also explain why civil society organisations were much more cautious to 
approve of the partnership policy in 2008 than they had been a few years previously. 
They feared that the vague formulation of the bill’s central provisions, like the powers 
of the registrar and the role of government in the partnership, could not be left 
undefined if they did not want to endanger civil society’s independence. The critical 
tone of the recent events was also the outcome of the dynamics those events 
developed and the relative strength of critical versus conciliatory voices within them. 
At the workshop a few years ago the then director of the LAC presented a very benign 
interpretation of the policy. The LAC’s current director in contrast strongly rejects the 
bill and given the high influence of the LAC in all legal matters the difference 
between the two might have been the crucial factor in tipping the balance between 
refusal and critical appraisal.  
 
NANGOF’s revival explains civil society’s new impetus on the partnership 
process and the threat of an impending law accounts for the difference over time, but 
they do not explain how some individuals could entertain completely different 
positions at the same time. These differences were above all a consequence of the 
multiple links that connect civil society and government. NANGOF could present 
itself as essential mediator between government and civil society for the African 
Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) funding because NANGOF’s relations with 
the government include the umbrella’s official status as civil society’s voice at the 
NPC. NANGOF could, however, equally present itself as stern critic of the bill to the 
Ford Foundation, because another function of the umbrella is to pool civil society’s 
concerns about new legislation and to monitor governmental policies. Both functions 
belong to the authentic work of NANGOF. The difference results from the umbrella’s 
 
 143
choice over which role to highlight. NANGOF’s example shows that organizations 
can tap into different resources by presenting themselves in various functions, 
depending on their audience and the context. It is this flexibility that is most 
threatened with assigning a fixed identity to every organisation in a centralized 
resource allocation. Organizations would loose substantial amounts of support if they 
had to decide on one particular role in their relation to government. The example 
shows that civil society organisations were reluctant to partner with government if 
they feared that cooperation would restrict their flexibility and foreclose change in 
future relations. The example also demonstrates why this flexibility is so important 
for organisations. It allows organisations to stress different roles, and take up a more 
cooperative position on a contested issue, if this allows it to access resources. 
 
Contestation or no-links? The debate around self regulation 
During the latest round of discussions of the partnership bill, civil society 
representatives came up with the idea of a self-regulation mechanism, because they 
felt that they could not reject the partnership bill without offering an alternative to it. 
As the last section showed, the overall opinion in the latest rounds of consultations 
was to do away with the partnership bill altogether and come up with an entirely 
different proposal to regulate government-civil society relations. One essential part of 
this alternative was seen to be self-regulation, a mechanism to establish and enforce 
good conduct within the sector. In the opinion of those at the Directors’ Forum and at 
the national consultative conference, self-regulation was a direct response to the 
partnership bill and thus part of civil society’s contested relations with government. 
But on a closer comparison the two documents talk about two different things 
entirely. Why did civil society representatives think of self-regulation an adequate 
response to the partnership bill, ignoring that there was no connection between the 
two mechanisms? This section argues that the drive towards self-regulation was as 
much about the proper conduct of civic activism as it was about the right relations 
with government.  
At the national consultative conference, the morning session on the second day 
was entirely devoted to self-regulation. The chairperson of the NANGOF Trust gave a 
presentation which suggested a need for self-regulatory and enforcement 
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mechanisms.178 Since government had justified the bill with the need for increased 
transparency, accessibility and accountability of civil society, the participants argued 
that self-regulations would undermine the rationale for the partnership bill. 
 
 
NANGOF’s Code of Conduct 
The proposed self-regulation mechanism uses NANGOF’s Code of Conduct 
(CoC) as blueprint. It is a short piece, about six pages long, that each organization 
applying for NANGOF membership needs to sign. The Code has several short 
sections setting out standards of organisational management. It includes paragraphs 
on governance and the separation of elected and executive structures, on transparency, 
integrity, financial accountability, the management of human resources and the proper 
conduct of projects.179 The Code of Conduct had been drafted independently of the 
partnership process and had never been mentioned in any of the partnership 
consultations before. 
 
It is quite remarkable that participants spent an entire morning of a two-day 
partnership event on an issue that was not related to the policy at all. The argument 
that self-regulation would undermine government’s justification for the partnership 
bill was never verified by any governmental institution. In fact the Help Desk Officer 
made it clear during an interview that the government would proceed with the 
partnership bill even if civil society established a self-regulatory mechanisms.180 
 
This may come as no surprise, because the two documents talk about entirely 
different things. The partnership policy organises the relations between government 
and civil society. It does not attempt to regulate the inner workings of civic 
                                          
 
178 He argued that self-regulation would enhance civil society’s “good corporate governance”. The 
following plenary agreed with him and the discussion soon moved on to possible enforcement 
mechanisms. Some participants suggested to use controlling and a fining system similar to the one of 
the private sector. The private sector thus functioned as role model for self regulation and the 
discussion shows that civil society’s relation to the private sector also varies according to context and 
NGO self image, an argument made in more detail in chapter 7.  
179 Many of these paragraphs seem to regulate the work of strong and well-connected organizations as 
they presuppose enough resources to have separate governance structure, financial audits and enough 
staff to speak of “human resource management”. 
180 Interview Civil Society Help Desk Officer/ National Planning Commission, Windhoek 17/07/2008 
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organisations, manage inter-NGO relations or set standards of conduct within civil 
society. The first impression is therefore that the policy provides for less “intrusion” 
into civic organisations than the Code of Conduct.181 By suggesting replacing the 
policy with the Code of Conduct civil society could have in fact opened itself to much 
closer scrutiny. 
 
Why did the sector discuss an alternative to the partnership policy without 
even making sure that their proposal would influence government’s partnership plans? 
Even if this was the case, why did civil society propose a mechanism that appeared to 
be much more intrusive than the partnership policy? The reason mostly given was that 
self-regulation would be an effective means to fend off government’s thinly disguised 
attempts to control civil society through the partnership bill. Most probably these 
fears were the result of experience in mid-1990s when government had already tried 
to draft a partnership agreement, which at that time was seen by civil society as 
attempt of outright control. The current partnership document arguably leaves enough 
room for suspicion. During the conference the LAC director admitted that there was 
nothing threatening with the actual wording in the policy, but the reasons the policy 
gave for a partnership were plainly wrong. The claim that government did not know 
what civic organisations were doing contradicted the long-term relationships between 
the two sectors and government’s dishonesty about its reason for the partnership 
nurtured the suspicion that it pursued a hidden agenda (Research Notes 09/07/ 2008). 
The argument was understandable but it was still difficult to justify the outright 
rejection with a plain reading of the policy. There was no open attempt to control civil 
society and the enthusiasm for self-regulation without obvious attempts of external 
regulation seemed at least a bit odd.182  
 
Self regulation did not only function as the often-cited self defence against 
government’s intrusion, it also said something about how civil society thought civic 
                                          
 
181 This impression might be deceptive though. Keeping the partnership standards vague could allow 
the NPC to claim that some organisations did not live up to them and to deregister them without having 
to explain what exactly was wrong. 
182 This is especially true in the light of the latest development. In December 2008 an NPC delegation 
met with NANGOF representatives and officially acknowledged civil society’s concerns about the bill 




activism had to function. The Code of Conduct can be read as an attempt to regulate 
social activism and set rules for the conduct of conduct, the sector’s governmentality. 
A large part of the discussion around enforcement was about surveillance, the proper 
reporting mechanisms and the umbrella’s right to issue, and by implication to 
withhold, certificates of good conduct which justified NANGOF’s inspection of civic 
organisations’ inner workings.  
 
As the chairperson of the NANGOF Trust put it, self-regulation was about 
creating a watchdog for the watchdogs, i.e. for civil society organisations. Other NGO 
leaders agreed and saw self-regulation as mechanism to increase the sector’s 
coherence and “togetherness”. The peer review of a self-regulation was seen as 
effective means to “pull us together”183 and address the diversity of civil society that 
many saw as great strength but also as challenge (Research Notes 10/07/2008) 
especially when it was difficult to reach a common position on sector wide 
concerns.184  
 
The Code of Conduct and the measures proposed to ensure that organisations 
adhered to it, were one more example of the sector’s ‘will to know’ (Foucault 1979). 
Civic organisations were encouraged to share their reports and project feedbacks with 
NANGOF, so that the umbrella could know whether they indeed adhered to the Code 
of Conduct and also so that NANGOF could promote the work of its members better. 
At times demands for the enforcement of the CoC were unveiled attempts to control 
civic organisations and thus curb short-lived NGOs, which were seen as damaging the 
image of civil society in general. The Director of NANGOF hoped that self-regulation 
would give the umbrella the powers to issue and take away licence from civil society 
organisations if they did not adhere to the Code of Conduct (Research Notes 2/07/ 
2008).185 
 
                                          
 
183 Director ‘Citizen for Accountable and Transparent Society’, Windhoek 10/07/ 2008. 
184 Participants of the National Consultative Conference suspected that some NGOs would be more 
than happy to support the governmental initiative and would thus divide and weaken civil society’s 
stance vis-à-vis the government. 
185 During a NANGOF staff meeting somebody suggested to ask the NPC to only acknowledge 
members of NANGOF as “proper” civil society organisations, because only they had signed the CoC. 
NANASO had asked similar a thing from the Ministry of Health and Social Service, but both 
governmental institutions refused to cooperate. 
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Relations to the government had thus a direct impact on inter-NGO relations 
and justified internally imposed checks on civic organisations’ conduct, but it would 
be far fetched to argue that the attempts to regulate the conduct of conduct in civil 
society were part of an overall masterplan designed to bring about a preconceived 
notion of what civil society ought to be about. 
Since Michel Foucault’s seminal work (Burchell et al 1991) a lot has been 
written about governmentality, the mechanisms to institutionalise surveillance and 
regulate the conduct of conduct.  The literature has used the concept of 
governmentality to examine how people turn into self governing subjects through 
institutions, discourses and through everyday practices. Governmentality became the 
overall term to denote all mechanisms that work on individuals to discipline 
themselves (Gupta/Ferguson 2002: 989). The literature on African politics has 
represented governmentality as directed, calculated and coherent system of policies. 
Governmentality as the rationality of government worked in such diverse fields as 
town planning, the privatisation of security (Robins 2002), in debates around 
ecological policies (Death 2006:412) or in IMF’s structural adjustment programmes 
(Neu et al 2008). All these studies seem to suggest that in systems of governmentality 
the overall goal is clear from the start and determines the entire system. James 
Ferguson (2006) argues that  governmentality is the government of the conduct of 
others justified by claims to superior spatial reach of the state (ibid:112) and he equals 
governmentality to governance (ibid:107) and sometimes even to government (ibid: 
40) which represents it as distinctively purposeful enterprise. 
 
In this representation governmentality is a means to direct human conduct that 
added up to a systematic technology of the self.  However as Gavin Kendall and Mick 
Michael (2001) argue Foucault speaks of techniques rather than technology of the 
self, stressing the multiplicity of simultaneous, discrete and undirected interventions. 
As Foucault pointed out governmentality is not  a way to force people to do what the 
governor wants; it contains complementarity and conflict between techniques through 
which the self is constructed or modified (Myers 2008:125). There is not one overall 
masterplan with a set outcome, but multiple and often conflicting acts bring about 




Neither the umbrella nor any other strong NGO pursued a hidden agenda of 
controlling smaller civic organisations and justifying it with phoney threats. They 
initiated multiple smaller interventions which they carried out for their own concrete 
and very plausible reasons.  Self regulation was presented as real alternative to the 
potentially more restrictive government regulation, attempts to avoid fly-by-night 
NGOs were to ensure the sector’s reputation with international donors and secure 
continuing funding, and gathering information about civic activism was to promote 
the work of different NGOs.186 None of these initiatives were particularly new but the 
“rediscovery” of the Code of Conduct was an example of how they all contributed to 
regulatory tendencies within civil society that emerged as response to a shared belief 
in external threats. 
 
The Code of Conduct had been in place for years and every new NANGOF 
member had to confirm that they had read, understood and implemented it. However, 
the umbrella never attempted to enforce adherence. The Code had been drawn up by a 
consultant for NANGOF a few years earlier and sailed through the Board without any 
serious changes. The “draft” document quietly became the official NANGOF Code of 
Ethics without the wide consultations the umbrella had organised around the 
partnership documents. However, the Code has never really been enforced and there 
had not been any plans to do so in future. It was only with the threat of external 
control that organizations saw the need to establish a peer review mechanism.  
 
The example of the debate around self-regulation shows that civil society 
could come up with a supposed response to the government without having a dialogue 
with it in the first place. Perceptions of an external threat provided the incentive, but 
internal motivations let the umbrella and strong NGOs team up to promote self-
regulation. Self-regulation might have been debated at some time even without the 
partnership process. The reason why civil society discussed self-regulation at this 
particular point in time had only partly to do with government’s partnership. The 
more important factor was NANGOF’s regained strength and the perception that peer 
review could now be enforced. 
                                          
 
186 See chapter 7. 
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No links– The Labour Act Opt Out 
 
It remains debatable whether self-regulation was indeed somehow linked to 
the government’s partnership policy or not, but it seems that quite a number of people 
in civil society really believed in the connection. A clearer example of a civil society 
project that remained strangely at odds with governmental law making was 
NANGOF’s “response” to the new Labour Act. The Labour Act, passed in 2007, did 
not make any provisions for volunteers and NANGOF concluded that it did not 
recognize their status and required all organizations to pay their staff, employed or 
voluntary. This would have disastrous effects for civil society where an estimated 80 
000 volunteers worked. The umbrella employed a Namibian labour consultant and 
used several international human resource volunteers to prepare an opt-out submission 
on behalf of civil society. This submission would allow civil society organizations to 
continue using volunteers without the need to pay them. After two years of 
preparation and shortly before finalizing the submission, the NANGOF volunteer 
charged with the task of completing the opt out learnt from a special advisor in the 
Ministry of Labour that the New Labour Act did not change the status of volunteers at 
all and that organizations could just continue using volunteers as they had under the 
old Labour Act. The misunderstanding showed how a patchy communication between 
a Ministry and an NGO resulted in a long pursuit of a project that lacked any 
substantial grounds.  
 
After the debate about self regulation the Labour Act opt out was the second 
instance where civil society supposedly responded a bill but failed to check its 
relevance with the government. The Labour Act opt out was arguably a consultant 
driven project. The consultant has a good reputation as Labour Lawyer in Namibia 
and NANGOF followed his advice when it started preparing the opt out submission. 
In doing so the umbrella relied too heavily on the opinion of one expert and did not 
confirm the necessity for its project either with the Ministry of Labour or with the 
NGO most experienced in labour matters, the Labour Research and Resource Institute 
(LaRRI). The lack of communication between NANGOF and LaRRI shows that 
relations between particular civil society organisations were much more important for 
internal consultation than specific issues. Whereas NANGOF planned to outsource 
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the response to the partnership bill to the LAC, the Labour Act opt out had been taken 
on by NANGOF volunteers without ever having contacted LaRRI. Part of the reason 
might have also been that NANGOF charged mostly overseas volunteers with 
preparing the submission, all of whom were not experts in Namibian Labour law and 
were most probably not aware of the existence of a specialized NGO. The frequent 
change of the person responsible for the submission might have been the reason why 
the umbrella never established an institutionalized relation with the Ministry of 
Labour. The separation between the two sectors was then indeed not intentional but a 
side effect of the high turnover of volunteers at NANGOF.  
 
Patchy communication, however, was not always accidental. At times one side 
decided to deliberately withhold information. In 2001 NANGOF acquired by chance a 
copy of the defence amendment bill and distributed it to Human Rights NGOs. 
However the Act was passed before civil society could respond and NANGOF 
protested against the “undemocratic and non-consultative manner in which the bill 
bulldozed through parliament.”187 As the example shows the government would often 
chose the less confrontational strategy of withholding information from civil society 
to avoid the sector’s critique. However, occasionally a governmental representative 
would outright refuse to see civil society as partner. The MP Hage Geingob told one 
NGO director after the parliamentary elections in 2004188 that government would not 
enter dialogue with civil society. SWAPO had just secured a mandate to rule the 
country for the coming five years and if he wanted to overthrow them he should 
contest in next elections in 5 years time! (Research Notes 11/07/2008). 
 
 
The “Breaking the Wall of Silence” (BWS) committee has sought for years to 
get SWAPO to enter a dialogue about the fate of people who had disappeared at the 
hands of the liberation movement or were imprisoned by SWAPO during the war 
against the colonial regime (Leys/Saul 2003). The national coordinator of the BWS 
said they were never invited to the president’s office despite their repeated attempts to 
meet the head of state. Despite the frustrating experiences of the past decade the BWS 
                                          
 
187 NANGOF September 2001:4 
188 Geingob was Namibia’s first Prime Minister from 1990 to 2002. 
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kept on trying to talk to the government. It emphasised that it regarded the 
government as partner and preferred dialogue to confrontation.189 This careful 
approach stood in stark contrast to the NSHR’s recent submission to the International 
Criminal Court, which accused ex-president Nujoma of gross human rights violations 
(NSHR 2006). The NSHR was heavily criticized for this move within civil society, 
especially as it did not seek contact to the victims’ families and did not offer a 
dialogue with SWAPO as the BWS had done (Höhn 2010).  
 
The BWS example shows that if government refused to cooperate with a civil 
society organisation, there was little the NGOs could do. Civil society organisations 
would also at times decide to withhold information, although their refusal was 
arguably never so consequential for the governmental counterpart. NANGOF had 
commissioned a directory of all the local donors giving to civil society in Namibia. 
The directory’s part about funding for HIV/AIDS projects was paid for by the 
Ministry of Health and Social Services, but the rest of the book was commissioned by 
NANGOF alone for the benefit of civil society organisations. When the NPC and 
some regional Councillors heard about the directory they asked NANGOF to release 
the information so that it could benefit organisations working in their region or 
contacting the NPC about funding opportunities. At this point the NANGOF Board 
decided that the information was for NANGOF members only. 
The Board members reasoned that government representatives would give out 
the information as their own and gain political advantages from it, which NANGOF 
did not want to support. A similar reason was given when the umbrella refused to 
share its database of civil society organisations with the NPC Help Desk.  People said 
they did not have a problem with giving out the information, but they did not want to 
provide the help desk Officer with data so he could pretend he had done anything in 
the months since he had started work for the NPC when in fact he had just been sitting 
on his hands (Research Notes 21/07/ 2008). 
 
                                          
 
189 The National Coordinator of the BWS emphasized how important it is in this sensitive issue to 
acknowledge that also contemporary SWAPO supporters suffered during war and that calling 
SWAPO’s leadership human rights abusers would add insult to injury. Interview, BWS national 
coordinator, Windhoek 21/05/ 2008. 
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In sum, the absence of links between government and civil society are more 
complex than they appear on first sight. They can be the result of one side consciously 
deciding not to communicate as the last examples showed. This was the case around 
controversial issues or when one side thought that sharing information would provide 
the receiver with an undue advantage. The example of the Labour Act opt out and the 
debate around civil society’s self regulation show that unarticulated and unchecked 
assumptions about the other side’s motives play a considerable role in bringing about 
a mismatch of projects. These assumptions remained largely unchecked for reasons 
having to do with the relations between civil society organisations rather than 
resulting from the specific relations between civil society and the government.  
 
 
So far this chapter has shown that a whole range of factors interact to 
determine the exact relations between the sectors. However, these formal aspects 
cannot explain why some civil society organisations apparently partner more 
effectively with government than others. Why does “Women’s Action for 
Development” have more opportunities to cooperate with ministries than the 
Rehoboth Development Forum? Why does the LAC have more input in governmental 
HIV policy making than the umbrella for AIDS service organisations? The remainder 
of the chapter will show that intangible factors like informal links, ad hoc 
opportunities and personal networks are crucial in explaining the differences between 
civic organisations’ relations to government.  
 
 
The importance of informal networks 
As chapter two has shown Namibia’s civil society is rather small with a 
limited number of individuals having long worked in the sector. Strong personal 
networks connect people working in the same field across the sectors.  Frequent 
phone calls, meetings at each other’s events or on invitation of a third party, the 
occasional formal meetings like courtesy calls, or official visits weaved a closely 
meshed network of people in governmental subdivisions and NGO units. The 
importance of personal networks and acquaintances for government – civil society 
relations cannot be overestimated as they were often the channels through which 
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substantial parts of opportunities and resources flew. NANGOF’s funding directory 
was paid for by the special programmes section of the Ministry of Health and Social 
Services (MoHSS), mostly because the programme officer in the Ministry and the 
then acting director of NANGOF knew each other very well and the job was given to 
NANGOF without a public tender, because only consultancies over 5000 Euros 
needed to be advertised. The long acquaintance meant that the MoHSS person as 
donor knew how the NANGOF director as recipient worked and could be confident 
that the project was realized in time and the comparably small amount of money well 
spent and accounted for.  
 
People who have been employed in civil society and government for a long 
time were often on first name terms and many civil society activists maintained these 
relations after they had left the sector.190 Very often people would move back and 
forth between government and civil society and thus span a network of close personal 
relations across the sectors through their individual careers. The current Help Desk 
Officer at the NPC had long been working for a developmental NGO and the 
chairperson of the NPC’s partnership advisory committee had been employed by an 
environmental research NGO before. One NGO director told me that he constantly 
struggled to find new staff because his organisation was loosing experienced 
employees to better paid positions in ministries all the time (Research Notes 18/07/ 
2008).191 The change from an NGO to government was by far the more frequent career 
step, but people occasionally would also move the other way: One of the new 
Capacity Building Officers at NANGOF left his position at the Ministry of Water and 
Agriculture, because he felt he could not develop his personal skills in the large 
bureaucracy of a ministry. These examples confirm the argument made by Nicolas 
Guilhot (2005) and Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth (2002) that careers spanning both 
sectors are an important factor in intertwining the governmental and non-
governmental sphere.192 
 
                                          
 
190 A lawyer who had long been working for the LAC and now lectures at the university still uses the 
contacts from his NGO time to get consultancies (Research Notes 04/04/2008). 
191 The fact that governmental positions are better paid, more secure and come with more benefits 
than employment in civil society is quite exceptional in Africa where high levels of donor funding 
often make NGOs the better career option compared to employment in cash striped state bureaucracy. 
192 See also “Telling the activist story: from roots to routes” in chapter 2. 
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Personal acquaintances made it also more likely that a ministerial division and 
an NGO would turn to each other for ad hoc support and information. There is hardly 
any difference for the NANGOF secretariat between somebody calling from a 
ministry or from an NGO asking for information and the staff at the secretariat knew 
some people in government as well as people in other NGOs.193 The first Capacity 
Building Officer at NANGOF spent an entire day of his first week at a new working 
group at Ministry of Labour. When NANGOF arranged for the second round of job 
interviews for its Capacity Building Officers there were not enough people to sit on 
the interview panel. During a staff meeting the director suggested to “borrow” 
somebody from the NPC, because she was sitting on NPC’s interview panels all the 
time and according to her it was high time that they returned the favour.  
All these contacts were made ad hoc and avoided the formal channels of 
cooperation. However they would happen so often and were so time consuming that 
one day NANGOF’s director complained to the NPC that she was not employed by 
them and that she really needed to spend some time at NANGOF.194 
 
The two sides needed to be physically close to each other to maintain 
(informal) relations and mutual help. This seems an obvious point to make, but one 
that is still often overlooked. Very often meetings would be rescheduled for the 
following day(s) on short notice and it often happened that the contact person was 
simply not in the office at the agreed time. It was crucial that people could come back 
within a few days to make up for the cancelled meeting.195 
During my time at NANGOF there were several occasions when somebody 
from a rural organisation had arranged for a meeting with NANGOF’s director, but 
did not meet her because she had to leave the office unexpectedly before the meeting 
and nobody from the staff could say when she would return. All that was left to do 
was to return the following day or sometimes a few days later with the hope of 
meeting her then. One representative from a rural organisation had travelled all the 
                                          
 
193 It is difficult to give exact numbers but on an average working day at NANGOF three out of five 
faxes and phone calls inviting to workshops or other events came from a ministry. 
194 Time and help are not always given entirely voluntarily. When governmental invitations piled up 
on the NANGOF’s director’s desk she complained that she felt she had to attend all those meetings and 
workshops, because if she declined once she would give government a reason to claim that the new 
NANGOF was not interested in a cooperation because it would not honour their invitations. 
195 Cancellations on a short notice had often to do with multiple jobs of activists. 
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350km from his hometown to Windhoek to deliver his organisation’s membership 
application in person to NANGOF and meet the new Executive Director. However, 
during the entire week he spent in the capital it was not possible to arrange a meeting 
with her or with anyone else from the NANGOF Council and he had to return without 
having spoken to any person in a management position at NANGOF. During a staff 
meeting a long term associate of NANGOF said he knew this person as a really 
committed activist who really wanted to advance his organisation’s work. “But he 
will not get information, consultancies and invitations to workshops, because he sits 
there in Khorixas, in the middle of nowhere and is utterly detached from what is 
happening in Windhoek” (Research Notes 10/03 2008). Similarly NANGOF’s 
director had arranged to meet with several heads of community-based organisations 
just before she flew to South Africa to attend a weeklong conference. But the evening 
before they were to meet it became clear that she had to fly earlier than expected and 
could not cancel the meeting in time. The leaders therefore only learnt about it when 
they came to the meeting. Since they could not wait over a week for the director to 
return they had to abandon the meeting altogether (Research Notes 18/02/ 2008). 
 
A Windhoek-based office brings clear advantages in meeting people, attending 
events and building a strong network. People were painfully aware of the Windhoek 
bias of events, but it is difficult to change this in practice. NANGOF planned to hold 
its National Consultative Conference on the partnership bill in Otjiwarongo, a town 
about 300km north of the capital. The reason was to avoid the impression the 
umbrella would only hold its events in the capital. However, the secretariat 
anticipated that most participants would come from Windhoek and the costs of 
transporting and accommodating for the three-day conference were seen as too high 
so that in the end the Conference was held in Windhoek.196 
 
                                          
 
196 It came as no surprise then that most participants were indeed from Windhoek and it is difficult to 
know where participants would have come from if the conference had been held outside Windhoek. 
But long distances between towns and sparse population density are undoubtedly an obstacle to any 
attempt in bringing a number of people together outside the capital. When a small NANGOF 
delegation toured the country to promote the Civil Society management Qualification, they spent two 




In sum, government – civil society cooperation has multiple dimensions and 
underlying reasons, as do contestations between the two sectors, and non-
communication. 
A good reputation and self-image helped NGOs to seek influence with the 
government and foster political cooperation between the two sectors. Donor pressure 
and funding priorities for partnerships on the other hand tended to give rise to 
economic links, as joint projects were more profitable for both sectors than separate 
plans. Personal networks, informal collaboration and ad hoc information sharing 
finally established important relations between the two sectors. Boundaries between 
the different kinds of relations were permeable and often social relations paved the 
way for more formalised political relations or joint project proposals result in closer 
personal contacts. As the sub-headings indicate there was a continuum of relations, 
cooperation might have been more economic than political but it was never purely 
either economic or political and often it remained difficult to categorize a relation 
without doubt. 
 
Contestations most often appeared around controversial issues. However it 
was often difficult to understand when exactly an issue became controversial. The 
case studies showed that an issue might become contested when it was perceived to 
restrict flexible relations between the sectors or when either side thought that 
information sharing would provide the other with and undue advantage. Besides 
cooperating with certain ministries and contesting governmental initiatives civil 
society would sometimes embark on projects that were strangely at odds with the 
governmental policies to which they were supposed to respond. In both examples 
there were motives driving the project forward that did not have anything to do with 
the links between the sectors - be it the ambition to regulate civil society’s internal 
conduct or the consultant’s interest in getting the project up and running.  
 
The main reason why the two sectors remained apart was the dominant 
opinion in civil society, government and amongst donors that civil society and 
government were two separate sectors. Dominant ideas about the sectors as non-
overlapping entities meant that NANGOF first consulted other civic organizations, 
before it talked to government about its proposed partnership policy. It also prevented 
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the umbrella from directly working with the Ministry of Labour on the new Labour 
Act. Civic organizations presented themselves as constituting a coherent sector and 
talked down their often close relations to government ministries and the fact that 
many NGOs maintained closer relations to government divisions than to other civic 
organizations. The dominant image of the two sectors as separate in fact meant that 
government and civil society remained apart even when the issue demanded 
cooperation. 
 
Practices showed that often the same organization engaged in all links at once 
and that these multiple relations were far less easy to separate than activists often 
claimed. Different factors like NGOs’ self image, their funding imperatives and above 
all their established personal networks to government agencies all shaped the distinct 
form of cross-sector relations. This was also the reason why civic organisations could 
entertain contradicting relations to governmental institutions at the same time, closely 
cooperating with one governmental institution and choosing to confront or disengage 
from another. Common interests, joint projects and long established personal contacts 
often meant that a number of NGOs were in fact closer to some government 
institutions than to their assumed “peers” in civil society. However, NGOs also felt 
the need to follow the protocol and consult with their peers first. This often led to 
basic tensions in the relation between the sectors and suggests to disaggregate the 
sectors and to regard the relation as continuum of in/decreasing closeness. 
Understanding civil society’s relation with the government therefore demands 
investigating the context that shapes NGO action and their decision whether to contest 
or cooperate with governmental agencies, questions that the next chapter will explore 




Chapter 6 Friends, foes, funds 
 
 
Namibian independence in 1990 coincided with a steep increase in 
international funding for NGOs. The combination of new political freedoms and an 
unprecedented amount of available funding meant that civil society organisations 
mushroomed, a growth activists occasionally found detrimental for the quality of civic 
activism in the country. New funding was therefore not always seen as entirely 
positive. NGOs’ funding experiences were arguably very particular in a strong state 
like Namibia, because civil society organisations faced high competition from strong 
governmental institutions and from a highly competitive private sector. Increased 
competition meant above all the stricter enforcement of standards in large grants 
whereas in weaker states donors often did not adhere to their own funding criteria and 
allocated aid according to very idiosyncratic criteria (Marriage 2006). Grant 
management was always a major subject for discussion in Namibian civil society 
wide events, because funding, or the lack of it, always had an immediate impact on 
what NGOs were able to do. Often NGO staff demanded that they should have more 
influence on the design of aid programmes because international aid (priorities) had 
such a profound impact on their work. But how exactly does aid influence NGO 
work? This chapter demonstrates that grant management, i.e. the application, 
administration and the end of funding, had a much wider impact on NGO projects 
than the much cited ideologies of donors or recipients.  
 
NGOs often conveyed an image of civil society wide cooperation when they 
applied for funding. However this representation contradicted the usually fierce 
competition amongst civic organisations for available grants. NGOs often used 
strategies of tacit gate-keeping and excluded rival NGOs by withholding funding 
information. Attracting funding therefore did not only influence how organisations 
worked, but also shaped the ways in which they related to their peers. The chapter’s 
second section shows how grant budgets defined NGO work priorities through the 
differentiated allocation of money. Organisations had to spend their entire budget in a 
given period of time and thus prioritised large budget items in their everyday work, 
because it took longer to spend more money. The termination of funding defined 




make contested decisions over which kind of work to scale down or abandon 
completely. The chapter shows that tightening budgets let Namibian NGOs invest 
more in their image as experts and scale down the organisations’ service delivery. 
However, these decisions were often contested and the widespread decline of funding 
in Namibian civil society thus resulted in a deep crisis of the sector that brought into 
the open contestations around priorities in civic activism. 
 
The chapter’s interest in the way in which funding shapes the daily work of 
NGOs fits with the thesis’ general attempt to understand how development works; an 
interest that departs from the literature’s concern to explain whether development 
worked. Development theory has long tried to discover the underlying reasons why 
international aid has not been able to live up to its ambitious goal to reduce global 
poverty (Easterley 2007).197 Development has long been equated with economic 
growth. Corrupt recipient governments or bureaucratic donors (Easterley 2002) were 
represented as hindering the free market and as major obstacles for the efficient 
administration of development.  
 
Ideas about the superiority of the free market translated into an increased 
interest in NGOs which were thought to be the more flexible and capable 
development alternative to states. NGOs were especially prominent when donors 
became increasingly disappointed with African states which they often blamed for the 
failure of the Structural Adjustment Programmes to boost economic growth in the 
1980s (Lewis 2008). However, at the end of the 1990s it was clear that NGOs were 
not the “magic bullets” that automatically brought development to the poor 
(Edwards/Hulme 1996) and aid preferences swung back towards state support or 
mixed approaches.198 Where the state was seen as too weak, corrupt or inefficient 
funds were channelled through NGOs but in strong states donors concentrated aid 
efforts on budget support and required NGOs to team up with state institutions in 
                                          
 
197 Modernization theory and dependency theory were the main competing explanations for 
(under)development in the literature. For a very short summary of the different development paradigms 
over the last 50 years see Easterley 2007; Rist 2002. 
198 The Paris declaration in 2005 again promoted state support as main tool in international 
development (Naidoo 2003; Akbar Zaid 1999). However the recently prominent budget support for 
states ignores that it is still not very clear how foreign aid influences national economies (Bourguignon/ 
Sundberg 2007, Easterley 2007; Kenny/Williams 2001; Mohan et al 2000; Mosse 2005; Uwin 2004). 




public-private partnerships. Budget support and public-private partnerships have 
again diverted funds away from NGOs and this meant that civic organisations in 
Namibia had to work with considerably smaller budgets. 
 
The literature on NGO funding has shown how new donor trends like budget 
support and the prioritisation of state or non-state actors have heavily influenced 
NGOs’ room for manoeuvre and how donors’ ideological orientations thus had 
profound impact on the way civil society organisations worked. As early as 1991 
Adam Fowler argued that the specific tasks of southern NGOs were likely to remain 
dependent on the priorities in international aid (Fowler 1991). A few years later David 
Hulme and Michael Edwards summed up the disillusion with the emancipatory 
potential of NGOs when they argued that NGOs’ continued dependence on 
international aid had resulted in a decline in their accountability, transparency, 
efficiency and grassroots connection (Hulme/Edwards 1997: 964). Specific case 
studies showed how donor agendas have continuously shaped the work and scope of 
southern NGOs. Mark Schuller (2007) argued that donors in the Caribbean 
structurally favour large local NGOs over smaller and upcoming grassroots 
organisations and thereby heavily influence the ways in which development projects 
are implemented in the region. Sarah Michael (2006) argued that NGOs in Tanzania, 
Senegal and Zimbabwe are systematically disempowered by international donors to 
define their own work priorities and are thus prevented from contributing 
meaningfully to development. Julie Hearn (2000) showed how international political 
aid to civil society in South Africa changed dominant perceptions of democracy from 
substantial to procedural aspects of democracy. A more recent study about 
international aid to NGOs in South Africa argued that donors’ preference for state 
agencies has left many NGOs with no choice but to turn to contract work and fees for 
services as they had to fend for themselves (Mitlin/Bebbington/Hickey 2007: 1709). 
This ultimately resulted in a decline of social justice organisations and let NGOs to 
concentrate on specific service delivery projects. Anthony Bebbington (2005) study of 
agrarian NGOs in the Andes showed how the new focus on service delivery and pro-
poor projects in Dutch development assistance meant that local NGOs had to scale 
down research and instead concentrated on service delivery only. Although some 
accounts have also pointed to NGOs’ ability to gain more room for manoeuvre (Lewis 




development always have concrete consequences for recipients. Some accounts in the 
literature have therefore argued that the voices from the South should have much 
more influence in the design of development programmes and that recipients should 
be given more room for manoeuvre to tailor development projects to their needs 
(Wallace et al 2006, Whitfield 2008). This would also avoid the situation of recipients 
having to twist their feedback to satisfy donor demands and would help to close the 
communication gap between Northern donors and southern recipients and thus 
contribute to mending the “broken aid chain” (Wallace et al 2006; Bornstein 2006; 
Whitfield 2008). This would not only provide the developmentalist state with a much 
needed protection of its economy (Chang 2002), it would also prevent donors from 
being fundamentally out of touch with recipients’ reality and force them to leave their 
fictitious “aidland” (Apthrope 2003). While it is generally accepted that aid has a 
profound impact on the way recipient agencies work, it is far less clear how exactly 
aid affects recipients. This chapter  focuses on the consequences of aid for those who 
receive it and how the practices of funding, i.e. applying for and the management of 
grants together with the difficulties in coping with shrinking budgets, shape inter-
organisational relations and daily civic activism. 
  
Looking at how aid relations affected links between organizations questions 
the idea that recipients are one homogenous entity.  A recent volume on the politics of 
aid (Whitfield 2008) differentiated between states’ ability to fend off intrusive 
development policies, but to my knowledge nothing similarly differentiated has been 
written about NGOs. This chapter shows that there were in fact huge differences 
between individual donor organisations and between recipient NGOs. They differed 
in their institutionalisation, in the amount of money they spent and received, in their 
flexibility and in their adherence to particular “aid fashions”. NGOs also differed 
considerably in their ability to secure new grants and in their funding experiences. 
While some NGOs could access large funds through open tenders, others only had 
access to much smaller but less competitive funds or had to enter partnership with 
Northern NGOs and adjust their own work to that of their partner NGO.  Interviews 
with funding agencies showed that donors were not one homogenous group either. 
They did not necessarily adhere to the latest “fashion” in international aid and they 
differed considerably in their independence from and agreement with dominant ideas 




Acknowledging differences between organisations on both sides opens the 
possibility of looking at the concrete consequences of funding dependence for NGO 
practices. This chapter looks at how funding influences NGO practices and relations 
before, during and after the grant period with special attention to sensitive areas which 




The funding cycle: applications 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Namibia increased from 110.29 
million US Dollars in 2003 to 149.98 Million US Dollars in 2009,199 but tendencies in 
international aid to channel money to strong states and the concentration of funding in 
a few highly visible areas like HIV and natural conservation left many NGOs 
experiencing a steep decline in their funds. The overall sum of aid to Namibia is 
therefore not nearly as important as the way in which grants were allocated, in order 
to understand civil society funding. The importance of allocation patterns in foreign 
aid was clearly visible in the single largest and most recent funding schemes in 
Namibia; the “President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief in Africa” (PEPFAR) 
and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), both run by the US government. 
The programmes promise a considerable influx of money into the country, but 
PEPFAR200 funds only HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care programs, mostly 
run by the Ministry of Health and Social Services which received the single biggest 
grant in 2007. The MCC was a 305 Million Dollar contract between the Namibian and 
the US government, designed as budget support. NGOs were only involved in the 
MCC consultation phase to identify priority areas, but the grant’s support for 
education, parks and infrastructure will entirely go to the state.  
  
Large grants usually went to state institutions and civil society organisations 
had to rely on small grants schemes as regular sources of income. A study on funding 
                                          
 
199 OECD Development Statistics available at  
http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/#?x=2&y=6&f=3:51,4:1,1:2,5:3,7:1&q=3:51+4:1+1:2+5:3+7:1+2:1,121+6:
2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008.2009  (last accessed 28 April 2010). 
200  PEPFAR provided $24.5 million in 2004, more than $42.5 in 2005, $57.3 million in 2006, $91.2 




for civil society organisations in southern Africa found that over 60% of HIV 
community based organisations (CBOs) obtained their funds from agencies that were 
open to fund small local civil society organisations (OSISA 2007). The findings were 
not only relevant for HIV organisations, because donors administering these small 
grants said that they would fund projects irrespective of the particular topic. They 
thought it more important that the project appeared to be durable and that the applying 
organisation had some relations with the donor agency or a proven track record of 
successful project management.201 But small grants were not only allocated to 
organisations with few staff and small budgets. When asked about the main recipients 
of their grants, donor representatives often mentioned a number of strong NGOs who 
were also repeatedly successful bidders in open tenders. These NGOs therefore often 
competed with smaller organisations for small grants and arguably diverted vital 
resources from small organisations. 
 
Interestingly, those NGOs that were capable of winning competitive tenders 
often criticised the small grants funds. Far from seeing them as opportunity to 
diversify civil society and open opportunities for weaker organisations, they 
complained that the decentralised form of aid would inject money into the wrong 
places and donors encouraged fly-by-night organisations with their short sighted 
distribution of easy money (Research Notes 11/02/2008; 10/07/2008). NANASO’s 
network officer complained that the mushrooming of small HIV organisations was 
entirely donor driven and happened without any consideration as to what was needed, 
and how civic activism around HIV was best coordinated amongst AIDS service 
organisations.202  
 
They saw that the support for smaller organisations as yet another fashion in 
international aid, ill-thought through and without the necessary long-term perspective 
to make aid intervention work. They argued that donors wavered in their support and 
acted according to fashions rather than in the best interest of recipients. In their 
                                          
 
201 Interview Country Representative USAID, Windhoek 23/11/2006; Interview Country Director 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Windhoek 09/11/2006; Interview Country Director Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
Windhoek 1/12/2006; Interview NGO & HIV/Aids Programme Officer Delegation of the European 
Commission to Namibia Windhoek 13/11/2006; Interview Country Director GTZ Windhoek 6/11/2006 
202 NANASO network coordinator 02/07/2008. This critique also implied a considerable criticism on 
smaller organisations which were portrayed as entirely donor driven. In this image most smaller CBOs 




opinion it was thus vital for organisations that their leaders were skilled to “play” 
donors, to identify trends and tailor proposals accordingly.203 This was the only way in 
which managers could ensure the survival of their organisations in uncertain times. 
Directors’ ability to tune in to the right aid discourse was a major criterion for their 
management skills and the organisation’s overall performance. In the opinion of NGO 
executives it was the particular skill of an NGO leader that made the difference 
between successful and shrinking organisations. Directors usually blamed the NGO 
management’s lack of leadership skills for organisational decline, but donors were 
also seen to be partly responsible for the inefficient management. According to NGO 
executives donors’ preference to have a local beneficiary in a leadership position did 
not take into account the person’s qualification and often led to the decline of the 
entire organisation. Qualification, not identity or ownership was therefore the most 
important criterion for NGO executives to judge their peers.204 Very often statements 
about (in)proper leadership were the only times NGO leaders would comment on the 
performance of other organisations. Apart from this they would enact rather than spell 
out inter-organisational tensions including one important relation within civil society, 
competition. 
 
The practice of competition 
Experiences of funding were highly diverse in Namibian civil society. A study 
of over 300 organisations working on HIV/AIDS in Namibia found that only 43 
received international funds. Of the 43 only one organisation received funds more 
than 20 times, three NGOs were funded between ten and 20 times and twelve 
organisations only received one grant in the last six years (OSISIA 2007).205 The 
reason for the high inequality was that funding was allocated through open tenders 
which were usually highly competitive and only NGOs with professional fundraisers 
and sufficient experience were successful. The gender unit at LAC employed a project 
officer who had been working as fundraiser for Amnesty International for years and 
                                          
 
203 Interview Country Director Project Hope, Windhoek 12/06/2008 
204 This is an interesting contrast to trends of indigenisation in international NGOs where as Stephen 
Hopgood (2008) argues “being” rather than “knowing” has become the most important criterion to 
judge whether a person fits the job. 
205 This shows the large gap between stronger and weaker organisations; only few NGOs could 
regularly access large grants whereas the majority of organisations had to rely on multiple smaller 




was thus highly skilled in drafting funding proposals. It was quite common for 
organisations with larger budgets to have a professional fundraiser who was tasked to 
identify new projects and maintain permanent contact with donors, whereas 
organisations with small budgets usually added fundraising to the job description of 
project coordinators. 
 
Executives supported competition in principle as being good for democracy 
and project quality,206 but they never talked about concrete experiences of inter-
organisational competition. It seemed that civil society organisations had magically 
divided all social activism amongst them. In a rare exception NGO directors said that 
the old NANGOF brought about its own decline by competing with members for 
funds. NANGOF’s competition was presented at breaching the tacit agreement that 
NANGOF was not to compete with its members for funds and the umbrella’s decline 
was portrayed as the logical result of this illegitimate competition. Usually NGOs 
walked the fine line between the often evoked civil society wide solidarity and fierce 
competition for funds through gate-keeping, non-coordination and non-information. 
This way it was possible for organisations to compete de facto without having to 
acknowledge competition between them. 
 
Gate-keeping and non information 
 
Strong and well-connected NGOs guarded their networks suspiciously and 
“forgot” to pass on vital funding information to others. From the beginning of 2009 
NANGOF received a major grant from the European Commission. The grant was a 
direct result of the EU’s acknowledgement that non-state actors were vital in 
stabilizing democracy and bringing about development (EC/ACP 2000).207 However, 
very soon the EC realised that strengthening civil society would involve more than 
funding the umbrella, a decision that was partly due to NANGOF’s inability to deliver 
results on its capacity building programme in time.208 The EC delegation therefore 
invited civil society organisations to an initial meeting about possible direct grants to 
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individual NGOs. The invitation was sent to NANGOF as the EC’s only partner in 
civil society with the instructions to pass it on to all interested organisations. 
However, NANGOF only sent the information to a few organisation and left out a 
particularly strong NGO with whom it had fallen out over election monitoring 
(Research Notes 06/06/2009). The NGO missed the crucial funding meeting with the 
EC and its director complained about the umbrella’s gate-keeping policy and 
announced that the organisation would consequently leave NANGOF. 
 
In a similar instance a strong NGO only invited selected colleagues to a 
funding meeting. When the Ford Foundation was planning to resume its funding for 
Namibian civil society organisations it used its long established links with the LAC to 
arrange an initial open meeting with interested NGOs. However, the LAC did not 
advertise this meeting broadly; it did not use any wider distribution list and did not 
even publish it on its own website. As a result only those NGOs attended who had 
either close links to the LAC or who had heard about the meeting by word of mouth 
(Research Notes 11/02/2008). 
 
Similarly the US Embassy in Windhoek regularly invited a number of highly 
visible NGOs to a donor-civil society breakfast. Although the organisations did not 
have much influence on the list of guests, they also hardly reported what had been 
discussed. They never used civil society wide channels to distribute information and 
only mentioned the breakfast meeting in private conversations. It appears that civic 
organisations saw their contacts with donors as zero sum game, because information 
about workshops and other opportunities were often not passed on by organisations 
that were supposed to distribute relevant news. NANGOF’s executive director 
complained that she did not want to pass workshop invitations to SWG lead 
organisations or sectoral umbrellas, because they would not distribute the information 
further and usually “the person answering the phone is the one who goes to the 
workshop, what a coincidence!” (Research Notes 15/03/2008) 
 
The lack of communication between civic organisations about funding 
opportunities led NANGOF to publish a funding directory. The umbrella claimed the 
directory would address a major concern of especially the smaller and more remote 




how to plan fundable projects. However, once the data had been collected and 
information about funding was available, the umbrella’s Board decided to make it 
only accessible to NANGOF’s members. The reason was to provide organisations 
with an incentive to join the umbrella, but the decision de facto narrowed the circle of 
entitled organisations to those NANGOF members who maintained regular contact to 
the umbrella and were usually well connected to donors anyhow. 
 
Access to and reputation in networks was vital for obtaining funding. As 
mentioned earlier most small grants schemes were more relaxed about feedback 
requirement but they usually demanded some track record of previous projects and 
often relied on peer evaluation through recommendation letters. As the examples of 
the EC grants, the Ford Foundation and the US embassy breakfast above showed 
personal ties and informal links often decided whether NGOs received information 
about new funding or invitations to important meetings. The SWG gender was the 
most cohesive of NANGOF’s working groups. Its members were connected through 
long established links, and it was no coincidence that two of the major driving 
organisations are headed by a couple. The SWG gender was so very coherent partly 
because the group consisted of the same members over the years. Staff at the 
NANGOF secretariat suspected that this was so because the lead organisation had 
organised meetings for years and had only invited its own contacts. The new Capacity 
Building Officers and NANGOF therefore thought that one of their most complicated 
tasks was to walk the fine line between delivering to well-connected organisations 
who were at the centre of these coordination mechanisms and opening their networks 
to newcomers, without being seen as compromising some organisations’ claim to 
leadership.  
 
Non – cooperation 
Interestingly, even the Sector Working Group gender with its close ties 
between NGOs hardly had any cross-organisational projects. Gender-sensitive law 
reform, the project presented as its concern, was largely driven by the gender unit of 
the LAC which conducted occasional workshops for others and urged all to include 
legal perspective in their own projects. The organisations however did not design and 
implement a joint programme on law reform. Coordination of NGO activities was 




overlaps. One NGO director said that there was a political culture in Namibian civil 
society that “everyone was doing their own thing” without any attempt to plan joint 
projects (Research Notes 06/06/2009). Questioning the common practice of separate 
projects one NANGOF paper asked whether civil society would have better access to 
programmes through joint projects as opposed to individual action (NANGOF 25 
January 2006). Coordination was presented as major concern of civil society and 
NANGOF’s sector working groups and most sectoral umbrellas were created to do 
just that.209 However, coordination was solely seen as dividing work between 
organisations, never to facilitate joint projects. The umbrella for conservancy NGOs 
(NACSO) “coordinated” projects in Namibia by dividing the whole country into 
several zones with one regional lead organisation and one organisation as leader on 
particular topics like training, research and advocacy. Coordinating efforts sought to 
minimise competition by carving up civic activism rather than facilitating joint 
projects. However, the division of activism often did not work out, because 
organisations did often not pass on the necessary information and “coordinating” 
umbrellas could not divide civic activism accordingly. Directors often tried to present 
the non-cooperation as deliberate and enhancing efficiency by avoiding overlaps.210 
They hardly conceded that non-cooperation resulted from competing projects. It 
seems that the idea that civil society embodied ideals of questioning and critique was 
only applicable to the sector’s relation to the state and to the private sector and did not 
concern the relations between civic organisations.211  
 
However, practices show that civic organisations did compete and intra-civil 
society relations were by far not as harmonious and naturally complementing as it was 
often portrayed by the NGO directors. During the years when NANGOF was without 
funding, the National Institute for Democracy (NID) took on several civil society- 
wide projects. The NID published a “guide to civil society” and its “civil society 
support programme” offered networking opportunities for civic organisations and 
redistributed funds to smaller organisations. All these activities were seen by the new 
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NANGOF as the tasks of an umbrella and contestations about the NID’s mandate 
came into the open when both organisations planned to head an election monitoring 
coalition for the November 2009 parliamentary elections. NANGOF’s Democracy 
Sector Working Group had long planned to organise a monitoring coalition from civil 
society, but its lead organisation ‘Citizens for an Accountable and Transparent 
Society’ (CATS) submitted its funding proposal so late that  it endangered the entire 
project. NANGOF risked to repeat the mistake of the “too little too late” action that 
had also endangered the monitoring mission during the previous election. While 
NANGOF/CATS were still planning, the NID teamed up with several other NGOs 
and filed a grant application for election monitoring with USAID. NID convinced the 
donor that it had the necessary networks and capacity to organise, train and deploy 
enough monitors to cover the entire elections and received the grant. When NANGOF 
heard about this the director of CATS complained that NID was taking over the work 
of the umbrella and demanded that NID should hand over the USAID money to 
NANGOF, in order to make it a civil society wide project. NID refused, but invited 
CATS/NANGOF to join the coalition under NID’s leadership. However, the 
cooperation was called off shortly afterwards when the CATS director demanded to 
single-handedly publish the coalition’s press releases.212 With only a few months left 
before the election NANGOF could not organise a countrywide monitoring team. 
Instead it only released a post election statement together with the SADC-CNGO 
mission which had deployed 47 observers (NANGOF 18 December, 2009).  
  
In another instance both organisations tried to promote management skills in 
civil society. Both organisations designed a programme, submitted to different 
donors, how to strengthen capacity in civic organisations; Both presented themselves 
as vital partners in strengthening the sector and both ran similar training elements on 
very similar topics. NANGOF received by far the larger grant and its project was 
therefore much more ambitious in breath and scope. However, the umbrella never 
tried to incorporate NID’s expertise in its “national” civil society management 
qualification and never acknowledged NID’s previous work in any of its grant 
applications. Instead the umbrella sought to undertake its own training needs survey 
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and trial runs of its modules. In turn the NID only approached NANGOF after it had 
secured its grant and suggested looking into the possibility of organising joint 
workshops. However, after the fallout between the organisations around election 
monitoring it became even less likely that they will collaborate on training.213 The 
relations between NID and NANGOF were a rare occasion when competition was 
openly acknowledged and parallel projects were not presented as agreeable parcelling 
of civic activism. The case is so remarkable because competition in civil society for 
funding is high, but it is mostly ‘done’ rather than explicitly discussed. The case of 
gate-keeping organisations and the deteriorating relations between NID and 
NANGOF showed that funding considerably influenced inter-organisational relations 
and NGO’s internal practices. The next section shows that funding continued to 
influence NGOs’ daily work and inter-organisational relations even when an NGO 
had obtained funding.  
 
Being funded 
Once an organisation secured funding, the project’s clock started ticking on 
spending. Especially larger grants posed a considerable logistical problem for NGOs 
to disburse the allocated money in a limited period of time.214 Budgets were therefore 
not only a tool to account for funding, but they delineated NGO projects and 
determined priorities in organisational work. NGOs had to spend much more time and 
resources on larger budget items in order to ensure that the allocated money was 
spend at the end of the project. Budgets translated sums of money into NGO work 
priorities and limited the organisations’ ability to change projects once the grant had 
been approved, as NANGOF’s main grant shows.  
 
The Programme Estimates 
The main grant that set NANGOF up again was the EC’s civil society capacity 
support programme which sought to strengthen NGOs’ contribution to poverty 
alleviation and to realise the commitment the EU had made in its Cotonou agreement 
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(Dearden n.d.; European Commission 2002). The EC budgets were called 
“programme estimates” (PEs) and NANGOF’s first PE provided the umbrella with a 
start-up grant before the project’s proper implementation began with PE2 running 
from 1 May 2008 to 30 April 2009.  
 
The case study shows that a grant dictated what an NGO could be working on 
during the project period. Since organisations were not allowed to over- or under-
spend on any item, the budget identified priority areas through the allocation of 
money. Since it took longer and required more effort to spend more money, the 
budget translated sums of money into time spent on particular agenda items and thus 
what had to be given priority in NANGOF’s everyday work. Budgets therefore 
became statements about what civic activism ought to be about. The two programme 
estimates prioritised two areas for NANGOF’s activities, “participatory development” 
and “improved governance within civil society”. Both areas aimed at regulating the 
conduct of civil society organisations through standardised training and 
qualifications.215 The budget did not only include the training itself but the entire 
process leading towards them, a study of training needs in civil society, employing a 
consultant to design the modules, the training of trainers and finally the organisation 
of the workshops. All these activities meant that the process was very long and as the 
chapter on activists already argued, the Civil Society Management Qualification took 
almost two years to be implemented.216 When NANGOF finally received the first 
instalment of its three year grant from the EC, the umbrella had to quickly issue calls 
for tenders and job advertisements, because the process took so long that it hardly 
fitted the three months period of the first instalment. Consultancies especially took so 
long with their calls for tenders, application rounds, short-listing, interviews, 
appointments and briefing meetings that NANGOF had to pay its consultants before 
they submitted any work, because the money had to be spent. Throughout the entire 
period several NANGOF volunteers and a considerable part of the umbrella’s 
resources were occupied with these workshops. The budgets’ focus on workshops and 
training of civic organisations indicated in the grant that NANGOF was the trainer 
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and assessor of its members and the project presupposed hierarchical relations of 
control. The PE’s were not only based on these relations, they actively encouraged 
them. The budgets translated the ‘greater role for NANGOF in a democratic civil 
society’ into workshops to promote the umbrella in the regions, into more surveys on 
civic activism and into more money for Sector Working Groups to “coordinate” civic 
activities. 
 
Misunderstandings about the budget often also pointed to fundamental 
disparities between donors and showed that grant makers had very different ideas 
about how their money should be spent. One misunderstanding between NANGOF 
and the EC   concerned the roles of external consultants and permanent NANGOF 
staff. Many budget items on PE1 and 2 were consultancies, because NANGOF had 
assumed that the EC, like the UN, preferred this way of outsourcing. However, the 
discussions for the PE2 made it clear that the EC thought that this was NOT the way 
to organise civic activism.217 This misunderstanding shows that even the sub-group of 
large donors disagreed on how to spend grant money. Similarly, small grant makers 
like the German Foundations and the small grants funds of the embassies often 
differed considerably on how best to administer grants. The country representative for 
the ‘Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’ said that Scandinavian donors were too trusting in 
giving money to little known organisations and were surprised when funds were not 
accounted for. He also said that his Foundation worked differently from the ‘Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung’ which supported strong and efficient NGOs “whose only problem 
was that they were entirely white”.218 The various funding regimes showed that donors 
were a heterogeneous group and NANGOF’s assumption that different grant-makers 
followed a single method to allocate funding was simply wrong.  
 
The second misunderstanding illustrates how budgets constrain the room for 
manoeuvre if projects are not going according to a funding plan. It concerned the lack 
of ‘fit’ between the original budget and the actual sums spent. NANGOF did not 
spend the grant’s entire sum in the first three months and had to find ways to deal 
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with unspent funds. NANGOF staff thought they needed to apply for a de-
commitment of funds when in fact any unspent money was automatically allocated to 
the next budget before the EU reclaimed the money 2 years later. NANGOF did not 
know about this and applied to extend PE1 for six weeks in order to spend the money 
on outstanding budget items. The misunderstanding around the de-commitment 
created a number of problems for NANGOF. The umbrella needed to find additional 
funds in PE 1 to pay its staff for an additional 6 weeks, because it could not combine 
budget lines from PE1 and 2. The extension therefore addressed the problem of 
unspent funds but created new ones in areas where NANGOF’s spending had been on 
target. There is a limited scope for the redistributing funds between budget items and 
spending must be kept under the same (sub)heading. The Executive Director had to be 
paid for six more weeks from the original salaries budget in PE1, because her pay 
could not be generated from postponing other activities. Differences between money 
applied for and actual spending had considerable impact on the entire budget. 
Necessary reshuffling of funds often meant that money was taken from posts that 
were on target which then became under-funded. That is the reason why NGOs tried 
to avoid budget over- or under-spending at all costs. NANGOF never allocated more 
than 300, 000N$ (30,000 Euro) to any single budget item, because any spending over 
this threshold would require an international tender according to EU regulations. 
International tenders however would lengthen the process considerably and make it 
highly unlikely that the funds could be spent before the end of the budget period. 
Organisations either had to use funds for their stated purposes or had to justify any 
changes in spending.219 Directors often complained that donors employed double 
standards in handling of funds because they wasted money on expensive workshops 
and conferences but threatened to cut NGO’s budget if the organisation could not 
justify even small expenses.220 
 
Grant management was a central activity of NANGOF and the organisation 
maintained almost daily contact with its main donor. The exchanges were often short 
and concerned mostly clarifications about terms and procedures, informal progress 
reports, feedback and meetings with third parties. Calls from the EC’s NGO 
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programme advisor always had priority for NANGOF’s executive director. Frequent 
and informal exchanges were made possible by the short distance between donor and 
NGO offices in Windhoek. Meetings could be arranged on a short notice and 
NANGOF’s director could easily drop off or pick up documents.221 Maintaining close 
contact was considerably more difficult with the Ford Foundation which funded 
NANGOF’s response to the government’s civil society partnership project, described 
in the previous chapter. The Ford Foundation’s office was in Johannesburg and 
although papers were turned around fairly quickly between Ford and NANGOF the 
spatial distance resulted in a relation that remained somehow aloof.  In fact the Ford 
Foundation had to ask NANGOF whether it was at all interested in receiving the 
grant, after the umbrella had not reacted to its initial invitation for two months. Once 
NANGOF decided to apply for the grant, fulfilling the Foundation’s requirements 
took up a large share of NANGOF’s administrator’s time. The Ford Foundations 
demanded, amongst other things, a separate bank account, but the Namibian banks 
asked all 16 Trustees to sign the application. In the long period it took to gather the 
signatures NANGOF found it difficult to explain to Ford representatives why it took 
so long to open a bank account in Namibia. 
 
Budgets structured NGOs’ daily work throughout the entire funding period. 
The scale of particular budget items defined how long NGOs worked on them and 
donors’ different rules for over- and underspending delineated NGOs’ room for 
manoeuvre. The specific ways funding structured NGO work priorities shows that 
grant management remained a continuous concern and structured relations between 
donor and recipient NGO. Close relations to main donors were vital for any NGO, 
because donors differed considerably in their rules and in their expectations how grant 
money ought to be spent. 
 
The end of funding 
International funding usually took the form of project based grants. This meant 
that any grant was allocated for a specific purpose and only for the period of a 
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particular project. Previously, donors had supported an entire organisation over an 
agreed period irrespective of its projects. The new ‘project based funding’ regime 
meant that organisations had to continuously look for new funding while their projects 
were still running, in order to ensure organisational survival, and finalising any 
project also implied the danger of running out of funds. Activists often complained 
that it had become more and more difficult to secure new funding once projects had 
come to an end. Donors and NGOs differed about underlying reasons for the funding 
decline in civil society. Donors saw the lack of capacity within civil society as single 
most important factor explaining the withdrawal of funds. NGOs, on the other hand, 
doubted whether this was the real reason behind the decline. They pointed to the 
many initiatives to strengthen project cycle management and proposal writing skills 
which indicated that problems of capacity were not new to Namibian civil society. 
The annual report of NEPRU in 1997 had already mentioned problems of recruiting 
and holding qualified staff.222 NGO staff pointed out that donors had for a long time 
employed formal requirements to evaluate NGOs’ performance. The question that 
troubled them was why these factors had now become so decisive for donors in 
justifying the termination of support.  
 
Decreasing funds did not only affect organisations with small budgets and no 
professional fundraiser. Although those organisations were arguably the first victims 
of the funding decline, shrinking budgets were also a problem for NGOs with large 
budgets and highly qualified staff. The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) 
shrank from 7 to 2 employees between 2002 and 2006, the Legal Assistance Centre 
had to close down 2 of its former 5 project units with one of remaining unit only 
staffed with one employee, and the National Economic Policy Research Unit 
(NEPRU) listed 19 researchers in its annual report for 2002/2003 whereas currently it 
only employs 9 fulltime researchers (NEPRU 2003). 
 
Since strong NGOs also experienced a considerable decline, activists doubted 
that funding really decreased because civil society organisations lacked qualified 
staff. They explained the waning support as reflecting international aid preferences for 
state agencies over NGOs (Research Notes 09/11/2006) and recognised that the 
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principled support for the non-governmental sector that they had taken for granted in 
the years after independence was no longer available. The decreasing support for 
NGOs in Namibia revealed a deep gap between aid practices of scaling down civil 
society in stable democracies and models of democratic consolidation (Diamond 
1999; Bratton 1994) which claim that a strong civil society is vital to ensure a 
country’s democracy. Larry Diamond argued that civil society’s main function is to 
maintain and strengthen existing democracies, because it is essential in providing 
public scrutiny of democratic governments and contain their power by holding them 
accountable and by checking potential violations of the law (Diamond 1999:7). 
 
Donors and NGOs blamed each other for being most responsible for the 
funding decline. Donors argued that civil society’s capacity was too weak to justify 
continuing support, NGOs argued that donors changed their priorities according to the 
latest funding trend and thus brought about the decrease in civil society’s funding. In 
fact only both trends combined can explain the recent funding plunge in civil society. 
Civil society’s (perceived) lack of capacity became a much more decisive factor 
because the state had returned as an equally legitimate aid recipient. The funding 
crisis provides insights into the relations between organisations and their donors.  The 
organisations’ coping strategies showed how NGOs sought to balance commercial 
work and civic activism, and saw the two as different aspects of an increasingly 
common NGO reality. Lastly, declining funds required a number of organisations to 
scale down their activities and close parts of the organisation. The decisions which 
units to close demonstrated which activities employees saw as core work of their 
NGO and of civil society in general, and illustrated how NGO executives justified 
difficult and contested management decisions.223 
 
 
The consequences of the funding decline  
The shift of funding away from civil society organisations deeply affected the 
relations between NGOs and their donors. Donors and NGOs had used different 
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levers, accountability versus authenticity, to advance their position in a contested 
conversation about the real needs and constraints of aid in Namibia. With decreasing 
funds for Namibian civil society, NGOs and donors did not use particularly new 
arguments to assert their position, but differed more openly about aid priorities in the 
country. Donors started to use formal criteria like the quality of proposals and written 
feedback to justify cuts in funding to NGOs. The donors insisted that NGOs were 
themselves to blame for their decline which brought considerable tension into the 
relations. Donors also pointed to their own constraints and stressed the importance of 
being accountable to an increasingly critical public in their home countries. At times, 
donors seemed to suggest that NGOs showed insufficient understanding of the 
dilemmas that came with being answerable to an electorate.224 They therefore used the 
older criticism of NGOs as non-elected and non-accountable to a general public.  
NGOs complained that they felt disempowered and had no real influence on what was 
funded, because donors “build and kill NGOs” with only minimal consideration for 
what was actually needed in the country.225 They accused donors of not listening to 
the experts in NGOs and forcing civic organisations to produce glossy reports instead 
of concentrating on their “proper” work, a false prioritisation that had been criticised 
in international development for a long time. NGOs thus re-iterated the widespread 
criticism of international donors as blind to local particularities (Hobart 1993; 
Neumann 1997; Stirrat 2008). They ignored, however, that donors in Namibia were 
bound by the decisions of the National Planning Commission, the governmental 
agency to identify aid priorities and streamline developmental efforts in the country. 
Donors were therefore hardly in a position to dictate the agenda, but were obliged 
under the decisions of the regular NPC developmental meetings which both donors 
and NGOs attended (Research Notes 03/07/2008).  
 
Contestations between NGOs and their donors therefore showed that relations 
between the two sides were not as completely asymmetrical as the literature portrays. 
Arguments that donors systematically disempower NGOs (Dicklitch 2003; Michael 
2006; Schuller 2007) tend to neglect the bargaining power of NGOs in these relations. 
It was certainly easier for donors to justify the withdrawal of funding than for NGOs 
to close the resulting gaps in their budgets, and both sides occupied very different 
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positions in the overall power relations in international aid. However, NGOs had their 
own resources in negotiating the agenda, including the general acknowledgement that 
a civil society was necessary in a stable democracy which meant that NGOs could use 
the threat to close down completely and considerably weaken civil society in 
Namibia, if their projects were not approved. With this argument NGOs hoped they 
could count on the donors’ keen interest in keeping at least a certain number of NGOs 
alive. One donor representative told me that his organisation provided “emergency 
assistance” on a ad hoc basis to one Namibian NGO just to keep it open.226 NGO-
donor relations were not entirely dictated by one side, but resulted from the ongoing 
negotiations in which each side tried to capitalise on its perceived resources in the 
overall struggle for credibility. This contestation was surely not new to donor-NGO 
relations, nor was it particular to a situation of decreasing funds, but the 




Coping strategies illustrated how organisations developed new projects, 
because in times of shrinking grants NGOs took extra care in developing their 
projects. NGO staff stated that they would abandon their NGO work altogether if their 
projects were no longer funded. However, they invested long hours and energy in 
finding out what could appeal to the international aid community before 
conceptualising new projects despite their claims that projects were designed 
independently of recent “fashions” in international aid. This is not to say that their 
final project proposals were not tailored in accordance with Namibian needs, but the 
process of project generating was more complex than NGOs often portrayed. 
The gender advocacy unit at the Legal Assistance Centre, for instance, set up a 
domestic violence project at a time when a domestic rape bill was proposed in 
parliament. However, the new focus on violence also coincided with recent 
developments in international aid. Many international donors had stopped funding 
projects on the structural positioning of women after gender mainstreaming had been 
introduced. Additionally, the focus on rape could be connected to HIV/AIDS and thus 
to a topic that has received high levels of external assistance recently. Other NGOs 
                                          
 




also remodelled their projects to fit topics around HIV/AIDS. The ‘Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR) had commissioned research work on the impact of HIV/AIDS 
(van Zyl 2003) and published a regular HIV/AIDS bulletin; and the ‘Namibian 
Economic Policy Research Unit’ (NEPRU has established an entire research area on 
HIV/AIDS and development in Namibia and Southern Africa. The HIV/AIDS 
prevalence in Namibia is one of the highest in the world227 and research on the 
pandemic was thus clearly a local need. On the other hand, the topic received 
extraordinarily high amounts of international funding and the NGOs are painfully 
aware that some of their projects needed to be connected to the topic in order to get 
funding. 
 
In the muddle of everyday work, neat distinctions between “committed” 
activism and profitable work could not be maintained. This became especially visible 
when funds were so scarce that the NGO was no longer in a position to decide freely 
where to spend resources and had to make painful decisions about how to divide 
human resources and time. NGO staff spent long hours doing commercial 
consultancies which they did not regard as their “proper” work. A focus group 
meeting about funding trends at the LAC discussed how the centre could attract more 
consultancy jobs whose pay could make up for declining donor money and fund the 
centres not-for-profit work (Research Notes 26/102006). Similarly, the heightened 
pressure from donors to scale up the management aspects of NGO work and improve 
on project proposals and feedback increased the load of duties, which NGO staff did 
not regard as “proper” work. NGO staff often spend entire days in donor organised 
workshops on how to improve on their management and reporting skills, but many 
donor agencies complained that the level of feedback reports had not substantially 
improved. 
The tension here refers to the NGOs’ official commitment to improve on the 
quality of their reports and the actual practice of many employees to keep the usual 
reporting style. NGOs met donor demands by attending the workshop but these were 
not put into practice and these workshops hardly had any consequences for the 
reporting habits. Erica Bornstein (2006) has argued that the practice of delaying or 
intentionally producing low quality reports is some form “resistance”, but comments 
                                          
 





from activists indicate rather that training was often not addressing their specific 
needs or that they could not implement their new knowledge  because they had not the 
means to do so.228  Some donor agencies therefore doubted that increasing the level of 
training to NGO staff would really address the problem of poor feedback and stopped 
organising capacity building workshops.229 
 
 
Justifying difficult decisions 
 
No matter how up-to date funding proposals were and how much an NGO 
earned from consultancies, most NGOs had to scale down their activities and also 
occasionally close entire projects. Interestingly in times of waning support and intense 
competition, only the units with a strong research component survived while the 
service delivery units were closed down. NGOs concentrated on research – asserting 
their positions as experts in their respective fields of knowledge at the expense of 
providing training or advice to the Namibian public. The Legal Assistance Centre for 
example, cut down on legal advice to the public at  headquarters level, closed down 
advisory offices outside of the capital and closed its legal education project; the 
Institute for Public Policy Research which has asserted its position as linchpin of 
national knowledge production by commissioning research work, abandoned making 
research papers available to schools as too costly; NEPRU, the organisation 
specialising in economic policy analysis, gave up providing economics training to 
learners at senior secondary schools. Both NGOs and donors acknowledged that 
cutting down on service provision was a hard choice but argued that it had became 
unavoidable with increasing difficulties in justifying funding for “intangible” goals 
like “awareness raising”. 
 
It was easier for them to find funding for projects with a clear output like 
research reports. However, as chapter 2 already argued, most employees I interviewed 
at the LAC, the IPPR, NEPRU and NANGOF saw themselves as experts in their own 
field of research and presented their job as providing the necessary information to 
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lobby for change. The increasing bias of strong NGOs towards research therefore 
reflected the organisations’ self-image. Secondly, the decline led to changed internal 
dynamics within NGOs. Donors no longer provided funding to an entire NGO for a 
fixed period of time irrespective of its projects. This left each sub-unit within an NGO 
to secure its own funding and each project could only guarantee its survival as long as 
its distinct projects were running. The end of core funding led to a de facto split of 
many organisations into smaller sub-units which sometimes directly competed for 
funds. The LAC staff said that they needed to meet across units and find ways to 
bring in new funding through joint projects instead of competing with each other.230 
Which units survived was therefore much more a consequence of the technicalities of 
funding, like feedback and reporting requirements, rather than resulting from 
ideological decisions. Funding did not promote any particular ideology amongst 
NGOs nor was it necessarily based on a distinct worldview amongst donors. It had 
far-reaching consequences for the ways NGOs worked structuring their internal 
priorities and division of work.  
 
Despite the increased competition activists were careful not to blame specific 
colleagues for the decline, and competition was again more practiced than talked 
about. Activists usually blamed donors, and unidentified fly-by-night organisations 
for the crisis. Activists therefore represented donors as dictating the terms of civic 
engagement and were prepared to give up their own agency in project designs. This 
way they avoided taking a clear position on difficult decisions within NGOs and in 
contestations around where the organisations were heading. When the LAC had to 
close down three of its five programmes the staff said the closing did not reflect the 
units’ performance and productivity, but donors had changed their priorities and 
demanded the closure of units. The funding decline was nothing the LAC or the 
programme coordinators could do anything about.231 Similarly “Project Hope” 
abandoned its project on people living with HIV/AIDS and focused on micro-credit 
schemes to OVC’s caregivers, because they thought this focus was more likely to 
attract PEPFAR funding and was also promoted by the organisation’s Headquarters. 
The decision therefore had nothing to do with the Namibian Project Hope and its 
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previous work.232 The director of the rainbow project presented the TRP shift from 
advocacy to service delivery as result of donor pressure and not as result of the 
organisation’s previous work. In sum, NGOs justified important changes in project 
outlook and the end of programmes entirely with changed donor priority. It made it 
thus possible for NGO executives to distance themselves from decisions and saved 
them from saying whether they thought change was justified. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that funding had a decisive influence on civil society’s 
work, but did so mostly through its technicalities. Grant selection criteria, the 
administration of budgets and the structural consequences of declining resources all 
had a much more profound effect on NGOs than any overarching ideological project 
of donors had. The chapter’s interest in how funding works in civil society therefore 
analysed how competition influenced inter-organizational relations, how grant 
management structured NGOs daily work and how the funding decline impacted on 
NGOs’ internal discussions about priorities in and the purpose of civic activism. 
 
The chapter adds to the existing literature on aid to non-state actors in Africa 
by looking at different aid relations. It does not focus primarily on donor – recipient 
or north-south relations, but through an interest in the links between and within 
recipient organizations by asking how different funding experiences shaped those 
relations. In this way, the chapter illustrated how development works, instead of 
evaluating whether it works (Mosse 2005: 8). It thus departs from an instrumentalist 
view on development which sees it either as tool for poverty alleviation or as 
mechanism for domination (Ferguson 1990). Disaggregating “development” into a 
number of discrete practices and relations challenges the view that “development” is a 
homogenous discourse that always works in particular ways, and always has distinct 
effects on its recipients. 
The daily reality of fundraising often qualified NGO claims that their projects 
were not designed to fit the latest aid fashion. NGO concentrated on research at the 
expense of service delivery and community outreach. The common explanation that 
these projects had better chances of attracting funding shows that organisations paid 
                                          
 




close attention to trends in international aid, despite their claims not to do so. It also 
reveals that NGO projects were much more strongly influenced by considerations 
about what might be(come) fundable than considerations about what recipients 
demanded. As the next chapter will argue in greater depth, NGOs regarded only 
donors has having changing demands and conceptualised communities as passive 





Chapter 7 Civil Society Inc. 
In times of declining funds, activists often thought that their organisations had 
to become more competitive to ensure organisational survival. They thus increasingly 
presented their own activities in the language of the free market with customers, 
products and selling strategies. By asking why activists felt the need to present their 
work in a business idiom this chapter examines civil society’s relation to the private 
sector. It pays close attention to how exactly the two sectors related and shows that 
civil society organisations employed strategies and structures that are usually 
associated with dominant practices in private firms. They resembled private 
businesses in their everyday practices like marketization and branding. NGOs had 
also started to express inter-organisational relations in the language of the market, a 
trend which indicated an increasing commodification of the activist discourse. 
However, the civil society differed from the private sector above all in the structure of 
its target group. While private corporations targeted customers as main source of 
revenue, civil society organisations did not derive their income from their 
beneficiaries. Civil society’s “clients” and customers were two separate entities with 
different demands on its services. The chapter shows that the division in civil 
society’s clientele had far-reaching consequences for NGOs’ economic activity. 
NGOs treated only donors as customers and regarded beneficiaries like corporate 
assets that could be used to advance the organisations’ agendas.  
 
This chapter’s findings therefore point to a complex relation between the two 
sectors which extends beyond the question whether civil society is similar to or 
completely different from the private sector. Most of the literature on the relation 
between civil society and the private sector has reified this binary. On the one hand 
scholars stress the difference between the market and civil society. These accounts 
present the private sector as shaped by capitalist globalisation and the increasing 
power of multi-national corporations, and portray civil society as globalisation’s 
counterforce that speaks truth to power (Kaldor 2003a).233 Based on a triadic model of 
state, market and civil society as separate sectors (Howell/Pearce 2001:229), Mary 
Kaldor argues that the prime goal of civil society is to strengthen democratic 
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accountability in a context where global market forces have weakened national 
systems of holding decision makers to account (Kaldor 2003b:13). On the other hand, 
theories of new social movements have increasingly borrowed concepts from 
organisational sociology which analyses how private sector organisations work. New 
social movement theory has shown that NGOs resemble large corporations in their 
tendencies to bureaucratisation and professionalisation, as well as in their strategies to 
shift their targets and internal structures in order to adapt to their resource 
environments and to ensure organisational survival (Campbell 2005:41).234 
Additionally the literature on NGO branding and the marketization of activism seems 
to confirm that the boundaries between the sectors have become increasingly blurred 
(Laidler-Kylander/ Simonin 2009; Vestergaard 2008).235  
 
Instead of asking whether civil society organisations were essentially different 
from, or identical with private firms, any understanding of the relation between 
sectors needs to ask how, where and why the two meet and when they diverge. A 
more complicating view on the relations also seems to mirror Namibian activists’ own 
opinions about the links between the sectors. At times they pointed to the many 
similarities between managing a civil society organisation and running a private 
corporation. They emphasised the same strategies were used by NGO executives to 
ensure organisational survival as business managers employed to keep their 
corporations running. They saw themselves as Chief Executive Officers, sought to 
model their peer review mechanism on that of the private sector and argued that 
“business minds” were key to ensure civil society’s success. However at other 
occasions activists emphasised the distinction between the sectors and claimed that 
NGOs differed in kind from firms, because the latter were only about making money 
whereas civic organisations followed a ‘higher calling’ and had a sustainable impact 
in society. Activists therefore used different values to set themselves apart from 
private sector employees. As David Graeber (2001) has argued, different values do 
not only show what people wish for, but they also carry normative assumptions about 
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what people ought to want. A pure economic understanding of value as quantifiable 
entity for people’s aspirations cannot explain why different groups rank their goals in 
a particular order. Instead, allocating value shows what people consider to be most 
precious, often without recognising their own agency in producing this value.  
 
This chapter starts by investigating the roots of the assumption that civil 
society and the private sector are different in the first place. It looks at how the 
relations between sectors developed as civil society became increasingly defined as 
sphere of ideas, rather than as relations of productions. This redefinition shifted civil 
society away from the private sector to become a distinct sphere in its contemporary 
definition. The second part then looks at what is actually similar between civil society 
organisations and private firms. It shows that larger NGOs used practices like 
reconnaissance, branding and marketing that are common in the private sector.236 Civil 
society organisations did not only employ similar practices like firms, they also 
increasingly talked about their work in the language of the free market. NGOs 
presented themselves as service deliverers who were duly paid for their competitive 
services, instead of receiving “donations” based on charity. The chapter argues that 
these widely shared self images as ‘non-governmental corporations’ led activists turn 
to market based solutions when organisations encountered problems of legitimacy. It 
looks at NANGOF’s persistent credibility crisis which did not seem to be solved 
through marketing as a number of activists had assumed. This chapter asks why. 
Assuming that NGOs function more and more like private sector corporations, should 
the solution to their problems not also be similar to the mechanisms firms used to 
overcome difficulties, i.e. market the organisations more widely? 
 
This chapter argues that NANGOF lacked legitimacy amongst its members, 
because its “product” did not correspond with their demands. The umbrella advertised 
itself as democratising and empowering civil society without having asked whether 
civil society organisations thought that the sector needed more democracy and wanted 
to be empowered in this way. This not only shows an umbrella markedly out of touch 
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with its membership base, it also made clear that NGOs and firms did differ. The most 
important difference was the composition of their respective “customers” (Oster 
1995).237 Civil society’s target group consisted of the organisations’ beneficiaries on 
the one hand and the revenue providers on the other, two groups that hardly 
overlapped. Civic organisations’ close links to, and dependence on donors meant that 
they were much more prepared to listen to donor demands than to beneficiaries’ 
requests. Organisations assumed that beneficiaries had unchanging and 
unaccomplishable demands that were not worth investigating. Instead of treating 
beneficiaries as customers, organisations made them part of their corporate identity 
and furnished them with needs that neatly fitted the NGOs’ expertise.  
 
Civil society and the market 
The idea that civil society organisations resemble private businesses more and 
more is based on the belief that these two kinds of organisations were different to 
begin with, and is rooted in the assumption that civil society and the market were 
distinct spheres that hardly overlapped. 
The contemporary separation between civil society and the economy is an 
invention of the last century, but it has informed most of present-day thinking about 
civil society in the global South. Contemporary political theory sees civil society as 
the third sector, separate from state and the economy. Its opposition to the state dates 
back to the mid-18th century, but its separation from the economy is much younger. 
Until the mid-20th century civil society was seen as the arena for individuals pursuing 
their economic interests.  For Hegel, civil society was the free sphere of self subsistent 
individuals realising their material interests (Keane 1998:53). As Jefferey Alexander 
(1998) and Krishan Kumar (1993) have pointed out, Hegel and his contemporaries 
saw the market as benign and as capable of teaching the individual self discipline and 
responsibility necessary for the full realisation of citizenship. Civil society as the 
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market was an essential tool to turn people into citizens and thus to counter despotism 
(Keane 1998). Civil society’s educative functions were later lost in the writing of 
Marx that defined civil society as the realm of the selfish pursuit of private interests. 
Civil society regained its civilising function with de Tocqueville, but the most it could 
do was to control individualism; the art of association essential for citizenship was 
learnt in political society, a realm distinct from state and civil society-as-market 
(Ossewaarde 2006). The decisive semantic shift in the understanding of civil society 
occurs a century later in the writings of Antonio Gramsci. Political society becomes 
the coercive realm and its educative function is assigned to civil society. Civil society 
is redefined as realm of ideas instead of modes of production, separated from the 
market and arriving finally at the nowadays common distinction between state, 
economy and civil society. Gramsci redefines civil society as the realm of consensual 
leadership which is central to the production and maintenance of hegemony of one 
group over the entire society. The separation between civil society and the market still 
informs current understandings of the two as separate and sometimes even as 
contradictory spheres.238 As Krishan Kumar (1993) has argued, most literature 
highlights the cultural institutions of the sector that are not directly related to market 
systems of commodity production and exchange. 239 
 
In practice the two sectors are more intertwined than is analytically 
acknowledged. Civil society is an integral part of the market economy and the ‘non-
profit’ label defines civil society through a market principle. Civil society creates 
jobs, generates (re-distributed) income and thus contributes to the national GDP 
(Howell/Pearce 2001). John Keane (2003) demonstrated that civil society depends 
heavily on global market forces like telecommunication, money and transport to 
function. Scholars who reify the separation between market and civil society hardly 
take note of these practical intersections. NGO enthusiasts were negligent towards 
their own analytical ambiguity when they claimed that NGOs were different from 
private firms but so successful because they functioned according to principles of the 
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free market. Praise for civil society’s assumed diversity mirrors the liberal argument 
for diverse markets as inherent value of capitalism (Friedman 1962; Kay 2003). 
NGOs are assumed to have a lean administration with “private sector levels of cost 
control and efficiency” (Hulme/Edwards 1997: 6) making the comparison more 
directly. These supposed small bureaucracies are mainly credited to be responsible for 
NGOs’ flexibility and their capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. Scholars 
have argued that decentralised activism is thought to be more efficient than 
centralised planning of large state bureaucracies, because many different 
organisations contribute much more efficiently to the overall goal than one larger 
entity could do (Fowler 1992; Korten 1987). This assumption mirrors a common idea 
about the advantages of deregulated markets. These markets are said to satisfy needs 
as they arise exactly through their lack of central regulation and planning (Kay 2003). 
These assumptions show how closely the picture the literature paints of NGOs, 
resembles the ideals of the free market. 
 
In general the civil society literature compares NGOs to an idealised version 
of the market where firms are efficient, lean, decentralised and flexible. The sociology 
of markets employs a less romantic view and defines markets as socially constructed 
arenas for interaction that “include social spaces with repeated exchanges between 
buyers and sellers under a set of in/formal rules governing relations between 
competitors, suppliers and customers” (Fligstein/Dauter 2007:113).  This does not 
sound very different from the definition of civil society as “arenas for contestations” 
(Howell/Pearce 2001:3). The step from the idealised version of markets as efficient 
and deregulated arenas to the acknowledgement of their social construction is 
analytically helpful because it allows seeing that markets are based on social 
conventions. It is social convention that determines what can be legitimately bought 
and sold by whom and how. The idea that markets are social constructions therefore 
helps to challenge the notion that there is something natural about market 
transactions. The problem with these definitions, however, is that they are so wide 
that they are too broad to offer any concrete analytical insights beyond the general 
point about the social construction of markets. Scholars on international NGOs often 
refuse to see the obvious links between civil society and the market. However, the 




not add analytical value either, as it suggests that the sectors are identical which 
forecloses any possibility to analyse how they relate.  
 
Instead, appreciating that “markets” exist both as set of discrete practices and 
as an ideal type helps to differentiate various relations between civil society and the 
market. Actors in civil society and the private sector employed similar sets of 
practices that did not belong exclusively to one sector, but activists also compared 
their work with an idealised version of the market that portrayed the private sector as 
flexible and efficient or mercenary and cruel depending on context. Activists therefore 
maintained very different links to “the market” in their everyday practices, and in the 
way they talked about it. Any understanding of the relations between civil society and 
the market has to differentiate between these two kinds of links and has to enquire 
when and how exactly they converge and differ, instead of trying to establish whether 
the two sectors are completely disparate or similar. Seeing markets as sets of distinct 
practices also makes it possible to distinguish between the degrees of corporatism in 
civil society organisations. Some civic organisations relied more on market based 
strategies and resembled firms more closely in their way of operation than others. 
Well-funded organisations had a comparatively high capacity to market themselves; 
Some had full time marketing officers and fundraisers, organised national 
competitions to design their logo and had their own publications to spread 
information about the organisation. Not all these tools were available to organisations 
with smaller budgets that spend large parts of their revenues on project staff salaries 
and were little known beyond their immediate location.240 With respect to practices, it 
might therefore be more helpful to see the transition between the corporate and non-
corporate realm as a continuum of decreasing corporation from private firms, to large 
and finally to small civic organisations.241 
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Where markets and civil society are similar: non-governmental 
corporations 
Scholars have demonstrated that ‘non-profits’ and ‘for profits’ employ similar 
strategies to achieve their objectives.242 As John Campell (2005:41) argues both kinds 
of organisations are forms of coordinated collective action and can thus be analysed in 
similar ways. He demonstrates how the sociology of corporations and new social 
movements theory share basic concepts and can benefit from each other’s analysis. 
The sociology of organisations used insights from New Social Movement theory to 
understand how firms adapt the way they present their product in response to 
changing public demands, and has adopted insights from new social movement theory 
into the  importance of networks, in order to understand how ideas travel within the 
private sector (DiMaggio/Powell 1983; Fligstein 1997). New social movement theory 
on the other hand has used insights from organisational sociology about the 
importance of leadership and the role of entrepreneurs to understand how social 
movements are managed and how decisions are made within ‘non-profits’ (Morris et 
al 2007). The fruitful cooperation between the two trends in the literature indicates 
that there are structural similarities between ‘for profit’ and ‘non-profit’ organisations. 
This section outlines how civic organisations resemble private sector firms by looking 
at branding and the commodification of activism. It illustrates these points through a 
case study of one NGO that deliberately employed the structure and strategies of 
private corporations.  
 
These structural similarities were especially visible in the common coping 
strategies amongst Namibia’s larger NGOs that could commission their own 
marketing strategy. They invested considerable resources in research on donor 
preferences, on branding their own organisation and marketing its “products”. NGOs 
were keen to gather information about civic activism and donor demands and adjust 
their services to these new insights. The managerial literature has shown that CEOs 
carefully read demands from the firm’s environment and adjust organisational 
structures to accommodate these (Fligstein/Dauter 2007:110). NGO leaders do the 
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same. Most large NGOs maintained a database of their beneficiaries and some had an 
archive of their past donors. Sectoral umbrellas kept databases of their member 
organisations with specific information about their size and activity.243 The databases’ 
main purpose was to ensure that the umbrella could keep in touch with its members, 
but databases also enabled umbrellas to portray themselves as knowledgeable 
representatives of their member organisations.244 NANGOF recently commissioned a 
“Civil society baseline survey” that collected data from organisations in all 13 regions 
of the country, in order to arrive at a clearer picture of civic activism. The consultant 
told me that the umbrella was particulary keen on responses to the questions about 
NANGOF. The final survey report consequently included concrete recommendations 
for NANGOF to raise its level of awareness amongst civil society organisations 
(NANGOF June 2009: 57). NANASO published a biannual directory of AIDS service 
organisations based on regularly updated surveys and commissioned a study of 
members’ training needs some time ago.245 
NGO directors often attributed a particular organisation’s success or decline to 
its leader’s ability to recognise new trends in donor requirements. Environmental 
uncertainties not only affected organisations’ performances but also inter-
organisational relations (Blau/Rabrenovic 1991). Organisations teamed up to ensure 
they covered a broader range of issues between them and to reduce overlaps.246 
However, uncertainty could also increase tensions in those relations and bring out 
competition more clearly as the previous chapter on funding argued. 
One of the less acknowledged ways of coping with uncertainty was to bluff 
expertise, and to simply make up the relevant skills if required. Civic organisations 
would occasionally pretend to have the relevant expertise or promise services without 
the capacity to deliver them. These strategies all included a more or less calculable 
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important factor to support NANASO’s claim to represent all AIDS service organisations in the 
country. 
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risk, and organisations would only employ them exceptionally, e.g. when the donor 
was too remote to regularly check on the project’s progress, or when changes were 
slim that the deception would have any serious repercussions. Organisations promised 
more than they could deliver in order to keep a loose contact with donors that could 
be revived anytime. Shortly after bird flu had broken out in Europe, a FAO delegation 
visited NANGOF to assess whether civil society was prepared for an eventual 
outbreak of the pandemic in Namibia. Not only was NANGOF not prepared for the 
meeting, the umbrella also had had no contact with any organisation that it could refer 
the delegation to. However, NANGOF’s director successfully talked her organisation 
out of the delicate situation with a few general statements about civil society’s 
expertise being located in member organisations, and advised the FAO visitors to 
consult a number of agricultural organisations directly (Research Notes 11/06/2008). 
In another instance, the Namibia Development Trust engaged on behalf of NANGOF 
in the transnational “Global Call to Action against Poverty” (GCAP) alliance.247 NDT 
convinced GCAP that it had the necessary contacts to set up a national awareness-
raising campaign. However, the NDT only had a strong network in the south and 
northeast of the country and far too few staff to set up a national network in order to 
implement the campaign. All the NDT did for GCAP was to design a poster advert in 
Windhoek’s city centre which allegedly stood in no relation to the amount of money 
the organisation had received.  
 
In most cases however, civil society organisations avoided having to lie about 
their capacities and invested a lot to find out about donor preferences during the 
project planning stages, in order to achieve a better fit between their projects and 
demands, and to promote their services more efficiently.248 The literature disagrees 
whether this increased market awareness of NGOs is a good development. Some 
scholars see the marketization of NGOs as dangerous trend that will necessarily 
compromise the organisations’ contributions to grassroots democracy and their focus 
on “beneficiaries” (Eikenberry/Kluver 2004). This literature seems to assume that 
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there is an inevitable contradiction between NGOs’ core objectives and market 
demands. Another trend sees increased market awareness and branding of non-
governmental organisations as absolutely essential for organisations’ sustainability 
and independence. These accounts see branding as the necessary adjustment 
organisations have to make in order to adjust to the changing politics of giving. They 
argue that a highly visible public image is the only means to overcome funding 
fatigue, access new resources and thus ensure the organisation’s sustainability 
(Wootliff/Deri 2001; Vestergaard 2008; Wells 2001).  
 
This argument was obviously shared by Namibian civil society actors who 
worried about the decline in international funding and started to actively search for 
alternative income sources in order to ensure organisational survival. During a focus 
group discussion at the LAC staff discussed how to increase the public profile of their 
work to attract local donors instead of continue to rely exclusively on international aid 
(Research Notes 26/10/2006). NANGOF’s chairperson said that NGOs needed 
business minds to find sustainable alternatives to decreasing international funding 
(Research Notes 22/07/2008) and another NGO leader stated that organisations 
needed to partner up with the private sector if they wanted to survive the ongoing 
funding decline.249 Civic organisations planned to increase their market profile, to 
improve their public relations and to open new markets and thus phrased their plans 
for the future in a particularly business-like idiom. 
 
The commodification of civic activism  
 
As John Keane (2003) argued civil society has always been part of the market, 
and civil society organisations arguably always needed to pay particular attention to 
donor requirements. Civil society practices of fundraising and advertising have 
always resembled those used by private corporations and it would be wrong to regard 
these practices as originating in the private sector from where they were adapted by 
civic organisations. Instead those practices are common to organisations seeking to 
attract money from outside, irrespective of whether the funds are for profit or not. The 
                                          
 




common practices make civil society and the private sector comparable, and civil 
society’s marketing strategies did not necessarily represent a new trend towards a 
commodified activism.  
 
However, what had changed was that NGO leaders saw the creation of a 
unique public profile as the only way to find new funding and increasingly used a 
business idiom to talk about their work and civil society’s internal relations. They 
redefined accountability as accounting, transparency as controlling, and relevance as 
high public profile. They thought an accountable umbrella ought to ensure that 
members received high rates of return on their invested trust and resources.  Several 
participants at SWG meetings stated that civil society organisations needed to own 
NANGOF if the umbrella was to establish any meaningful relation with its members. 
They thought that the best way to ensure this was for organisations to pay 
membership fees, because then they would hold NANGOF accountable (Research 
Notes 02/07/2008). One director said that organisations employed a cost-benefit 
analysis in calculating whether they should join NANGOF and it was the umbrella’s 
responsibility to ensure that the calculus was in its favour. According to him one of 
the umbrella’s functions should be to advance members’ transparency by helping 
them to have sound budgets. The most important task of NANGOF was to “do the 
branding” (Research Notes 22/07/2008) of civil society – to sell civic activism to the 
outside world and ensure that it remained relevant. Donors, governments and the 
general public were all seen as potential customers to ‘buy’ civic activism. Several 
directors suggested that the Namibian government should pay civic organisations as 
service providers instead of supporting them out of charity. Seeing donors and 
government more as customers than as philanthropic supporters meant that NGO 
leaders had to increase the market value of their organisation.250 Evaluations of civic 
activism had thus turned into judgements about the value donors got for their 
money.251  
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quantifiable outcomes. 
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how closely the projects matched recipients’ demands and how well organisation kept them informed 




The new NANGOF has taken seriously the idea that civic activism and inter-
organisational relations were products to be owned, traded, and branded like any other 
commodity. It has sorted its accounts, commissioned several market research surveys 
and has organised a promotional tour of its civil society management qualification. It 
has invoiced its members to ensure they contribute and “own” the umbrella and 
regularly encourages members to communicate any specific requests for assistance to 
the umbrella. However, after members followed this invitation and started to express 
demands, NANGOF’s executive director encouraged the staff to see the umbrella as a 
firm delivering particular pre-defined services and not as demand driven 
organisation.252 She organised a couple of strategic meetings for the NANGOF 
secretariat in the first two months in order to help employees understand what these 
services actually were. The first of these was an entire day of “strategic planning”, 
designed to encourage staff to internalise their organisation’s objectives and feel 
responsible that they were realised in time. A human resources consultant organised 
the planning meeting with a number of small exercises used in the private sector to 
encourage people to be self governing employees, exercises in efficient time 
management and target group awareness. The overall purpose of the meeting was to 
become clearer about the “product we want to deliver” (Research Notes 30/05/2008). 
The second of these meetings was much shorter and took place a month later.  This 
“benefits” meeting was designed as unstructured session asking staff what services 
NANGOF could provide to its members. The director had called for this meeting to 
bring out a clear profile, because she only wanted to promise particular services when 
she was certain that the secretariat could deliver them. She pointed out that she 
wanted to engage in something successful, because she had a career ahead of her and 
did not think that any company would hire her in the future if she did not see to it that 
NANGOF kept its promise (Research Notes 30/06/2008). In the staff exercise the 
director made the close connection between internal and external branding. Internal 
branding aims to instil a strong sense of corporate identity in employees, so that staff 
feel personally responsible for organisational performance and reputation. The 
literature on NGO branding shares the assumption that “internal branding” is an 
                                          
 
252 Those demands included all kinds of services from secretarial duties to help with finding donors, 
coordination of civil society wide concerns and to make its office space and equipment available to 
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prepared to provide; for example NANGOF staff regularly refused one Board member’s request to 




important factor in brand equity and the overall success of an organisation. As 
Nathalie Laidler-Kylander and Bernard Simonin (2009:64) argued “efforts to increase 
operational focus have a direct impact […] on […] organizational legitimacy and 
brand positioning, which helps differentiate an organization from its competitors.”  
 
NANGOF’s director repeated a common argument in the literature when she 
assumed that the same branding strategies worked in the private sector and in civil 
society because the two kinds of organisations functioned in essentially the same way. 
She claimed that NGO directors were like CEOs with the additional task of finding 
the money they ought to spend (Research Notes 30/06/2008) and another director 
argued that a good NGO leader was above all a successful manager.253 NANGOF’s 
director tried to create a corporate image of NANGOF inspired by civil society 
organisations with a strong marketing strategy that seemed to flourish even in times of 
declining funds. These organisations seemed to confirm the assumption that 
successful branding was indeed the only solution to the funding crisis. One of the 
organisations with such a strong marketing strategy was Women’s Action for 
Development (WAD). WAD has not only grown in times of declining civil society 
funding, it is also one of the few remaining NGOs to receive core funding and has 
done so for the past 14 years. 
 
Women’s Action for Development Inc 
When I first met the director of Women’s Action for Development she handed 
me a business card with the WAD logo and the subtitle “corporation not for gain”. 
And indeed the organisation resembled a corporation in all but tradable shares.254 
WAD’s strategy and structure were closely modelled on that of a commercial firm, 
including central planning and quantifiable indicators to define success. The 
organisation presented its objectives in the form of a business plan, complete with 
measurable indicators that assume that all objectives were calculable and could be 
broken down into a number of discrete centrally planned activities. WAD’s first 
objective was to contribute to poverty alleviation, by training people in income 
                                          
 
253 Interview Country Director Project Hope, Windhoek 12/06/2008. 




generating skills255. This training was designed centrally and delivered at WAD’s 
regional centres. WAD claimed that its success was largely based on “strong 
directives which are continuously given through to staff and project members by the 
WAD Management”.256 This meant that all projects were developed in Windhoek and 
passed on as directives to regional centres. The centralised management structure did 
not leave any room for inputs from trainees or adaptations to particular contexts.257 
WAD assumed that market mechanisms like competition, self -promotion and 
public presentations would not only lead to material independence but render 
psychological benefits as well. The organisation believed that trainees would feel 
more self confident, proud and assertive by taking part in a public competition with 
highly visible awards. Trade fairs, auctions and public presentations were all 
presented as essential in people’s self realisation by helping them to overcome 
inhibiting self consciousness. WAD claims that through their ceremonies and events, 
trainees had grown the confidence to speak in public which “merely proves the point 
that some of the greatest barriers to our performance are often situated within 
ourselves.”258 The organisation therefore argued that the best way to promote rural 
women was to increase their “market value”. The organisation’s projects were based 
on the neo-liberal assumption that an active engagement in the economy will not only 
achieve material independence but also psychological well being.   
 
Analysing WAD’s activities in a market idiom shows how complex the 
structure of NGOs’ ‘customers’ and ‘products’ is. At first sight, WAD’s ‘customers’ 
were the rural women who signed up for the courses, and the organisation’s official 
‘product’ was the training it provided. However, the organisation’s customers were 
also donors and politicians who invested money, time and support in WAD and its 
services. The NGO was therefore the producer and the produce at the same time. This 
double function was especially visible during WAD’s “field days”. Field days were 
organised for trainees to showcase their products and generate income, but they also 
                                          
 
255 The number of people trained could thus be presented as indicator that measured how far the 
organisation had progressed towards poverty alleviation. Using the number of people as evidence of 
success is arguably a particularly private sector practice as corporations measure their success through 
quantifiable indicators alone. 
256 http://www.wad.org.na/ last accessed 05/05/2010. 
257 This structure directly contradicts Nathalie Laidler-Kylander’s and Bernard Simonin’s (2009) 
argument that NGOs are decentralised with flat hierarchies which make them difficult organisations to 
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provided an opportunity for the organisation’s supporters to be seen, entertained and 
feel good about themselves. WAD proudly pointed to the high community turnout at 
field days. However, it is very likely that the high turnout had more to do with the 
general attraction of public events in rural areas than with the attendees’ genuine 
sense of belonging to WAD. Field days were highly popular because they were 
particularly entertaining. WAD was keen to display the “diversity of Namibian 
culture” and stated that “since the regions in which WAD operates often coincide with 
different cultures, the annual conferences continuously reflect the diversity of the 
cultural landscape in Namibia. WAD conferences therefore invariably represent a 
kaleidoscope of colours, traditional attires etc, but similarly of inspirational and 
motivational views and opinions.”259 
 
In this regard WAD’s trainees were not (only) customers but part of the WAD 
brand, the “cultural asset” the organisation brought into play to promote its work and 
to show its competitive advantage to potential sponsors. WAD was keen to display 
cultural activities and artefacts during its field days, and requested regular supply of 
photos from the training sessions to publish in its reports. The organisation also 
encouraged members to wear WAD membership cards - officially to instil a sense of 
belonging in trainees - but the public display of the WAD logo above all raised the 
level of the NGO’s public awareness. WAD’s executive director had pursued a very 
forceful media campaign to market the organisation as a particular attractive partner 
with a proven connection to grassroots.260 WAD’s high public visibility was the main 
reason why the organisation’s primary sponsor has supported the NGO for the past 15 
years.261  WAD’s capacity to exploit the attraction of cultural artefacts for its branding 
(Comaroff/Commaroff 2009) provided the organisation with a highly efficient 
cultural capital in Bourdieu’s sense.262 However, the organisation could only use the 
cultural artefacts this efficiently because it was in a position to set the context in 
which they were displayed and seen. WAD’s cultural capital was thus based on highly 
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260 Some people in civil society remarked that the director had not really changed careers when she 
gave up her job as TV presenter to set up a women’s organisation (Research Notes 31/03/2008). 
261 Interview Country Director Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Windhoek 09/11/2006. 
262 For Bourdieu capital is an agent’s ability to use the available resources efficiently (2000). The 
better an agent can put resources to use the larger is his/her capital. This definition differs considerably 
from the purely economic understanding of cultural capital as the discrete (monetary) value added 




unequal relations between the empowering agency and those to be empowered 
(Cruikshank 1999: 72). WAD could dictate the terms of empowerment, and designed 
its workshops in a way that stressed the ethnic undertones that made the organisation 
so appealing for international supporters.  
 
Martin Chanock (2002:26) and the Comaroffs (2009) argued that cultural 
artefacts are particularly apt for branding, because brands aim to create an emotional 
link between the consumer and the product. Brand promotion ties customers’ feelings 
in particular situations to a distinct brand name. Customers’ attachment is thus not 
created through the experience of using a product but by evoking particular contextual 
memories. Brand managers thus link products to characteristically non-monetary life 
experience (Arvidsson 2006: 13). WAD’s field days were so successful in branding 
the NGO because they created a particular life experience for supporters and tied this 
closely to the organisation’s name. The NGO assembled an entire cultural-rural-
women imaginary around its services which promised its “customers” that “after 
purchase they will reflect in their new self representation” (Mattelart 1991: 195). 
Field days essentialised the meaning of ‘rural women’ in order to speak directly to 
WAD’s main sponsor’s self image as supporting disadvantaged groups and as 
promoting a social market economy (Chanock 2002:26).  
 
WAD’s cultural branding showed that an NGOs’ beneficiaries were customers 
and product at the same time. Rural women paid fees for their training but they were 
also presented as carriers of the cultural diversity that distinguished WAD services 
from those of other NGOs. The organisation itself was the producer of services and 
the product to be sold to the media, to donors and politicians. Those roles were not 
mutually exclusive. It was not the case that WAD was either promoting the cause of 
rural women or trying to sell itself, it could pursue both objectives and the mixture of 
motives is most common amongst (non-profit) organisations (Aldrige 2005:147). 
Activists often claimed to contribute to social development by promoting “their” 
organisation, because only strong NGOs could successfully promote the cause of their 
beneficiaries (Research Notes 23/01/2008). 
 
However, organisations rarely investigated whether there was indeed a close 




NGOs’ successful marketing strategy would be equally appealing to donors and 
beneficiaries. NGOs usually promote two kinds of products to two distinct customer 
groups and this makes it doubtful whether the straightforward adaptation of marketing 
strategies always works for civil society. When NANGOF was reconstituted, hopes 
were high that the new start would enable the umbrella to finally redress its long term 
lack of support amongst members. The assumption was that NANGOF would resolve 
its legitimacy deficit simply by marketing itself more effectively. Since its 
reconstitution, NANGOF has invested considerable resources into raising the level of 
its awareness. One of the first tasks of the new Secretariat was to establish contact 
with civil society organisations nearby, and invite all interested organisations to a 
presentation about the new Trust (Research Notes 06/05/2008). According to 
NANGOF’s director and Board members, the most important task of incoming staff 
was to promote the umbrella. The Board’s chairman said that the umbrella needed to 
advertise its services better, and several NGO representatives urged the umbrella to 
make it clear to civil society organisations what they could gain by joining NANGOF 
(Research Notes 22/07/2008). They seemed to believe that NANGOF had a low 
reputation in civil society because its service had not been sufficiently advertised, and 
the umbrella had failed to create a distinct identity amongst its potential members. 
NANGOF has thus started to distribute an email newsletter every fortnight and has 
published a quarterly magazine from August 2009 onwards. The new Trust has 
recently been launched in a high level public ceremony. All these initiatives served to 
increase the umbrella’s level of public awareness and frequent comments on 
NANGOF’s email service suggested that the umbrella was very successful in doing 
that. However, NANGOF had not really suffered from low levels of awareness. A 
previous funding application stated that one of its greatest strengths was that 
NANGOF is established as a household name in Namibia, recognised even beyond 
civil society (NANGOF 27 June 2004). And indeed a recent survey of civil society 
organisations showed that a majority of organisations were aware that the umbrella 
existed. However, they were still reluctant to become members although most 





How civil society differs from the market  
The two publics 
NANGOF’s increased efforts to market itself did not lead to more trust in the 
umbrella because the service it offered had arguably very little to do with the concerns 
of civil society organisations. In its marketing campaign, NANGOF presented itself as 
enhancing democracy and transparency by promoting civil society organisations and 
by making internal decision making processes clearer to members. This rhetoric stood 
in sharp contrast to what member organisations had seen from the umbrella so far. 
Wide consultations, presented as the main tools to democratise civil society, had not 
taken place. NANGOF consulted only a small number of organisations to establish a 
“civil society” wide position to the government’s partnership policy,263 to draw up the 
people’s budget or to elicit a ‘sector wide’ position on poverty alleviation. The 
organisations that provided input at NANGOF’s consultations were usually well 
connected, with a high public profile and already established close links to NANGOF 
through its Board, through sharing a building or through personal connections. None 
of the “national consultations” so far included organisations based outside of 
Windhoek and none of the civil society wide events attracted representatives of new 
regionally based NGOs.264 Rural organisations were only contacted if the umbrella 
wanted to promote an already defined service like its civil society management 
qualification or the sector’s response to the government’s partnership policy. The 
umbrella has only recently started to gather information from non - Windhoek based 
civic organisations. The first “Civil society organisations baseline survey” points to a 
huge gap between the services NANGOF offers and what civic organisations consider 
to be relevant. The survey makes it clear that regionally based NGOs do not think that 
they needed support e.g. in becoming more transparent or efficient, because they 
considered themselves as already transparent and efficient enough.265 
 
NANGOF’s legitimacy crisis points to more than a mere omission on the part  
of the umbrella. It is indicative of civil society’s fundamental problem of the “two 
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265 Rural organisations awarded themselves 4 out of 5 possible points for organisational structure, 
target group focus and Board performance and thus ranked themselves considerably higher in all 




publics”. What NANGOF and WAD had in common and what distinguished them 
and most civil society organisations from private firms was that their target groups did 
not constitute their revenue basis. Private corporations’ target group and their money 
source were identical. Civil society organisations received their funds from donors, 
but their (stated) target group were the beneficiaries of their projects. The remainder 
of the chapter examines what consequences this division has for NGO practices. It 
does not seek to repeat the traditional argument that donors simply dictate the terms of 
civic engagement, but argues that the separation between recipients and revenue basis 
deeply affects NGOs’ projects. This section uses insights from New Institutional 
Economics theory, especially the idea that economic activity is embedded in actors’ 
multiple networks of strong and weak ties (Amin 2003; Granovetter 1985). These 
different ties provide actors and organisations with certain opportunities while 
precluding others. This section shows that NGOs’ strong ties to donors meant that 
organisations constructed donor demands as dynamic and in need of constant 
attention. Their weak ties to beneficiaries, in contrast, meant that NGOs thought of 
their needs as unchanging, and often their wishes remained unarticulated. Since they 
did not investigate beneficiaries’ demands, organisations could blend them with their 
own goals. 
 
The division of NGOs’ social networks structured NGOs’ entire economic 
activity as New Institutional Economics theory has argued.266 Mark Granovetter 
(1985) has demonstrated that economic actions are inseparably linked to actors’ social 
networks. The combination of strong and weak ties has a significant impact on the 
shape of economic activity, on what counts as ‘rational behaviour’ in transactions267 
and on mechanisms to establish trust as important asset in economic relations. Mark 
Granovetter (1985) argued that trust is created through repeated interaction between 
known partners; the repetition reassures partners that they will not be deceived by 
their counterpart. Strong civil society organisations interact much more regularly with 
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their urban peers and donors than with their projects’ recipients.268 NANGOF did not 
contact rural civic organisations until well into its first year of funding, but has 
maintained a daily contact with its main donor in the years leading up to the funding 
agreement. The small grants funds administrator at the Finnish embassy told me that 
she maintained frequent contact with most civic organisations and knew people there 
quite well.269 Donor agencies with a local representative held regular funding meetings 
with their main recipient NGOs to check on project progress and discuss new ideas. 
Regular interactions between NGOs and their donors meant that donors could have 
confidence in the quality of the service their partner NGOs provided and assured 
NGOs that new project ideas would receive a sympathetic hearing with established 
supporters. In a relationship of trust both partners are assured that the cooperation will 
only come loose in really exceptional circumstances (Granovetter 1985: 496). When 
the Austrian national development agency terminated its support to the Legal 
Assistance Centre’s gender unit the project staff interpreted this as a distinct breach of 
trust between the unit and its donor (Research Notes 09/11/ 2006). 
The close links between NGOs and donors meant that mutual trust was based 
on a high number of interactions and experiences. It also let civic organisations see 
donor demands much more in focus than beneficiaries’ requests. NGOs’ perceptions 
were based on a circular argument: because they paid much closer attention to donor 
demands these appeared as constantly changing and thus requiring further attention. 
Beneficiaries’ demands in contrast were never investigated and could therefore be 
constructed as unchanging and not worthy objects for investigation. 
 
Civil society’s promotional culture 
When NANGOF designed its major funding application it did not ask 
members what they thought an umbrella should be doing. It had spent two years 
negotiating the project with its main donor, but only contacted new and old members 
when the project objectives had already been set. When I suggested a small survey 
amongst prospective members what they thought NANGOF should be doing, the 
interim director dismissed this saying that members will expect NANGOF provide all 
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the suggested services and more, which was not durable under the already agreed 
project objectives. NANGOF’s executive director stated that the umbrella should not 
be demand driven. The secretariat needed to decide what it could offer and announce 
that, rather than trying to meet the different demands of NANGOF members. The 
caution not to be demand driven was based on the assumption that beneficiaries’ 
demands would always be exaggerated and unrealizable whereas donor requirements 
might be unpredictable but at least durable and time-bound. One NGO director said 
that rural communities were, and always would be, hungry. It was dominant donor 
demands that changed and thus dictated the organisation’s changing project designs.270 
 
However, beneficiaries did have concrete and changing demands. NANGOF’s 
members had very specific demands on the umbrella that could not be constructed as 
general and unobtainable needs. They demanded concrete help with finding donors 
and designing project applications; they sought information about other civil society 
organisations from the umbrella and repeatedly asked the umbrella to negotiate 
benefit schemes on the sector’s behalf.  NANGOF responded to these demands only 
selectively. The request to arrange for a sector wide medical aid scheme has been 
acknowledged time and again but so far NANGOF has not contacted relevant donors 
or negotiated with health insurers.271 The umbrella did address the need for better 
information about funding, and commissioned a funding directory which had been 
one of the repeated explicit demands from members. However the directory was not 
part of umbrella’s core activity and could only be published because NANGOF used 
an intern to do the research and draft the directory. Subsequently NANGOF pointed to 
the funding directory to show that the umbrella was indeed responsive to members’ 
demands, a key asset for any organisation claiming to represent civil society. 
NANGOF needed to combine its response to donor demands with concrete proofs that 
its members actively invested in the umbrella, because this support made the 
organisation particularly legitimate in the eyes of its funders. Beneficiaries had thus 
become part of the organisations’ corporate assets in a promotional culture that 
blurred the distinction between content and advertisement. As Alan Alderidge 
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(2005:152-154) shows for British universities, promotional culture redefines target 
groups as the institutions’ competitive assets. Universities have started to see students 
as resources in their competition for state funding. Alderidge argues that universities 
have increasingly blurred the boundaries between advertisers and their products, 
encouraging the state to invest in a particular university instead of promoting the 
specific education it delivers. Similarly NGOs have encouraged donors to fund 
organisations instead of the particular services they render. Funding applications flag 
the specific advantages of the organisation instead of promoting a particular service. 
The Legal Assistance Centre argues for the need to have a public interest law firm 
instead of advocating for example gender sensitive legislation, special legal protection 
of HIV positive people or legal services for conservancies. The Namibian Nature 
Foundation stresses that it has the highest concentration of environmental expertise in 
country, instead of arguing why this expertise important.272 
 
Since members had become part of the NGOs’ corporate asset, they had to fit 
into the overall image the organisations created for themselves, and had to fulfil the 
specific roles the organisations had assigned them. NANGOF and other umbrellas 
presented themselves to donors as facilitating training, enhancing communication and 
ensuring standards. Members were therefore represented as remote, isolated and in 
need of training together with an acute awareness of their deficits and a genuine 
interest to improve. The NANGOF-EC finance agreement states that “a legitimate 
Namibian civil society is rather new and coordination among civil society 
organisations is under-developed” (European Commission 2002:3) and that “both 
CBOs and NGOs are in high need of capacity building interventions [by the umbrella 
and its donor, SH] that address both the knowledge and the financial aspects of 
capacity” (ibid: 4). Tellingly NANGOF also claimed that it needed full-time staff to 
“spread out the principles of accountability, transparency and representativeness” 
(ibid: 6). It thus suggests that it took a fully staffed secretariat to persuade members of 
their real needs. 
NANGOF also suggested that all civic organisations needed specific 
institutional components: mission statements, regular evaluations, a clear governance 
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structure all of which should be made public in the name of transparency and 
accountability. When civic organisations applied for NANGOF membership they had 
to agree that the umbrella could check their policies regularly in order to ensure that 
members complied with the (compulsory) Code of Conduct. NANGOF was no 
exception; most sectoral umbrellas had their own code of ethics in which members 
pledged to let the umbrella evaluate their spending patterns, their human resources 
policies and their project cycle management. NANGOF’s attempt to establish a civil 
society wide self regulation was another example of how the umbrella asserted a 
central role in the constructed need for more transparency.273 
 
 
Conclusion: An incorporated civil society? 
 
How important are the similarities and differences; can civil society 
organisations be described as charitable firms and does civil society essentially 
function like the private sector? The answer might as well be that civic organisations 
function like private firms but that they do so with respect to a different market. New 
Institutional Economics theory argued that markets are embedded practices that are 
structured by actors’ positions in multiple networks (Granovetter 1985; 
Hollingsworth/Boyer 1997). The particular composition of these networks is therefore 
the single most important factor in determining the nature of the market. Network ties 
are the kind of enduring collective forces that shape the economy (Amin 2003:51). 
They determine actors’ choices and what counts as rational in this context. Civil 
society’s rationality is markedly different from private sector’s rationality, because 
NGOs operate in a context of a divided demand structure. Civic organisations thus 
pursue similar objectives to private firms, i.e. they seek to further organisational 
growth and to  promote their own work, but their embeddedness in different networks 
has important consequences for the way they represent their work, how they relate to 




                                          
 




This chapter has proposed to rethink the relation between civil society and the 
market. It has shown that civil society is not merely a sphere of ideas contrasting with 
the market as realm of relations of production and exchange. The chapter’s case 
studies of WAD and NANGOF demonstrated that civic organisations do “produce” 
something; they attempt to tailor their “products” to dominant demands and try hard 
to market them. NGOs’ dependence on donors meant that civic organisations sought 
to tailor their services more to donor than to recipients’ demands. They increasingly 
represented their work in a business language because they felt that this would attract 
more funding from donors who sought to increase the rates of return on their grants. 
The recent idea that civil society’s actions had to be represented in the idiom of the 
market represented a distinct trend towards the commodification of activism. The 
increased commodification of activism was therefore not the result of different 
practices, but was brought about by changes in the way activists represented these 
practices. It shows that organisations only regarded donors as rational choice-making 
independent customers worth targeting. They called for ‘business minds’ to attract 
more funding rather than as a way to mediate between donors and recipients and thus 
to further their accountability vis-à-vis local communities. Activists did not see 
recipients as demand making customers, but as the NGOs’ organisational asset who 
they could use to sell their services better to donors.  
 
This chapter’s case study of the waning support for NANGOF has shown the 
limits of this view. NANGOF encountered a crisis of legitimacy because it presented 
its membership support as the umbrella’s greatest asset, a support that was not 
forthcoming, because NANGOF had never investigated members’ expectations. 
NANGOF’s case makes it highly doubtful whether civic organisations’ self image is 
correct, and that the organisations are indeed closely linked with their target groups 
and advocates of recipients’ demands. It also casts doubt on NGOs’ claim to deliver 
the most needed services efficiently, because it challenges the underlying assumption 
that NGOs know what these services were.  
 
NGOs nevertheless maintained their image as true advocates of communities’ 
needs, because it enabled them to construct a self image as altruistic organisations 
whose work stood in stark contrast to market principles and the selfish pursuit of 




and services given without an immediate return are not necessarily free from an 
utilitarian calculus and thus contrary to market exchanges. NGOs did benefit from 
communities, because they could use them as valuable corporate assets and because 
the dominant image of communities-as-beneficiaries created a clear hierarchy 
between the two sides, an unequal exchange in which the organisations could present 
themselves as the sovereign agent to determine the projects’ design. 
In contrast, relations to donors as customers assumed equality between the two 
sides. NGOs expected to be paid for their due services and saw themselves as donors’ 
equal partners. Grants were thus based on relations of trust between known partners. 
The anthropological literature distinguishes between barter and monetary exchange 
(Humphrey/Hugh Jones 1992: 1-2) Barter as exchange of items that are different in 
kind takes place between free and equal partners and is based on their mutual trust. 
Barter is contextual, because the value of the exchanged items depends on the social 
relations between exchangers. Monetary exchange in contrast replaces the need for 
context with a universally accepted medium and therefore does not presuppose any 
particular relations between exchangers. However, NGOs’ close networks with 
donors show that trust and long personal relations were decisive in their relations to 









The thesis started by asking how we best understand civil society. The 
previous chapters have explored the relationship between the umbrella for Namibian 
NGOs and its members and investigated why NGOs do the things they do. They have 
shown that NGOs systematically prioritised administrative issues at the expense of 
substantial discussions about the purpose and relevance of civil society. This 
prioritisation had a direct impact on NGOs’ definition of accountability, transparency 
and relevance, it structured their relations to external actors, created hierarchies 
between NGOs and gave rise to a fundamental tension between organisations’ ideal 
self image as committed activists and the bureaucratic reality of their work.  
 
NGOs’ systematic bias towards the administrative suggests that the 
disappearance of recipients’ agency from civil society projects was much more than 
mere oversight on the part of the organisations. NGOs’ procedural understanding of 
accountability, their tight integration into administrative networks to donors and their 
focus on the correct form created a self contained system that structurally passed over 
recipients’ demands. NGOs focused on administrative issues because the clear 
standards of protocol offered them concrete evidence of organisational action and 
tangible standards that were much preferable to their projects’ elusive impact on 
recipients. NGOs thus used technicalities to assess their work, to plan future projects 
and to evaluate accountability and good organisational practice.  
 
Administering civil society, creating accountability.  
 
Organisations spent most of their resources on executing administrative tasks 
like writing reports, maintaining databases, preparing audits, administering meetings 
and compiling funding proposals. It was these mundane tasks, rather than any grand 
visions about civil society’s purpose that defined NGOs’ accountability and work 
priorities. These tasks were partly required by donors, but NGOs themselves 
presented them as ‘best practice’ within the sector and often used them to distinguish 






Michael Edwards and David Hulme (1997) have argued that NGOs in Africa 
are too dependent on donors to be able to autonomously define their work agenda. 
According to them the increase in international funding brought about a particularly 
procedural definition of accountability. Donors piled additional layers of bureaucracy 
on top of NGOs’ grassroots projects which distorted the organisations’ original 
calling and the pro-poor agenda of their projects, dissolved their bonds to their 
original constituencies, and turned them into urban middle class professional 
associations. 
 
However, the thesis has demonstrated that NGOs’ procedural understanding of 
accountability and transparency was as much internally generated as externally 
demanded. Rather than being completely determined by donors, NGOs themselves 
sought to demonstrate organisational integrity and accountability through regular 
work reports, through audits and through a formally correct “consultations”. The 
success of any project was redefined as close fit between its proposal and outcome 
and unrelated to its impact in society. Transparency was redefined as proper auditing 
instead of open relations to the recipients. Efficiency was not measured in maximal 
benefit for communities but defined as effective management visible in the timely 
conclusion of projects, in the frequency of stakeholder meetings or the number of 
people trained in NGO workshops.  
 
This particular view turned recipients into organisational assets, with the 
number of project recipients as proof of organisational efficiency. NGOs thus treated 
recipients as resource to demonstrate a high rate of return for donor money.  NGO 
work therefore created a bifurcated network which assumed equality between 
administrative partners and created a hierarchy between organisations and recipients. 
This division turned out to be particularly problematic if recipients’ demands did not 
overlap with the project’s objectives. The thesis has shown that NGO projects could 
be particularly out of touch with recipients’ expectations, a gap that resulted in stalled 
projects and ‘crises of accountability’, defined as the lack of fit between project 
proposal and outcome. 
 
The closer embeddedness of NGOs in administrative networks had a direct 





development which they redefined as the formally correct procedures. Consequently 
they thought that the prime function of the national umbrella body for civic 
organisations was to promote the effective administration of civil society rather than 
to facilitate any substantial debate about the sector’s role. People working in NGOs 
evaluated their own and their peers’ performance through written evidence of civic 
activism, i.e. by assessing whether reports, meeting protocols or grant applications 
followed the correct form and resembled similar kinds of documents (Riles 1998; 
2000).  
 
Inside the NGO box: the self referentiality of bureaucracy 
The thesis has shown how NGO staff themselves systematically prioritised 
instantaneous administrative tasks and neglected more substantial but less immediate 
questions about the value and purpose of civic activism. As agents in their own right 
NGOs evaluated their actions predominantly in relation to administrative standards. 
Staff assessed organisational performance by technical accuracy rather than 
substantial impact. NGOs evaluated the usefulness of documents with reference to 
formal aspects and their fit with preceding documentations (Riles 1998; Reed 
2006:171). Civil society wide meetings generated above all more meetings instead of 
promoting NGOs’ networks with recipients or a better coordination of civil society 
projects. Funding management was above all concerned with an exact correlation 
between a project’s proposal and its final report. Accountability was defined as 
following the correct procedures to spend the grant in the designated manner and was 
not defined as the impact the project had on recipients. Civic activism therefore 
resembled the “network” in Riles definition as “set of institutions, (...) practices and 
artifacts that internally generate the effects of their own reality by reflecting on 
themselves” (2000:3).  
 
 
The disappearance of recipients’ agency from civil society’s project was 
therefore neither mere oversight nor an intentional disregard on the part of NGOs. The 
organisations’ procedural understanding of accountability, their close links to donors 
and their focus on formality created a self referential system that only marginally 
acknowledged recipients’ demands. The internal closure of dominant NGO practices 





(2000) demonstrated that networking between women’s NGOs in Fiji constituted a 
closed system without any direct relation to the outside. Dorothea Hilhorst (2003:10) 
argued that dominant discourses about and in Philippine NGOs resulted in a particular 
understanding of their work and silenced alternative ideas about their role. By contrast 
the thesis has shown that ideological discourses about NGOs had only marginal 
impact on NGO practices rather than defining them directly. 
 
  
The practice of doing good: Tension between aspiration and reality 
The primacy of the administrative is certainly not particular to civil society 
and classical organisational theory argued that an efficient administration and a 
rational bureaucracy distinguished organisations from other forms of collectives 
(March/Simon 1993). However, NGOs had long grappled with unrealistic 
expectations on their work. Lester Salamon for instance called the rise of NGOs an 
“associational revolution to deliver human services, promote grassroots economic 
development, prevent environmental degradation, protect civil rights and pursue a 
thousand other objectives formerly unattended or left to the state” (1994:1). 
Salamon’s representation fits in a long tradition of presenting NGOs as issue driven 
activists which created tension between what NGOs aspired to be and the reality of 
their daily work that was mostly concerned with administrative tasks. This tension 
also had a profound impact on NGOs’ relations to donors, private corporations and 
the state. Civic organisations often collaborated closely with state agencies, but were 
reluctant to acknowledge this cooperation due to the dominant idea that state - civil 
society relations were antagonistic. In their relations to the private sector NGOs were 
often caught between their admiration for an idealised version of “the market” and 
their caution to distinguish themselves from private corporations who in their opinion 
lacked NGOs’ activist zeal. Lastly in their relations to donors civic organisations 
often faced the dilemma of showcasing grassroots activism to attract funding and at 
the same time emphasising bureaucratic diligence to ensure the sustainable flow of 
resources. 
 
Civil society is not a homogenous sector. Reporting, networking and 
marketing in well-equipped organisations had more in common with dominant 





civil society. Stephen Ndegwa (1996) showed that Kenyan NGOs were divided 
according to class, ethnicity and locale and Gerald Clarke (2002) made a related 
argument for civil society in India. The thesis finds that one important factor 
differentiating civic organisations was their exact position in administrative networks 
and their distinct internal administrations. Since technicalities played such a major 
role in defining NGO work, those organisations with strong internal bureaucracies and 
consolidated administrative partnerships were in a much better position to survive or 
even grow than those organisations with weak administrative ties. The thesis therefore 
questions a presumed natural affinity between distinct NGOs and challenges the idea 
that NGOs have automatically more in common with their peers than with institutions 
in other sectors.  
 
The consequences of technicalities: NGOs’ agency 
The thesis includes important lessons for our understanding of civil society in 
African development more generally. The division between image and reality of civic 
activism and the priority given to the sector’s day-to-day administration also defines 
which analytical questions can reasonably be asked to understand the meaning of civil 
society. The primacy of protocol in civic activism shows that NGOs were agents in 
their own right but in contexts that were shaped by external demands. Civic 
organisations were not necessarily mediators between grassroots on the one side and 
donors and states on the other. They could use their room for manoeuvre between 
donor demands and state constraints to define their own agenda, but in doing so they 
had to factor in external constraints and expectations. Analytical questions about 
NGOs’ agency therefore need to explore the factors that influence the ways in which 
NGOs define their own work.  
 
Managerialism determined NGOs relations with donors, peers and government 
agencies. Here ideas about proper protocol, about ‘accountability and transparency’, 
and about the correct accounting and high profile structured NGOs ideas about proper 
civic activism.  In contrast recipients stood aloof from NGOs’ concerns. NGO staff 
saw civic organisations as distributors of charity to “beneficiaries” whose needs were 
not seen as location of struggles over the meaning of civic activism. NGO agency was 
defined by their conviction that they instinctively knew recipients’ demands which 





potential gap between recipients’ requests and their projects’ objectives and 
consequently did not see any need to broker between them (pace Mosse 2006:15). In 
accordance with NGOs’ preoccupation with technicalities they represented any 
conflict between organisational objectives and recipients’ demands as result of faulty 
implementation and thus as technical shortcoming that could be redressed by an 
improved administration. 
 
The thesis’ findings about NGO agency and their systematic prioritisation of 
protocol are generally applicable, but other conclusions are arguably specific to a 
strong state like Namibia. Michael Bratton (1989) has argued that political factors 
determine whether states are accommodating or hostile to NGOs. The more secure a 
regime is the more tolerant it seems to be towards NGOs. Echoing this argument 
NGO staff in Namibia said that working in a democratic stable state meant that civic 
organisations regarded the government as a partner rather than as threat. However, the 
thesis also qualifies Bratton’s argument by showing that strong states also have 
increased possibilities to control civil society. The Namibian state delineated the 
space for civic activism through specific legislation, through particular registration 
requirements and through its national development plans that determined which 
projects were eligible for international funding. State agencies also often competed 
with NGOs for international grants and thus diverted some of civil society’s most 
important source of revenue from the sector.  State employment provided a viable and 
often better paid alternative for NGO staff. This meant that civil society organisations 
had to constantly compete for professional employees with other sectors that could 
offer better and more secure terms of employment. This situation is quite exceptional 
in Africa where NGOs usually offer higher salaries, more benefits and better job 
prospects compared to local jobs. This qualifies the argument that NGOs provide 
opportune career choices for ex-civil servants (Mercer 2002: 14). 
 
 
NGOs concentrate on the technicalities of their work because any proof of 
organisational action beyond the concrete realm of bureaucracy is so difficult to 
establish. Their focus on bureaucracy promotes a particularly technocratic 
understanding of NGOs’ role in development and shift struggles over meaning into 





dominant development discourses of their environment, but they reformulate and thus 
actively shape these ideas by administering the everyday in civic activism. Exploring 
how civil society works rather than assessing whether it works (Mosse 2005: 8) 
demonstrates that NGO work is locally shaped but organisations constantly redefine 
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Appendix I List of Interviews 
Date Interviewee’s position/ Organisation Location 
22/08/ 2002 
 





AIDS Law Unit Coordinator/Legal Assistance 
Centre  
Windhoek 
27/08/2002 ex-Director/Legal Assistance Centre/Legal 
Assistance Centre, 
Windhoek 
20/09/2002 Gender Unit Coordinator/Legal Assistance Centre Windhoek 
24/09/ 2002. 
 
Land and Environment Project Coordinator/Legal 
Assistance Centre, 
Windhoek 
27/09/ 2002 Librarian/Legal Assistance Centre Windhoek 
26/10/2006 Focus group interview Legal Assistance Centre Windhoek 
6/11/2006  Country Director GTZ Windhoek 
13/11/2006  NGO & HIV/Aids Programme Officer Delegation of 
the European Commission to Namibia 
Windhoek 
09/11/2006. Country Director Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Windhoek 
 21/11/2006 Interview Program Officer Embassy of Finland Windhoek 
23/11/ 2006 USAID Country Representative Windhoek 
 01/12/2006 Country Director Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Windhoek 
 21/05/2008 BWS National coordinator, Windhoek 
10/06/2008 Chairman of the NANGOF Board of 
Trustees/NANGOF 
Windhoek 
12/06/2008. Country Director Project Hope, Windhoek 
24/06/2008 National Coordinator/Namibian Association of 
CBNRM support organisations 
Windhoek 
17/07/2008. Civil Society Help Desk Officer/ National Planning 
Commission, 
Windhoek 
18/07/ 2008 Director /Legal Assistance Centre, Windhoek 
 
